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her book is: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. The Quest for Good Governance. How Societies Develop Control of Corruption.
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in the Global Corruption Barometer 2017 document [1]:
there is a list of 5 countries labeled "PLACES WHERE THE PUBLIC SECTOR IS PERCEIVED TO BE LEAST CORRUPT":
and a page "PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO PAID A BRIBE WHEN THEY CAME INTO CONTACT WITH A PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE 12 LAST MONTHS*" where countries are divided into brackets, less than 5% (eg Germany), 5 to 10% (eg Italy), 10 to 15%, 15 to 20%, 20 to 30%, 30% to 40%, 40 to 50%, 50-75%, and 75%+. The countries in 'less than 5%' are (note: neither the US nor Switzerland appears on the list in ANY bracket in this report; in the 2013 report both of theose countries are in the 5-9.9% bracket):
in the 2013 report [4]:
" Key Findings
...
• Bribery is widespread Overall, more than one in four people (27 per cent) report having paid a bribe in the last 12 months when interacting with key public institutions and services.
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Public institutions entrusted to protect people suffer the worst levels of bribery Among the eight services evaluated, the police and the judiciary are seen as the two most bribery- prone. An estimated 31 per cent of people who came into contact with the police report having paid a bribe. For those interacting with the judiciary, the share is 24 per cent.
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The democratic pillars of societies are viewed as the most corrupt Around the world, political parties, the driving force of democracies, are perceived to be the most corrupt institution.
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Recommendations
((note: since my purpose here is the design of institutions, i didn't include the 'people should..' bullet points))
Hold the corrupt to account • • All governments must work to end impunity by effectively preventing, detecting, investigating, prosecuting and punishing acts of corruption. • • Elected public officials should not enjoy immunity when charged with corruption offences.
Clean-up democratic processes • • Governments should pass and implement laws on making party financing transparent, including requirements for political parties, political candidates and their donors to publicly disclose donations. • • Parliaments should adopt comprehensive codes of conduct for members, including guidance on conflict of interest situations and rules for disclosure of assets, interests and income. • • Parliaments should introduce mandatory registers of lobbyists.
Give people the tools and protections to fight against corruption • • Governments should pass and implement whistleblower laws. These laws should include appropriate follow up mechanisms to allow people to report wrongdoing in the public and private sectors and protect whistleblowers from retribution. • • Governments should seek to provide people with effective mechanisms to report corruption and get redress. • • Governments should enable independent civil society organisations to function as effective watchdogs of government and to help people to hold public officials to account. "
"% OF RESPONDENTS WHO REPORT HAVING PAID BRIBES IN THE PAST YEAR TO ANY ONE OF EIGHT SERVICES BY COUNTRY/TERRITORY 11 "
<5% AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, (also in <5% in 2017 report) CANADA, (not in 2017 report) CROATIA, (in 10-15% in 2017 report) DENMARK, (not in 2017 report) FINLAND, (not in 2017 report) GEORGIA, (in 5-10% in 2017 report) JAPAN, KOREA (SOUTH) (also in <5% in 2017 report) MALAYSIA, (20-30% in 2017 report)) MALDIVES, (not in 2017 report) NEW ZEALAND, (not in 2017 report) NORWAY, (not in 2017 report) PORTUGAL, SPAIN, (also in <5% in 2017 report) URUGUAY (20-30% in 2017 report)
5-9.9% bulgaria (in 5-10% in 2017 report), estonia (in 5-10% in 2017 report), italy (in 5-10% in 2017 report), slovenia in <5% in 2017 report), switzerland (not in 2017 report except as top 5 least corrupt perception), united kingdom (in <5% in 2017 report), united states (not in 2017 report)
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so countries which scored less than 5% in both the 2013 and 2017 Global Corruption Barometer reports:
and countries which are not on the above list but scored less than 5% in one year, or were in the top 5 perceived least corrupt list, and either not present or in 5-10% in the other year:
top 23 from the http://integrity-index.org/ (cutoff at 23 chosen because that's the lowest position of any country that was either <5% in both the 2013 and 2017 Global Corruption Barometer reports, or was in the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer top 5 perceived least corrupt list:
" Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perception Index or CPI, which tracks government bribes, kickbacks, embezzlement, and other forms of public corruption. Topping the list as the world's least corrupt nation is Denmark, followed by New Zealand, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, and Canada" [5]
note: Singapore is not in the integrity-index.org list at all, nor is it in the Global Corruption Barometer for either 2013 or 2017
note: Japan is in the Global Corruption Barometer in both 2013 and 2017 but not in the integrity-index.org list at all
the lowest rank of any of those other 5 (Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Canada) in the integrity-index.org list is Canada, at 14. In the 2013 and 2017 Global Corruption Barometers, all of those other 5 had <5% in one report year and were not present in the other report year. Sweden is the only one of those 5 in the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer top 5 perceived least corrupt list.
so, some countries that appear to be models of anti-corruption include:
in short: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Germany, Canada, Australia.
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if you put those 8 countries into internet search engines, what else comes up?
"What is the Best Country in the World? An Index of Morality, Conscience and Good Life
The Social and Moral Development Index is a compilation of relevant statistics on a wide range of issues which are put into a database-driven formula which calculates points per country. The country's overall score is an average of all the datasets that a country appears in.
... --- The Best ---1 Pos. Higher is better Points1 1 Iceland 84.3 2 Sweden 81.7 3 Norway 80.9 4 Denmark 80.4 5 Finland 79.8 6 Belgium 79.4 7 New Zealand 79.0 8 Luxembourg 78.6 9 Switzerland 78.4 10 Germany 78.2 ...
The Criteria (Year) Winners
Human Development (UN) (informational) (2015) Norway, Australia, Switzerland
Overall Life Satisfaction (informational) (2011) Denmark, Netherlands, Norway
Environmental Performance (2011) Iceland, Switzerland, Costa Rica
Forest Area Change 1990-2015 (2015) Iceland, Bahrain, Uruguay
Global Peace Index (2012) Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark
Charitability (2013-6) Myanmar, USA, New Zealand
Corruption Perception Index (2012-6) Denmark,New Zealand, Finland
Religion Importance (2009) Estonia, Sweden, DenmarkThe Criteria: Health (Year) Winners
Adolescent Birth Rate (2015) N. Korea, S. Korea, Switzerland
Alcohol Consumption (2010) 4-country draw
Infant Vaccinations (2011-5) Hungary, China, Uzbekistan
Fertility Rates (2012) N. Korea, Brunei, St.Vincent & Gren.
Life Expectancy (2015) Hong Kong, Japan, Italy
Smoking Rates (2015) Guinea, Solomon Islands, KiribatiThe Criteria: Human Rights & Equality (Year) Winners
Antisemitism (2014) Laos, Philippines, Sweden
Gay Rights and Equality (2013) Netherlands, Belgium, Canada
Nominal Commitment to Human Rights (2009) Argentina, 12-country draw
Personal, Civil and Economic Freedom (2014) Hong Kong, Switzerland, New Zealand
Slavery (2013) Joint: UK, Ireland, Iceland
Women Stand for Election & Vote (1893+) New Zealand, Australia, Finland
Gender Inequality (2015) Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands
Press Freedom Index (2013) Finland, Netherlands, NorwayThe Criteria: Modernity (Year) Winners
Freedom On The Net (2012) Estonia, USA, Germany
Internet Users in Population (2017) Iceland, Norway, Bermuda
IPv6 Uptake (2017) Belgium, Germany, Switzerland
Malware and Email Spam (2010-2)
Research & Development (2016) S.Korea, Israel, Japan" -- [6]" The Top 10 Happiest Countries: Country Happiness Rank Overall Best Countries Rank Finland 1 14 Norway 2 12 Denmark 3 11 Iceland 4 N/A Switzerland 5 1 Netherlands 6 10 Canada 7 2 New Zealand 8 13 Sweden 9 6 Australia 10 7 " -- [7]
denmark sweden norway netherlands finland
" Here's a list of the countries that allow women in front-line combat positions. In Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. Elsewhere: Australia, Canada and New Zealand in the Anglosphere; plus Eritrea, Israel, and North Korea. " [9]
Countries With the Best Quality of Life
| US News Best ... |
Countries That Allow Gay Marriage Around The World
| … |
The 10 happiest countries on Earth
Map: Which countries allow women in front-line combat
World Happiness Report: Finland Lands No. 1, United
umm.. so basically countries that are lowest in corruption are also high in happiness, quality of life, and gender equality. So it's unclear where the causation is; when a country is happy and has gender equality, does corruption go away? Or is low corruption a necessary condition for happiness and equality? Or is there some other factor that causes both low corruption and happiness and equality?
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The Organization must keep track of events where employees who have been found to give incorrect testimony in cases between the Organization and another entity, and provide Tribunals of these records along with that employee's testimony in future cases.
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in terms of the idea of some organizations 'recognizing' others, should probably also think about terms like 'ambassador' and 'consul'. Although we aim towards organizing private organizations, not states, there may be some ideas that we can use there.
" There can be only one ambassador from one country to another, representing the first country's head of state to that of the second, and his or her duties revolve around diplomatic relations between the two countries; however, there may be several consuls, one in each of several main cities, providing assistance with bureaucratic issues to both the citizens of the consul's own country traveling or living abroad and to the citizens of the country in which the consul resides who wish to travel to or trade with the consul's country. "
" In Classical Greece, some of the functions of the modern consul were fulfilled by a proxenos. Unlike the modern position, this was a citizen of the host polity (in Greece, a city state). The proxenos was usually a wealthy merchant who had socio-economic ties with another city and who helped its citizens when they were in trouble in his own city. The position of proxenos was often hereditary in a particular family. Modern honorary consuls fulfill a function that is to a degree similar to that of the ancient Greek institution. "
"As such, diplomatic personnel with other responsibilities may receive consular letters patent (commissions). Aside from those outlined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, there are few formal requirements outlining what a consular official must do. For"
" Letters patent (always in the plural) are a type of legal instrument in the form of a published written order issued by a monarch, president, or other head of state, generally granting an office, right, monopoly, title, or status to a person or corporation "
[11] : "
Consular officers, being nominally more distant from the politically sensitive aspects of diplomacy, can more easily render a wide range of services to private citizens, enterprises, et cetera. They may be more numerous since diplomatic missions are posted only in a nation's capital, while consular officials are stationed in various other cities as well.
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Ranks The current system of diplomatic ranks was established by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).[1] There are three ranks, two of which remain in use: "
"The body of diplomats accredited to a country form the Diplomatic corps. Ambassadors have precedence over chargés, and precedence within each rank is determined by the date on which diplomatic credentials were presented.[3] The longest-serving ambassador is the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, who speaks for the entire diplomatic corps on matters of diplomatic privilege and protocol. In many Catholic countries, the papal nuncio is always considered the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps."
" Historical ranks, 1815–1961
The ranks established by the Vienna Convention (1961) modify a more elaborate system of ranks that was established by the Congress of Vienna (1815):[4]
Ambassadors, Legates, and Nuncios were personal representatives of their sovereign.
Envoys and Ministers represented their government, and were accredited to the receiving sovereign.
Ministers resident formed an intermediate class, between ministers and chargés. This rank was created by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818)[5]
Chargés d'affaires were accredited by their Foreign Minister to the receiving Foreign Minister."
" n modern diplomatic practice, there are a number of diplomatic ranks below Ambassador. Since most missions are now headed by an ambassador, these ranks now rarely indicate a mission's (or its host nation's) relative importance, but rather reflect the diplomat's individual seniority within their own nation's diplomatic career path and in the diplomatic corps in the host nation:
Ambassador (High Commissioner in Commonwealth missions to other Commonwealth countries); ambassador at large
Minister
Minister-Counsellor
Master
Counsellor
First Secretary
Second Secretary
Third Secretary
Attaché
Assistant AttachéThe term "attaché" is used for any diplomatic agent who does not fit in the standard diplomatic ranks, often because they are not (or were not traditionally) members of the sending country's diplomatic service or foreign ministry, and were therefore only "attached" to the diplomatic mission.
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Multilateral diplomacy
Furthermore, outside this traditional pattern of bilateral diplomacy, as a rule on a permanent residency basis (though sometimes doubling elsewhere), certain ranks and positions were created specifically for multilateral diplomacy:
An ambassador-at-large is equivalent of an ambassador and assigned specific tasks or region in which he is assigned various assignments aimed at multi track diplomacy.
A permanent representative is the equivalent of an ambassador, normally of that rank, but accredited to an international body (mainly by member—and possibly observer states), not to a head of state.
A resident representative (or sometimes simply representative) is also a member of the diplomatic corps, but is below the rank of ambassador. A representative is accredited by an international organization (generally a United Nations agency, or a Bretton Woods institution) to a country's government. The resident representative typically heads the country office of that international organization within that country.
A special ambassador is a government's specialist diplomat in a particular field, not posted in residence, but often traveling around the globe.
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is an ambassador of Cabinet rank, in charge of U.S. delegations in multilateral trade negotiations (since 1962). The USTR's Special Agricultural Negotiator also typically holds an ambassadorial appointment."
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article from Economist:
" African governance: Law comes first
Botswana is rated best on the continent in rule of law and governance, again Middle East and Africa Jun 3rd 2015
THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT Rule of Law index, a new global report that ranks countries’ adherence to the rule of law, puts Botswana in the top spot for Africa. The country's chief justice, Maruping Dibotelo (pictured at left, with President Ian Khama), was probably not surprised: the diamond-rich southern state has been regarded for decades as among the best-run on the continent. Botswana also placed near the top in the latest Index of African Governance, published annually by Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese-British telecoms magnate. That guide uses a broader set of criteria going beyond matters of law. While Botswana did not clinch the top spot in Mr Ibrahim's survey, last published in 2014, it was beaten only by the tiny island states of Mauritius and Cape Verde. On the mainland, Botswana was first. Indeed, on a global scale, the World Justice Project (WJP) report puts Botswana 31st out of the 102 countries measured, one spot behind Italy and two ahead of Greece.
...
The WJP report, issued in Washington, counts 18 African countries among those it measures, and uses eight yardsticks to assess how the rule of law is experienced. It seeks to measure constraints on government powers; corruption; the openness of government; fundamental rights; order and security; enforcement of regulations; civil justice; and criminal justice. Mr Ibrahim’s index covers a wider geographical range, including all but three of Africa’s 55 countries, and applies a broader set of criteria. It lumps political participation and human rights into a single category. It also measures safety and the rule of law, sustainable economic opportunity and human development, thus putting greater emphasis on prosperity.
In the WJP index, Ghana comes a notable second, while in the Ibrahim index it places seventh. That marks it out as west Africa’s most creditable country in both listings. Another strong performer is Senegal, which comes an admirable fourth in the law index and ninth in Mr Ibrahim’s table.
Middle East and Africa Jun 3rd 2015 "
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Separate the Forum and the annual meeting. In meeting, default everyone's proxy to the board (ie default unless they specify a different proxy), and require board to vote its proxies the way the vote would have gone without them.
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some remaining issues:
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perhaps we could write theorems on the resistance of this government system to various sorts of attacks
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we forbid the Board floor from deciding who chair committees based on majority vote to prevent the majority party organizations from controlling committees in a top-down manner.
To do this, we also have to prevent the Board floor from ignoring the committees. Here's an idea:
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maybe just simplify committee chairmanship to always seniority
we also have to decide how committee assignments are determined, and decide if seniority is per-committee or for the whole organization.
the way the US senate does it sounds good. From wikipedia, "Seniority in the United States Senate":
"Senators are given preferential treatment in choosing committee assignments based on seniority. Seniority on a committee is based on length of time serving on that committee, which means a senator may rank above another in committee seniority but be more junior in the full Senate."
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should we let ELECTORS, not just Boardmembers, be in committees?
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y'know, my argument for having 0,1,2 (default 0) instead of the more intuitive -1,0,1 (default 0) was that it would reduce negative campaigning.
BUT... look at the M.O of some contemporary candidates. They say things that are outrageous to people who wouldn't vote for them anyways so as to get publicity. "There is no such thing as bad publicity". 0,1,2 makes this strategy more attractive: with 0,1,2 a candidate's main problem might be to get people who might like em to recognize their name; if something you do makes people who won't vote for you anyways hate you, there's nothing they can do, because the default vote is already the lowest vote they could give you. Note that candidates sometime says negative things about opponents, not to persuade their supporters to dislike them, but just to garner more publicity -- this would still be profitable under the 0,1,2 regime.
This accords with my vague impression from other sources that allowing negative votes is thought to promote moderation by allowing voters to punish immoderate candidates.
So, maybe switch to -1,0,1.
This also has the chance virtue of according with my 'triscore voting' procedure, which demands -1s.
I made the change in concordBylaws.
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jjoonathan 12 hours ago [-]
How about having a mechanism to allow the opposition to vote on a secondary name which will be included alongside the primary name in official correspondence?
Yes, it will degrade into "Bill to Save America / Bill to Destroy America" most of the time, but that's the point: it makes the absurdity easy to spot and difficult to ignore.
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airstrike 7 hours ago [-]
This is actually an amazing idea.
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recruit
also a good discussion in general: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17205357#17208412
excalibur 4 hours ago
| unvote [-] |
This is a great start, but there's room for improvement. What if we could scale it up to roughly one representative per 10K constituents AND have each constituent represented by someone whose views closely resemble their own?
This is possible if you eliminate congressional districts altogether and have people "subscribe" to a representative. It removes the problem of a single congressman "trying" to represent constituents with widely disparate views equally, and abolishes gerrymandering in the process.
maxxxxx 6 hours ago | unvote [-]
Sounds like an interesting idea. In the end the US needs a system where if a party gets a certain percentage of votes it gets some level of representation in Congress. For example in the 90s Ross Perot got 18% of votes but these voters got 0 percent representation anywhere. This is just extremely unhealthy. The extreme partisanship would get reduced quickly if there were some people in Congress who would vote with one of the big parties one and then with the other another time.
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clarkevans 49 days ago
| parent [-] | on: Both in rich and poor countries, universal health ... |
Regarding "violent coersion of the state", by this, I assume you mean.. taxes.
At this point in the world's history, we are not individuals who can wander off into the wilderness on our own, to live and die as God might have intended. We are members of a vast, global social fabric. We benefit from it. We pay into it. There's no way to avoid the coersion/evils or really deny the benefits/goods that this society provides. We can only discuss things relatively speaking, on a whole, in balance.
I think a productive use of our time is thinking about (and experimenting with) how information technology could better support our emerging social fabric so that we could make the best collective decisions: that is, enable even more personal freedom.
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consider again having all 3 chairs co-chair the Board via voting
consider again having board subcommittees whose membership and/or chairs are selected via the triscore, and consider having them have 3 co-chairs
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some ppl argue that supreme courts should have even, rather than odd, numbers. This would allow us to have only 6 procedural tribunal judges instead of 9, which significantly reduces the burden on small organizations. But, it also means that a majority decision is also a 2/3s decision, whereas currently we have some special powers that require 2/3s.
In addition, whereas for substantive matters i think it's fine for a supreme court to tie (which means that appeals are not overturned), since this is a procedural tribunal which is the court of first (and last) instance for procedural matters, a tie means it's hard to resolve procedural issues that really do need an answer. Otoh we currently have a thing in there that says that the chairs (as a group) vote to break ties on the procedural tribunal, which i guess is good.
also those 2/3 powers of the procedural tribunal add to complexity, and i'm thinking of taking them out anyhow.
otoh having appelate ties means that different original jurisdiction panels of judges might come to different understandings of the law, which means that forum shopping/venue shopping becomes more important, which is bad.
also having the Chairs get frequently involved to break procedural ties further gives 'positive' powers to the Chairs, which takes away their focus on the 'negative' powers. But it's not as bad as giving them powers over substantive matters, if we also amend their tie-breaking power to restrict it to only situations where the Procedural Tribunal has original jurisdiction, that is to say, procedural matters.
hmm.. all in all, i think i'd rather have every decision decided (no ties)... but i think that maybe reducing the burden on small organizations is more important than that.
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on arbitration
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mb have something like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Question_time
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" For example a tribal system of hunter-gatherers needs to gather food from the external world by hunting animals and gathering other goods. They need to have a set of goals and a system to make decisions about such things as when to migrate to better hunting grounds. The tribe also needs to have a common belief system that enforces actions and decisions as the community sees fit. Finally there needs to be some kind of educational system to pass on hunting and gathering skills and the common belief system. If these prerequisites are met, the tribe can sustain its existence. " [12]
mb let the chair have both the first and the last word in a debate on whether to overrturn the chair's ruling (appeal from decision of chair)
rro apparently does this [13]
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Read the rest of 2013 Global corruption barometer report, start at page 12
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read chapter 10 of http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/The_Dictators_Handbook.pdf which talks about how to prevent authoritarianism
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mb just define supermajority as >= 60%, instead of either the complicated thing in the current bylaws, or 2/3s. Mb leave 2/3s in there just for bylaw amendment.
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recruit
here's some ppl who care about procedure:
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/373430-the-demise-of-debate-in-congress https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/healthy-congress-index-signs-of-progress-on-appropriations/ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/policy-gridlock-it-the-new-regular-order author Donald Wolfensberger and also: Political scientist Barbara Sinclair Former House Parliamentarian Charles Johnson https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/01/06/in-the-senate-promises-and-perils-of-regular-order/ author Siobhan Hughes https://www.npr.org/2017/07/26/539358654/what-is-the-regular-order-john-mccain-longs-to-return-to-on-health-care author Ron Elving (also has a great video series) playlist for his 'office hours' videos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4UGCrI37p8&list=PLp-wXwmbv3z-pSC15WHqo9sviHS0Uyj5K&index=19 here's his other articles (most of them are just about current events, not procedural matters): https://www.npr.org/people/1930203/ron-elving https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/olympia-snowe-a-return-to-order-in-congress-means-changing-the-rules/2017/09/04/d2dcc350-8f5f-11e7-9c53-6a169beb0953_story.html?utm_term=.38217558855c Olympia Snowe https://gai.georgetown.edu/the-senates-return-to-regular-order/ Josh Huder https://www.rstreet.org/2015/10/08/could-the-modern-senate-manage-an-open-amendment-process/ writing about the study: https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/RSTREET42.pdf by Anthony J. Madonna and Kevin Kosar
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interesting analysis
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/policy-gridlock-it-the-new-regular-order
In a Boston University Law Review article, Sinclair argues that the “much maligned partisan polarization” stemming from “the strengthening and internal homogenization of the political parties ... has made possible the development of a strong and more activist party leadership that allows the majority to work its will.”
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But, on balance, Sinclair sees the partisan sorting that has taken place in Congress as being beneficial to the institution because it has produced a system that is more open, inclusive, accountable and expeditious (at least in the House, to the majority party caucus).
She concedes, however, that this change has entailed costs — namely the loss of a committee system once characterized by expertise, deliberation, bipartisan harmony and productivity. That was consciously replaced by Democrats in the 1970s because the bipartisanship that existed on committees did not always reflect the majority will of the Democratic Caucus.
This new partisanship did not start with Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), as some have recently argued. He only pushed the accelerator.
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The three prerequisites Johnson notes as essential to restoring some measure of regular order are a participatory and deliberative committee system that aims to develop good policy, a more open amendment process on the House floor and a return to conference committees to resolve differences. He says all of these could technically be done tomorrow by the leadership through the Rules Committee.
What stands in the way, of course, is what Sinclair points to: the will of the majority party to have its way. And that way is all about getting re-elected and retaining majority status. The majority does not trust the minority to behave as rational, responsible actors if allowed to fully participate.
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In 1913, when House Republicans complained about the procedural abuses of the Democrats’ “King Caucus,” Speaker Champ Clark (D-Mo.) responded: “The people of the United States ... are much more interested in results than in the methods by which those results are obtained.”
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https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/01/06/in-the-senate-promises-and-perils-of-regular-order/
" He’s clearly calculating that the advantages will outweigh the risks.
Among those risks: putting some of his own members -- many of whom are up for re-election in 2016 – on the spot with tough votes. Democrats now in the minority can also make mischief by tying votes on partisan priorities to bills that Republicans consider priorities.
The minority party can offer amendment after amendment in a way that starts to feel abusive, said Tom Daschle, a South Dakota Democrat who served as Senate majority leader in 2001 and 2002.
“The open amendment process used to be how things worked,” Mr. Daschle said. “I think to the extent to which Republicans believe that both sides are not abusing the opportunity I think it will last. I’m skeptical about whether it can last very long.” "
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" Regular order might also be called "doing things the old-fashioned way." The way you heard about Congress in school. A bill is proposed to the body. Leadership assigns it to a committee, or more than one. Then the chairman of the committee decides whether to consider it and when. Public hearings are scheduled in coordination with the ranking (most senior) member of the opposition party on that committee.
After the hearings, the chairman brings forward a version of the bill he or she likes and schedules a "markup" to consider amendments. The members of the committee from both parties offer amendments, debate them and vote on them.
If the committee likes the amended bill enough to approve it, the next step is floor consideration. The gateway to the floor is a "motion to proceed," which, in recent times, has often been filibustered.
To beat the filibuster, leaders in both parties have fallen back on the budget reconciliation process, which cannot be filibustered. Reconciliation was intended for strictly fiscal measures that kept the government operating, but it has been used more creatively to pass measures that stretch the original boundaries.
That was the case for the Democrats desperate to pass budget additions to Obamacare in 2010, and it's the case now for Republicans desperate to repeal it.
Such use of reconciliation can defeat the filibuster tactic but at the price of destroying the last vestiges of bipartisanship. And the consensus-building that was once the hallmark of the Senate. Just ask John McCain?.
If the Senate was to return to regular order, in theory, the last step of the process would be a floor vote to be decided by a majority. Then if the House has passed its own version of the bill, there's a conference between House and Senate to make sure their versions are the same.
Then it goes to the president for the signature that enacts it into law.
That's regular order. In practical terms, regular order is slow and tends to get bogged down. In practical terms, it may mean processing an idea to death or talking a bill to death.
That was why, when it came to repealing Obamacare, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell? decided to short-circuit the process and have a special task force instead. And that task force produced a bill, which McConnell? and the other leaders have massaged and fixed up and tried to get a majority of the Senate to accept. "
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interesting discussion on seniority:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftoKx1btN_8
" seniority has worked especially well as an overall power strategy for the southern states as they made a comeback after the Civil War in the reconstruction period by electing people in their youth and keeping them until they were quite elderly they could guarantee they would hold committee chairmanships, lots of them, in fact, at one point the state of Texas controlled roughly half of the important committee chairmanships in the House of Representatives
in the mid-1970s partly in reaction to that Texas domination Democrats decided they would start voting for their committee chairs rather than strictly going by seniority. as a practical matter the senior member usually still gets elected chairman of each committee when the Democrats are in the majority and elected to what's called the ranking minority slot. when the Democrats are in the minority Republicans to have experimented with limits on seniority what they have done is to set six-year term limits on full committee chairs, that in the house has encouraged some of those chairs to retire after they lose their gavel, but on the Senate side they just moved from chairing one major committee to chairing a different major committee and the next most senior Republican takes over "
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another interesting point is that
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XiRB7ys2oOY
and
claim that, by reducing the cloture vote from 2/3 to 60%, and also by introducing a multitrack system so that the filibuster did not bring to a stop all business in the Senate but only held up that particular bill, filibusters stopped being seen as a weighty thing to only be used as a last resort, and started to be used all the time
(that is, the practical difference between a filibuster and a supermajority voting threshold became less)
according to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XiRB7ys2oOY , filibusters used to be seen as something to be used only once or twice in one's career
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" Sen. John McCain? (R-Ariz.) was right in his Sept. 1 Washington Forum essay, "A charge to my fellow members of Congress," to call for a return to regular order in Congress. Getting there will require a reorientation of Congress's system of rules, procedures and precedents to focus again on the idea of true deliberation — especially at a moment when more than half of the members of Congress have not served in the institution long enough to remember a time when it did function.
Regular order yields real benefits both for the legislative process and comity in Congress. A more open amendment process is critical, as amendments are indispensable bridge-builders to bipartisanship and ensuring both parties have a stake in legislation. Also, Congress requires real debates to fully assess the nature of the issue at hand as well as to explore alternative approaches before reaching widely agreeable solutions. And regular order will reverse the trend toward centralization of power in the leadership by empowering committees, which is where bipartisanship is forged. "
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https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/RSTREET42.pdf has some suggestions:
" THE SENATE AMENDMENT PROCESS Nearly all major legislation that reaches the floor of the U.S. House does so pursuant to a rule promulgated by the House Rules Committee. These rules usually restrict individual members’ ability to offer amendments on the floor. House rules further restrict the amending process by imposing a gen - eral requirement that all amendments be germane or related to the bill. This grants the chamber’s majority party leader - ship substantially more leeway in controlling the floor agenda
By contrast, the U.S. Senate lacks comparable institutional features to rein in individual members....
The right to unlimited debate and the right to offer non-ger - mane amendments are arguably the two most distinguish - ing features of the Senate
...
as the Keystone Pipeline reauthorization highlights, the term “open amend - ing process” is a bit misleading. Generally, amendments are written and negotiation take place between sponsors, lead - ers, bill managers and committee chairs over which will be offered on the floor or included in the bill. As ... Senate bills usually are fil - tered through this amendment-selection mechanism. 22 ... 22. Additionally, the procedural context can be manipulated in a way that makes raw counts of amendments or bills inappropriate for analysis. For example, instead of fill - ing the amendment tree, leaders may schedule bills in such a way that time demands force members to choose between the bill and their amendment votes. Leaders may also use omnibus legislation to insulate themselves from large numbers of amend - ments. Peter Hanson, Too Weak to Govern: Omnibus Bills, Agenda Control and Weak Senate Majorities , Boston, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Finally, leaders may not fill the tree on specific bills but instead offer controversial measures as amendments to those bills in a manner that they can’t be altered. An example of this occurred in a recent debate over a Defense Authorization Measure, where majority party Republicans offered a controversial cybersecurity measure as an amendment and immediately filed cloture on it, barring any further amendments. Burgess Everett, “Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell? Escalate their War of Words,” Politico , June 11, 2015
...
Of course, much of this debate centers on whether amend - ments are offered for sincere policy reasons or for electoral position-taking motivations. As with differentiating filibus - ters from legitimate debate, determining member intent is difficult. Indeed, most members have mixed motivations. It is both true that senators recognize the electoral value of certain amendment votes and that leaders seek to protect vulnerable party members from difficult roll call votes. 23
23. Perhaps the most famous electoral amendment was the one from Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., to bar the Affordable Care Act from providing insurance coverage of Viagra to child molesters and rapists. While Democrats dubbed it a “crass political stunt,” Republicans featured the vote in a number of electoral ads. Angie Drobnic Holan, “Ed Perlmutter voted for Viagra for sex offenders, paid for by health care bill? Nope.” Politifact , Oct. 26, 2010
...
Roll-call votes in Congress are the product of a two-stage selection mechanism. First, a motion or proposal must be given consideration on the House or Senate floor. This can be a difficult proposition—especially in the House, where majority party leadership can use the Rules Committee to control the floor. Second, a member must formally call for the yeas and nays and, as specified by the Constitution, be supported by a sufficient second.
...
The founders recognized how roll-call records could be used to undercut legislative efficiency, and wrestled with the issue during the Constitutional Convention. Several delegates argued that any one member of Congress should be able to call for a recorded vote on a given proposal. A counterpro - posal supported removing any roll-call voting provision from the Constitution on the basis it would result in “frivolous” votes that would “mislead the people.” 31 The compromise was to keep a provision that would provide a roll call if sup - ported by one-fifth of the chamber. Scholars have argued that increasing electoral competitiveness between the parties and the prevalence of the 30-second television attack ad has made roll-call votes more influential. 32 As the data in the next sec - tion of this paper indicate, the increased value of the roll-call vote has led senators to exploit their individual right to offer amendments in a manner that weakens legislative efficiency.
...
Accusations like these are frequently made dur- ing battles over procedure because, frankly, members fre - quently look like hypocrites when it comes to procedure. 46 This is understandable. Nobody runs for Congress because they are deeply enthusiastic about the motion to recommit or other parliamentary maneuvers. If they did, the evidence suggests they would not be elected, as voters appear to be less consistent on issues of congressional procedure than members. 47
46. On member consistency on the filibuster, see Sarah A. Binder and Steven S. Smith, Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate , Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
47. For recent examples regarding the public’s attitude on procedure see Steven S. Smith and Hong Min Park, “Americans Attitudes about the Senate Filibuster,” Ameri - can Politics Research 41, 2013, pp. 735-760; and Steven S. Smith, Ian Ostrander and Christopher M. Pope, “Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S. Sen - ate,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 38(2), 2013, pp. 205-236
The first set of reforms involves altering the leader’s abil - ity to restrict individual senators’ right to offer amendments by filling the tree directly. These include—but are certainly not limited to—proposals such as guaranteeing “at least 10 amendments (if offered) in order, given in alternating order between senators of both parties.” 51 These proposals may successfully prevent the majority lead - er from filling the amendment tree on the floor. However, it is worth noting that these reforms may make the Senate less efficient, and may push more intra-senate conflict out of the public view. With the majority leader’s leverage effectively undercut, he or she may opt to wait until a unanimous-con - sent agreement is in place before bringing a bill before the Senate. The end result could be fewer bills considered under an open-amending process on the floor. A second set of reforms focuses on stemming individual sen - ators’ ability to offer amendments indiscriminately. Expand - ing the germaneness requirements to a broader set of bills and issues is an example of this type of reform. Such propos - als likely would make it difficult for individual senators to offer “hobby horse” amendments to every piece of legisla - tion. 52 However, as germaneness rules bolster leadership at the expense of individual senators, they would likely meet with bipartisan resistance. 53 They may also encourage indi - vidual senators to engage in more obstructive efforts to get their proposals included and/or voted upon later in the ses - sion, such as refusing unanimous consent
51. Richard Dorment, “22 Simple Reforms That Could #FixCongress? Now,” Esquire , Oct. 15, 2014. These reforms were proposed and agreed to by a panel consisting of former Majority Leaders Trent Lott, R-Miss., and Tom Daschle, D-S.D.; former Reps. Barney Frank, D-Mass., and Bob Livingston, R-La., and political pundit Lawrence O’Donnell?.
52. One frequent hobby-horse amendment that dogged Reid was Sen. David Vitter’s, R-La., proposal to end health-care contributions for members and staff under the Affordable Care Act. News sources attribute several instances of filling the amend - ment tree on Reid’s behalf to his desire to bar Vitter from offering the amendment. Democratic leaders criticized the maneuver and the amendment. Reid argued that “punishing hard-working congressional staff, who put in long hours because they believe in public service—that is, the work we do here in Congress—will not roll back the benefits of Obamacare.” Press accounts suggested that Reid and Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., floated an amendment that would deny government contributions to lawmakers “if there is ‘probable cause’ they solicited prostitutes.” Manu Raju and John Breshnahan, “Will Democrats Haul Out Hookers in David Vitter Fight?” Politico , Sept. 12, 2013. The amendment referenced a 2007 scandal in which Vitter was tied to a prostitution ring. Congressional Record Daily , 113 th Congress, Sept. 17, 2013, p. S6479
53. See Don Wolfensberger, “Is the Senate Germane? Majority Leader Reid’s Lament.” Roll Call , Aug. 13, 2007.
Third, as the preceding discussion has demonstrated, unlim - ited debate is intertwined with the amending process (and negotiations over the amending process); successful reform efforts might necessitate pairing reforms to cut down on filling the amendment tree with broader filibuster-rules reform. These proposals might limit obstruction on motions to proceed, which could save bill supporters time that could be reallocated to the amending process. Alternatively, the Senate could revive either of the reforms adopted before the 113 th Congress. The first of these created a motion to proceed that could be adopted by a simple majority in exchange for the guaranteed consideration of at least four amendments (two from each party). It expired after the 113 th Congress ended. The second procedural reform created a new stand - ing rule allowing a bipartisan group to expedite the end of debate on a motion to proceed. 54 While the direct effect of such reform efforts is theoretically quite muted, in the sense that they do not touch individual senators ability to obstruct legislation directly (or threaten to obstruct directly), 55 it cer - tainly is possible that such proposals influence negotiations over scheduling and amending. Short of altering the Sen - ate’s debate rules directly, any effort to improve the Senate amending process will require a combination of approaches
54. Elizabeth Rybicki, “Changes to Senate Procedures in the 113 th Congress Affecting the Operation of Cloture (S.Res. 15 and S.Res. 16),” Congressional Research Service, Report R42996, 2013.
55. Steven S. Smith, The Senate Syndrome , Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014
A final avenue is directed to lowering the value of elector - ally motivated floor amendments. There are three gener - al ways to accomplish this. The first involves limiting the source of information being transmitted to voters. Scholars have observed that greater transparency in Congress—while providing many normative benefits—has made deal-making more difficult and the lawmaking process less efficient. 56 Altering congressional rules to roll back transparency in ways that relegate amending to committees, or encourage more unrecorded voting, might help in this regard. The number of hobby-horse and electorally aimed amendments would presumably decline, as senators no longer would be able to offer amendments to embarrass senators of the other party. However, such reforms would be nearly impos - sible and would face intense political opposition outside the chamber. 57
56. Sarah A. Binder and Frances E. Lee, “Making Deals in Congress,” in Nathaniel Persily, ed., Solutions to Political Polarization in America , New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, pp. 240-260
57. In addition to the difficulties in marshalling coalitions to alter internal Senate rules—as we previously discussed—the yeas and nays are protected by the Con - stitution. Additionally, social media and improved technology has made it nearly impossible to restrict the flow of information. Even if they do not take advantage of it directly, voters almost always support greater transparency
The second general approach would limit the manner in which information is transmitted to voters through a substan - tive reform of our campaign-finance system. Such reforms, typically, either aim to reduce the flow of misinformation to voters, 58 or to offset it through the delivery of nonpartisan, factual communications that would contextualize roll-call votes and other legislative activities. As has been well-docu - mented, legal challenges have substantially complicated this alternative. Even if there was no issue regarding constitu - tional interpretation, it is unclear whether the quality of the information voters receive would improve. 59
58. Tightening caps on campaign spending by private groups is a common for reducing electoral advertisements
59. For a debate on campaign finance laws and legislative effectiveness see, e.g., Thomas E. Mann and E.J. Dionne, Jr. “The Futility of Nostalgia and the Romanticism of the New Political Realists: Why Praising the 19 th -Century Political Machine Won’t Solve the 21 st Century’s Problems,” The Brookings Institution , June 2015; Jonathan Rauch, “Political Realism: How Hacks, Machines, Big Money, and Back-Room Deals Can Strengthen American Democracy,” The Brookings Institution , May 2015; Ray La Raja and Brian Schaffner, “Want to Reduce Polarization? Give Parties more Money,” The Washington Post , July 21, 2014; and Lee Drutman, “The Debate over State Polar - ization and Campaign Finance Laws Continues,” The Brookings Institution , July 16, 2015
Finally, senators take advantage of their individual rights to offer amendments and force uncomfortable roll-call votes because they believe voters respond positively to this tech - nique. An obvious way to discourage them from doing so would be to make the public less susceptible to charges made through roll calls. Having taught Introduction to American Government to college students, we are aware that getting the public excited to learn more about the legislative pro - cess directly is a nearly impossible task. However, this could be mitigated by either increasing the level of information on legislative process and procedure possessed by elites and the media 60 or by making the system less complex, such as by adopting several of the previously discussed internal pro - cedural reforms.
60. For a discussion of increased media sophistication during the health care debate, see John Sides, “What We Have Learned from the Health Care Debate,” TheMonkey? - Cage.org , Dec. 16, 2009
61. Both the total number of electorally generated veto players and the permissive - ness of individual legislator rights in the United States are higher than in most other nations. On electorally generated veto players, see Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, “Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the United States,” Perspectives on Politics 9(4), 2011, pp. 841-856; and on individual/minor - ity rights, see Andrew J. Taylor, The Floor in Congressional Life , Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2012. This both slows down the lawmaking process and muddles the final output. Steven M. Teles, “Kludgeocracy in America,” National Affairs , 17, 2013, pp. 97-114. This makes it more complex and difficult for voters to understand. Thus, holding elective officials “accountable” for policies is more difficult in the United States than in most other democracies. Essentially, the current system may be asking too much of the voters
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http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IntroPSC/introReads/Stepan%20and%20Linz%20-%20US%20Democracy.pdf
Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the United States Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz
... during the heyday of income equality in the United States, no other country in the set was as unequal as Amer- ica, and most were substantially more equal. ...
Electorally Generated Veto Players and US Inequality Social inequality has many determinants. And, as insti- tutionalists “historical” and “new” have emphasized, a key determinant of inequality is the institutional structure of a society. A question thus arises, one both simple and surpris- ingly understudied by scholars of American politics: From a comparative perspective, does the United States have more “majority constraining” and “inequality inducing” politi- cal structures and veto players than other democracies? In addition to the volumes under review, valuable work on the majority-constraining capacity of “veto players” that may enrich the study of the United States has been done by comparativists such as Ellen M. Immergut, George Tsebelis, and Evelyn Huber and John Stephens, specifi- cally concerning those vetoes involving an “individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision.” 9 For example, in the United States, the Senate and the House of Representatives are veto players because without their consent, no bill can become a law. Using spatial modeling and empirical arguments, Tsebelis makes a convincing case that the more veto players there are in a political system, the more difficult it is to construct a win- set to alter the political status quo. We will concentrate on electorally generated, constitutionally embedded veto points and players. ...
How many veto players are there in each country in our comparison set of long-standing democracies? Is the United States, on these grounds, an outlier, and if so, does this fact take us some way to explaining the high degree of social inequality in the United States as documented in the volumes under review? When we examine our set of 23 long-standing democ- racies in advanced economies, we find that slightly more than half of these countries (12.5) actually have only one electorally generated veto player. This is so because, with the exception of France, they are all unicameral (or if bicameral, the upper house does not have a veto) and parliamentary; thus, the only veto player whose consent is needed is the prime minister’s majority in the lower house. There are 7.5 countries with two veto players, two coun- tries (Switzerland and Australia) with three veto players, and only one country, the United States of America, with four electorally generated veto players. 10 Thus, the United States is politically exceptional in the high number of elec- torally based veto players who potentially can block social change, by blocking key bills or amendments.
...
Federal; bicameral with both houses having absolute veto. President has a veto that can only be overridden by a 2 3 _ vote in both houses. Constitution cannot be changed unless 3 4 _ of states ratify an amendment proposed by both houses (United States).
...
Other Majority-Constraining Features of the US Political System In addition to having the highest number of veto players, there are four more constitutionally embedded features of the US political system that, taken together, make that system even more majority constraining and, we believe, inequality inducing, than any other democracy in our set (and more than Table 1 indicates). First, the principle that every state in the Union has an equal vote in the Senate (two senators) generates by far the greatest violation of the classic majority principal of “one person, one vote” of any of the eight federal democ- racies in our set.
...
Second, to compound the significance of the compar- ative inequality of representation of the US Senate, this most malapportioned chamber in our set has the most comparative power in our set. The Senate has vastly more influence on federal appointments than the “one person, one vote” House of Representatives, and more preroga- tives than any other democratically elected upper house in our set.
...
Third, ... most ... constitutions allocate “residual powers” to make such decisions to the center, or in the case of some federal states such as Germany, to the center and the states acting jointly. Due to other features of the German constitution, such as Article 31, which stipulates that “Federal law shall take precedence over Land Law,” or especially Article 106, which mandates “unifor- mity of living conditions in the federal territory,” the Ger- man federal state is not constrained in its efforts to produce equality. However, the Tenth Amendment of the US Con- stitution creates the strong presumption that residual pow- ers do not pass to the center, but rather to the states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti- tution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Fourth, all of these majority-constraining features are constitutionally embedded and could, in theory, be changed by amendments supported by exceptional major- ities of citizens. However, the US constitutional system enables minorities to block such amendments with com- parative ease. Indeed, Donald Lutz, in his excellent Amer- ican Political Science Review article “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment,” demonstrates that the US Constitution is by far the most difficult constitution to amend in our set.
...
There is a positive correlation between a high number of electorally sanctioned veto players and high inequality, as Table 4 shows clearly.
"
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mb have anonymous voting on amendments? only have roll-call voting on the final proposal.
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https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a32838/congress-the-report-reforms-fixcongress-1114/
" Over two days in July 2014, Senator Tom Daschle, Representative Barney Frank, Representative Bob Livingston, Senator Trent Lott, and Lawrence O'Donnell convened in Washington, D. C., and came to unanimous consensus on the following recommendations to reform Congress for the Twenty-First century
I
Establish a fivE-day workweek.
In order to ensure that lawmakers have sufficient time to do the people's work in Washington and to accommodate their need to spend time with constituents, Congress would be in session for three consecutive five-day workweeks followed by a one-week break. This would not only streamline the legislative process but also foster closer working relationships among members.
II
SYNCHRONIZE HOUSE AND SENATE SCHEDULES.
When and for how long the Senate and the House of Representatives are in session is the prerogative of congressional leadership, and in order to maximize productivity and encourage dialogue, this recommendation would require that the two chambers be in session during the same three weeks each month.
III
Allow committees to work every morning without the interruption of floor votes.
The Senate has twenty standing (i.e., permanent) committees, and the House has twenty-one. This measure would allow them to devote uninterrupted time to conducting hearings, shaping legislation, and the other work required of their committees, shielding them from arbitrary and unpredictable disruptions.
IV
UPON CONSIDERATION OF A BILL IN THE SENATE, THERE SHALL BE AT LEAST TEN AMENDMENTS (IF OFFERED) IN ORDER, GIVEN IN ALTERNATING ORDER BETWEEN SENATORS OF BOTH PARTIES.
This would effectively prohibit the practice of "filling the tree," a parliamentary tactic by which the Senate majority leader can block any amendments to a bill. There would be no requirement that such amendments be considered germane to the bill.
V
END THE FILIBUSTER ON THE MOTION TO PROCEED, AND IN TURN LIMIT DEBATE ON THE MOTION TO TWO HOURS, DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES.
Prior to a bill even reaching the Senate floor for debate, the majority leader must bring up the bill for consideration, and the current rules allow any member to filibuster (or threaten to filibuster) the bill at that point. This would eliminate that practice altogether and cap the amount of time spent debating the motion to proceed.
VI
REQUIRE FORTY-ONE AFFIRMATIVE VOTES TO MAINTAIN A FILIBUSTER.
Rather than the current rule, which requires a supermajority of sixty votes to end a filibuster, this would require forty-one votes to maintain a filibuster.
VII
FOR FEDERAL APPOINTEES, LIMIT SENATE CONFIRMATION TO THE TOP FOUR HUNDRED POLICYMAKING ROLES (I.E., REDUCE THE CURRENT NUMBER BY HALF).
VIII
EXCEPT UNDER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (ETHICAL ISSUES, HEALTH ISSUES, AVAILABILITY ISSUES), ANY NOMINATION THAT HAS BEEN IN COMMITTEE FOR NINETY DAYS SHOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY DISCHARGED AND PLACED ON THE CALENDAR FOR DUE CONSIDERATION.
Due in large part to Senator Harry Reid's triggering of the so-called nuclear option last fall (when he made it possible to end debate on any non–Supreme Court judicial nominee with a simple majority rather than the sixty votes required previously), the power of the minority to block judicial appointments has been limited. However, it is still possible for a nomination to remain in committee (i.e., not even on the floor) indefinitely, and this would end that practice.
"What damage comes from the Senate having to vote up or down on the presidential nominee? What minority protection is being abused if the United States senators who have been elected have to vote yes or no on an official appointment of the president of the United States?" —Barney Frank
IX
ENSURE PARTIAL PRIVILEGED STATUS FOR MEASURES THAT HAVE GONE THROUGH THE COMMITTEE PROCESS BY PROVIDING THAT COMMITTEE-REPORTED AMENDMENTS BE CONSIDERED GERMANE TOTHE REPORTED MEASURE UNDER CLOTURE.
To strengthen the role of committees in the legislative process, this would ensure that any amendments approved in committee would be given special consideration in the event it is necessary to invoke cloture to pass a measure.
X
MOTIONS TO RECOMMIT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MUST EITHER CONTAIN INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE PROVISION THAT THE BILL BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY ORBE STRAIGHT MOTIONS TO RECOMMIT.
Just before the Speaker of the House calls for a floor vote on any given bill, a member can make a motion to "recommit" the bill back to its original committee in order to consider any final amendments. This is one of the ways the minority can influence the final makeup of the bill, but the way the House currently works, such a motion instructing a committee to report a measure back "promptly" could send the bill back to committee indefinitely (in other words, killing it). This measure would ensure that any motions to recommit contain instructions to have the bill return to the floor immediately ("forthwith").
XI
RESTRICT THE ABILITY OFTHE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE TO REWRITE BILLS THAT HAVE ALREADY CLEARED COMMITTEE.
A bill can clear a committee with unanimous bipartisan support only to see its language altered by the House Rules Committee (often under the direction of the majority leader or Speaker) before it goes to the floor for a vote. This would limit such a practice.
XII
REQUIRE PERIODIC JOINT-PARTY LEADERSHIP CAUCUSES TO DISCUSS POTENTIAL AREAS FOR LEGISLATIVE COOPERATION.
Although the Commission stops short of mandating specific timing or frequency, since such conditions resist enforcement, it nonetheless would require that such meetings take place regularly.
XIII
INCREASE THE USE OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEES BETWEEN THE HOUSE AND SENATE.
XIV
THIRTY CALENDAR DAYS AFTER ABILL HAS PASSED BOTH CHAMBERS, A MOTION IN THE HOUSE TO GO TO CONFERENCE SHALL BE A PRIVILEGED MOTION.
When one version of a bill passes in the House and another version passes in the Senate, it is the responsibility of the conference committee, made up of members of both chambers, to reconcile the two versions into a final bill that can be approved by both chambers and then sent to the president for signing. However, even when two versions of a bill pass their respective chambers, there are numerous ways it can be prevented from going to conference. Measures XIII to XV would minimize and in some instances eliminate those obstacles.
"I was always offended that even after the committee had acted and the Senate as a whole had acted and voted affirmatively, one turkey could show up and say, 'It's not going to conference.' " —Trent Lott
XV
MAKE MOTIONS TO REQUEST A CONFERENCE ANDTO APPOINT CONFEREES NOT SUBJECT TO DEBATE.
XVI
EXTEND THE ANNUAL BUDGET-RESOLUTION PROCESS TO A BIENNIAL ONE WHILE ALLOWING FORMULTIYEAR AUTHORIZATIONS AND ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS.
Instead of an annual showdown between parties on spending priorities—or, as has recently been the case, an annual passing the buck in the form of continuing resolutions that extend the previous year's spending—this would move the process to every other year while still allowing the House and Senate to adjust their spending on a year-to-year basis.
XVII
PURSUE WAYS TO FACILITATE MEMBERS' PRESENCE AND ON-FLOOR DEBATE.
Rather than relying on prepared speeches and emotionally gripping barn burners delivered to C-SPAN, the Commission urges the congressional leadership to consider ways that members could engage in substantial debate.
XVIII
LIMIT MEMBERSHIP TO TWO COMMITTEES.
Right now there are few limits to the number of committees that any member can serve on. In order to make sure that members aren't overburdened with obligations (or tempted to use a high number of committee assignments to attract the attention of donors or lobbyists), this would limit the number of committees they could serve on to two.
XIX
ESTABLISH A SINGLE, NATIONWIDE CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARY DATE IN JUNE.
The Constitution gives Congress the right to set the terms of congressional elections. This would eliminate the patchwork of primary dates throughout the first half of an election year (which inevitably leads to lower voter turnout) and create a single national primary date.
XX
MANDATE IN-STATE BIPARTISAN REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS TO ELIMINATE GERRYMANDERING.
In each state, every ten years, a bipartisan commission of Democrats and Republicans, appointed by the state legislature, will study census data, conduct statewide hearings, and reach an agreement on the geographic lines that determine the states' various districts.
"Because of the way we gerrymander, officials now are picking their voters. The voters aren't picking their elected officials." —Tom Daschle
XXI
PROHIBIT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FROM ORGANIZING AND RUNNING PACS.
Although still able to raise funds for their own campaigns and for national organizations like the Democratic or Republican National Committees, members would be prohibited from raising and disbursing funds to other candidates through PACs.
XXII
RESTORE THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES BY AUTHORIZING SPECIFIC EXPENDITURES SO LONG AS THE PROVISIONS ARE TRANSPARENT AND SUBJECT TO THE COMMITTEE PROCESS.
This measure allows members to petition on behalf of their constituents, and in restoring these so-called earmarks and subjecting them to oversight, it allows members to better represent their constituents' interests.
Published in the November 2014 issue
" Consensus? Hard enough to find at the average American dinner table and even harder to hope for when you've got this much vintage brass in one room: Tom Daschle and Trent Lott, two Senate majority leaders from opposing sides of the Clinton-era culture wars; Bob Livingston and Barney Frank, two might-have-been Speakers of the House (the former once having voted to expel the latter from the chamber for behavior unbecoming); and two former high-level staffers to help run the show: Alan Frumin, a longtime Senate parliamentarian, to advise on matters of precedent and procedure; and Lawrence O'Donnell, the host of his own show on MSNBC and a chief of staff to the Senate Finance Committee at a time when big bipartisan deals actually crossed the president's desk, to moderate and lead the Commission. "
discussion at https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a32815/how-to-fix-congress-now-1114/
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https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a23553/congress-living-hell-1114/
" the way his district is drawn, you can't ever be conservative enough. He could get up at one of his town halls and say that the president is a transvestite Muslim from Mars and get a standing ovation. He wants to do the right thing and make a public stand for greater decency and civility in public life. But he can't. Oh, in his own quiet way he does. He has many friends who happen to be Democrats. " ... "You know, if I had a magic wand, one thing I would love to change—which you can't do unless you're king—is the redistricting process by which our boundaries are drawn,"
says Republican Aaron Schock of Illinois. "Because what has happened over the decades is he who controls the mapmaking process, you know, creates hyperpartisan districts. And you get more and more members who come out here and say, 'Gee, I know that I want to accomplish something on this issue. I want to take action on this issue, but the base of my district is so far to the right or to the left it makes it difficult for us to negotiate to the center.' But whether you're the most conservative member or you're the most liberal member, if you have half a brain, you recognize you're not going to get everything, and that any successful legislation requires the art of negotiation." ...
"When you have these one-party districts, the only election is in the primary, and the winner of the primary will be the one who is closer to the views of the narrowest base," says Angus King, Independent senator from Maine. "You can't be moderate. Who votes in primaries? You have a 10 percent turnout in a primary election in Georgia, and Republicans are 30 percent of the population. So 10 percent of 30 percent—that's 3 percent of the population voting to choose the nominee, and then if it's a multiperson race, and the winner gets 35 percent, that's one third of 3 percent—1 percent of the population chooses the nominee, who in a gerrymandered district will be the eventual member of Congress. That is bizarre, and it has completely polarized Congress. In the primary system that we have now, there is no upside for a Republican to be reasonable. I have a friend who is a very conservative senator, and he faced a primary this year, and I said, 'Good Lord, man, what are they gonna charge you with?' And he said: 'Being reasonable.' "
"Our Venn diagram," says Derek Kilmer, Democrat of Washington State, "is two circles, miles apart. Just after we got here, a group of us, Democrats and Republicans, were at a burger joint talking, and after about forty-five minutes, I said, 'We have to be able to get our act together and figure some of these things out. And across the table, one of my colleagues said, 'Derek, I like you, but you have to understand that I won my seat by defeating a Republican incumbent in my primary, and I campaigned against him for not being conservative enough. The first vote I cast when I got here was against John Boehner for Speaker, and I put out a press release that I had voted against him because he was too compromising. I like you, but I have zero interest in compromising with you or anybody else. My constituents didn't send me here to work with you; they sent me here to stop you.' I left there and called my wife and said, 'Oh, my God!' "
...
incentivizes hyperpartisanship and punishes compromise. But all the same, the great majority of members interviewed said that the most rewarding work they ever did in Congress was in finding points of agreement with a congressman or senator from the other party, working to forge legislation that bridged the usual divides.
"But nobody cares about that stuff," says Republican congressman Morgan Griffith from Virginia. " 'News flash: People are getting along, compromising, doing their jobs like adults' doesn't have the sizzle of conflict that the media demands in order to hold your interest. I have good relationships with several Democrats, and last year Diana DeGette [Democrat of Colorado], Gene Green [Democrat of Texas], and I introduced an important compounding-pharmacy bill to help prevent disease outbreaks. It really matters. And gets very little attention."
Conflict media. Many of them argued that because conflict is rewarded with attention, more actual conflict is fostered, which is then amplified by social media, which blasts powerful narratives at members around the clock—who cares if they're true?—largely obscuring their meek attempts to actually get something done. All of that drives what most members think of as a perception gap between the way things are and the way they seem to be. The "twenty-four-hour news cycle" was mentioned by nearly every one of the members I interviewed as something that makes their lives hell and, more important, makes governing very hard. "It's the coliseum," says Joaquin Castro, Democrat of Texas. "And in the coliseum, people get hurt for sport."
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"It's a never-ending hustle. You get elected to this august body to fix problems, and for the privilege, you find yourself on the phone in a cubicle, dialing for dollars."
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MAKING THOSE POLICY relationships harder still is the fact that most members of Congress just don't know one another anymore. When Newt Gingrich rose to the speakership after the 1994 election, he urged his members to leave their families at home in their districts as a statement against Washington, thus shortening the congressional workweek, keeping people constantly running either to or from the airport, and preventing anybody from developing the relationships that make governing possible.
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And any spare moment that in the past may have been used to build trust between the members of Congress is now spent begging for money, particularly since the Citizens United Supreme Court ruling, which permitted unlimited spending by corporations or associations in support of political candidates. And it's not just "front line" members—those in tightly contested districts—who have to spend their allotment of hours per week at the call center, working donors. It's everybody. Some members report having to spend thirty hours a week on fundraising alone.
"When you look at the cost of a House seat now—which is about $1.6 million or something—you've got to raise that money," says Donna Edwards. "And particularly for our candidates and for incumbent members who are in these really tough districts. I mean they've got to raise double or triple that to win their seat. And they have to do it every two years. It's a never-ending hustle. You get elected to this august body to fix problems, and for the privilege, you find yourself on the phone in a cubicle, dialing for dollars."
And as if that weren't bad enough …
"There's an entire industry in Washington that makes money on conflict," says Republican Adam Kinzinger of Illinois. "Some of these outside groups—you know, your Club for Growth types, and your Heritage Action, and your FreedomWorks—they? go out and they fundraise by saying that Republicans aren't sufficiently conservative. Or they pick an issue to go to war on because they can stir the base and raise money on it and pay their big salaries. And what that does in the long run is it takes what would be a solid Republican agenda and causes chaos. And they do the same thing on the Democrat side, you know? If Democrats want to reach out and work with Republicans, you have these groups that will stir the base and say, 'If they're working with Republicans, they're capitulating.' So there's a very destructive cottage industry that exists on 'Hey, we can raise nice salaries for ourselves by just raising people's ire with Washington.' "
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On all of that—the crippling effects of the money, the empowered extremes, the outside pressures—there is general agreement among the scores of legislators I spoke to. But that is where agreement ends.
"
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"There isn't a Democratic senator of long standing who was enthusiastic about the rule change. You can check your notes, and it is those senators who just got here who demanded it," says Republican senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma. "The Senate is injured severely, because once you decide to break the rules, then no rules have impact anymore. Those senators who have more experience understand that."
"It's pretty easy for us to put the blame on Harry Reid and say, Ya know, Harry fills the tree and doesn't give us any amendments and by God, we're gonna put all the blame on him!" says Republican senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia. "But the fact of the matter is, too, that we have some folks who are bound and determined to come up with some wild and crazy amendments that are intended to be purely political amendments rather than doing the business we were sent here to do in a very serious way."
"There was a meeting of the Democratic caucus," says Senator King, the Independent from Maine, "and several members were saying, 'Let's just vote. Let's allow the amendments, we'll vote on them, and we'll move on.' And a member who is up for reelection in '14 made a pretty powerful point. He said, 'I don't mind making hard votes, but not if the Republicans are going to turn around and filibuster the bill anyway, so it's all for naught.' And I thought that was a persuasive argument. If you're gonna be forced to vote on one of these crazy gotcha amendments—Viagra for sex offenders or whatever—then there oughta be some purpose. If no Republicans are gonna vote for cloture and the bill's not gonna pass anyway, then what's the point?"
"Part of the reason that certain groups and the cable shows fixate on something like Benghazi is that we aren't offering much else for them to talk about," says Jeff Flake of Arizona. "When you go through regular order, you've got twelve appropriations bills to pass, each of which funds a different agency. There's a lot to talk about. There's a lot to fill the void that currently exists. And so I think if we get back to regular order, allow legislation to be debated on the floor, then we'll fill the void that others will fill if we don't."
In response to that, you discover, all sorts of formal and informal groups are breaking out, in both houses, to try to make things better, because people are "sick of this shit," as one senator told me. The Problem Solvers, the Future Caucus, the Civility Caucus, the Gang of 14, the Gang of 12, the Gang of 6. The twenty women in the Senate have a bipartisan dinner once a month to talk about what jerks the men are. And the members of the massive freshman class in the House—more than seventy first-term members—have resolved to maintain bipartisan class cohesion, hold social and policy events, and keep a conversation going, even when Mom and Dad are fighting. In a sign of faith that the dynamics can change, six members of the class, including Luke Messer of Indiana, the Republican class president, have moved their families to Washington.
As a group, the freshmen seem very serious about this effort to change things, although a couple of them tell me they are skeptical, indifferent, or consider it to be a waste of time.
"Well, you can't just leave me hanging," says Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii, a Democrat. "You have to tell me who!" And then she guesses. "Tom Cotton." Cotton is running for the Senate in Arkansas and is known for his sharp elbows.
"No," I say. "I actually just spoke to one of them, a Democrat."
"Alan Grayson!" she says.
"How did you know?"
"Everybody knows," Gabbard says. "It was either going to be Cotton or Grayson."
Others agree. "When a Grayson amendment comes up on the floor," says a Democratic member of the class, "I'll ask colleagues what it's about, and they'll just say, 'It's Grayson. I'm voting against it.' "
"They're assholes," says another. "The Asshole Caucus."
Grayson, an aggressively partisan Democrat from Florida, dismisses the freshman-class effort at comity as "window dressing. This class has gotten nothing done."
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And the recurrent citing by members of those who come not to talk but to silence, not to compromise but to attack—whatever insult or injury they may feel—is damning....And with that, a final discovery: When you talk to so many members of Congress, you realize that those who are widely reviled can do much more damage than those who are widely respected can do good, and with half the effort. "
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interesting anecdotal article but no real conclusions:
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/regular-order-faa-bill
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a note i wrote on judicial filibusters:
for a long time, the U.S. senate allowed filibustering of judicial nominees. This had the effect of a de-facto supermajority voting threshold: 60% of senators had to acquiesce in order for a nominee to be confirmed.
supermajority voting had a number of good effects (i don't have evidence to support the following, but i think it's likely that they are true):
so i believe that a supermajority threshold was better. Almost every present-day senator appears to disagree with me: on november 21, 2013 all but 3 Democrats (Levin, Manchin, Pryor) voted to end judicial filibusters on most judges, and on april 6, 2017, every Republican voted to end judicial filibusters for the rest of the judges.
as an aside, the existence of a 'nuclear option' that allowed a change of Senate rules with only a simple majority is another flawed procedure. A better procedure imo would have required a supermajority for changing the rules.
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this was mentioned in 'The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S ... By Steven S. Smith', which was also cited by that Rstreet study, above
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Schumer seems to regret it:
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/03/politics/chuck-schumer-nominees/index.html
(so why did he vote for it?)
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Pryor was one of the three Democrats who voted against the abolition of the judicial filibuster.
in his farewell speech he specifically mentions that he likes an "open amendment process" and "regular order":
" In the Senate, if the new Re- publican majority will run the Senate the way they have said it should be run, then this is a very good start. If we can replay the tape over the last 2 years, we will hear Republican Sen- ators time and again clamor for an open amendment process and for reg- ular order. They were caustic when the Democratic majority changed the rules—a change, by the way which I did not support. So let’s change the rules back to what they were. Let’s govern the way we know we ought to "
in Pryor's farewell speech he says:
" Polarization is exacerbated by forces outside this Chamber. For instance, we seem to make news more often these days by our responses in the corridors outside this Chamber to reporters ques- tioning us about the latest breaking story or rumor than we do by debating or legislating inside this Chamber. The viral nature of information and disinformation and the expectation that public officials will be imme- diately responsive to every news flash with but a few seconds to think through the implications or con- sequences or pros and cons has led too often to less thoughtful discourse, and that has helped drive rhetorical wedges between us. The incoming Senate has an oppor- tunity to restore a greater measure of bipartisan compromise by revisiting one of the most contentious issues we face, one that we struggled with at the beginning of this Congress; that is, the Senate rules I believe the excessive use of the fili- buster to obstruct confirmation of President Obama’s nominees was dam- aging to the Senate and to the Nation. Any President—Democratic? or Repub- lican—should have the ability to choose his or her team. But the Senate majority eliminated obstructions to Presidential nominations through the use of the nuclear option, effectively accomplishing a rules change outside the rules, a method I could not sup- port. In doing so, a precedent was es- tablished that the majority could effec- tively change the rules as it wished by overruling the Chair and the Parlia- mentarian. That precedent will not serve the country well in the future be- cause it leaves the minority with no protection, diminishing the unique role of the Senate. I hope the Senate next year considers reversing that precedent while simulta- neously—and I emphasize simulta- neously—amending the rules so as to assure the President’s ability to fulfill his or her constitutional duties. Put simply, I believe the Senate should do the right thing in the right way. It should amend the Senate rules, as pro- vided for in the rules, to adopt the sub- stance of the changes we made last year. I know my good friend Senator L AMAR A LEXANDER , who was part of the bipartisan Group of 8 who worked closely and successfully together on this issue in 2012, has proposed some- thing similar. Such action by the Sen- ate next year would be a welcome vic- tory for comity and for compromise, and it would I hope represent a step back from a precedent that leads to ef- fective rules changes by simple major- ity. It would be a step toward a better functioning Senate. "
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so it sounds like a big part of the problem here was that the Constitution's idea that Cabinet and other nominees should require senate consent, combined with a supermajority parliamentary threshold in the senate, led the consequence that sometimes the president would refuse to nominate someone who met the supermajority threshold and then there would be no one to fill the role for a long time, and in addition, because the supermajority mechanism was via filibuster, the nominee would never get an up-or-down vote.
this was seen as illegitimate even by many senators. it seems like the two reasons this was seen as illegitimate were:
Also, when the Constitution was written, it was probably expected that business in the senate would be via simple majority, without filibustering. So the idea that the senate should confirm the president's choices was probably seen more as a power that the senate majority would hold over the president, than as a power wielded by the senate minority. You can see how that seems more legitimate.
The most obvious way to address these points would probably be:
This addresses the objections by:
otoh Schumer says that it should be supermajority for Cabinet too [15]. And if it's going to be there, why not also for the quasi-independent agency heads like the Fed etc?
so maybe:
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