still wondering if mb we should make the board size 11 (3 class of 3, plus 2 randomly chosen). Then we could have an ordinary supermajority threshold of 60%, but also have an amending supermajority threshold of 66%, and have them be distinct, and distinct from a simple majority (6/11, 7/11, 8/11). This also lets us have 1/3 be distinct from the largest minority (4/11 and 5/11).

But in this case, the number of Boardelector-elected boardmember is close to 10, the current number of annually elected Boardelectors. And, 11 seems kind of unweildy, esp for small groups.

i looked up and found:

most of which suggest that both 7 and 11 are reasonable, but 7 may be better (some even suggest that 5 is better than 7).



internal, external, governance


could stick with a 60% (5/7) ordinary supermajority, but just require that amending requires "the greater of 66% or one more vote than is required for 60%", eg 6 members. That's a high bar to amend though; 5/7 is already almost 75%.

i guess i like that. todo.


ThePhysicist? 2 days ago [-]

Surprised that no one mentioned the new EU data protection directive, which goes a long way to fix the first issue mentioned in the article, the loss of control over our personal data (only for users in Europe though). I studied it in detail as I work in data analysis and consult companies on this, and I honestly think it is one of the best laws produced by the EU so far:

It gives users a multitude of rights such as being informed about exactly which kind of data a company has about them (and even get a digital copy of that data), how the company uses that data and for which purposes it is used. And if you're subjected to algorithmic decision making (e.g. an algorithm decides if the bank should award you a credit) you have the right to know which kind of algorithms were used in the process and to contest the decision. You also have the right to demand the deletion of your personal data and to revoke the right of a company to process it, as well as to demand correction of inaccurate data. The legislation also allows for severe fines and punishments for companies not respecting the regulation (up to 4 % of yearly turnover of the whole company group), so even companies the size of Google or Facebook should have strong incentives to follow the regulation.



this is nice and short:

let's try to be shorter, like they are!

huh, the wayback machine doesn't work on that page, so i'll copy them to here:

" Bitcoin Unlimited: Articles of Federation

(...some introduction about the motivation for this project, afaict this is technically just an introduction and not part of the Articles...)

Article 1: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System for Planet Earth (...a list of substantive principals specific to the Bitcoin project...)

Article 2: Confederation

    All Bitcoin Unlimited (henceforth BU) activities shall be recorded and be publicly accessible.
    BU roles shall consist of:
    President: a publicly identified (real-life identity is known) BU Member who is responsible for the ongoing activities of the confederation. The president shall resolve BUIP number conflicts, organize BUIP discussion (in the forum designated by the secretary), and schedule/initiate voting (within the limits specified in these articles).
    Secretary: a publicly identified BU Member who is responsible for recording activities and vote results, and making this information publicly available. The Secretary is responsible for creating, maintaining and moderating a public forum where discussion can be held. Moderation is exclusively limited to moving content with an indication of it being moved - no content may be deleted. The secretary shall tally and report on votes.
    Developer: a publicly identified BU Member who is responsible for maintaining the BU code repository, choosing which committers have access to the software repository, reviewing and merging patches, and periodically releasing BU software. The Developer is an outreach position - s/he must actively work to encourage others to work on submissions, and to convert one-time submitters into regular committers.
    Pool Operator: a publicly identified BU member who is responsible for running the BU Mining pool as specified in Article 4. The position of pool operator might be vacant and pool operation is optional, as resources permit.
    Member: an individual who is invited (by BUIP) to join the Confederation, signs this document, and has joined or voted within the last 1 year. Non-publicly identified members may have restricted voting or other restrictions as determined by subsequent BUIPs - this measure may be needed to restrict duplicate accounts.
    Officer term is for two years. For continuity, elections shall be staggered by 6 months and take place 1 week prior to responsibility transfer. Beginning with the President on Jan 15, 2018, then Secretary, Developer, and Pool Operator. This means that the initial officer term may exceed 2 years. Voting for all the initial officers shall occur on Jan 15, 2016.
    Formal interaction between members, including but not limited to BUIP submission and voting must occur via cryptographically verified identities. Members shall supply a Bitcoin public key when applying for membership and sign all formal communications with the corresponding private key.
    Decisions shall be made via the following procedure:
    Any member can propose a "Bitcoin Unlimited Improvement Proposal" (the Proposer). The Proposer can submit a proposal on behalf of another non-member. The president or secretary shall assign this Proposal a number and make it publicly accessible. The President, Secretary, or Developer has a 2 week opportunity to review the proposal and suggest modifications, within their own domain. That is, the President reviews proposals related to the operation of the Bitcoin Unlimited Confederation, the Secretary reviews proposals for adherence to BUIP standards, and the Developer reviews proposals related the the Bitcoin Unlimited code. The Proposer may choose to extend this 2 week period as long as desired.
    After this period, the officers may attach an opinion or counter BUIP to this BUIP. This package shall be presented to all members and opened for discussion for a minimum of a 2 week period. The Proposer may choose to extend this period for a maximum of 6 months. At the end of the public discussion period, members shall vote whether to adopt the BUIP. A BUIP is adopted if accepted by a majority of voters (51%) with at least 50% of members voting OR a 75% super-majority of voters with at least 25% of members voting, unless otherwise indicated in this document (BUIPs that change these articles or remove officers).
    If a counter-BUIP is proposed, voting occurs in a twofold manner: first each member votes his preference, BUIP, counter, or none, with a 33% majority. Then if the BUIP or counter-BUIP wins, each member votes to accept it or not with the normal majority requirement. Note that members could make both votes simultaneously (I vote for the counter, but if BUIP wins I vote to accept it), depending on the Secretary's implementation of this process.
    Voting shall be open for a minimum 48 hour period and a maximum of 5 days. Members who will not be available during that period may submit an early vote in a manner described by the Secretary. Members may not change their vote. All votes are publicly recorded.
    Additional BUIP requirements on patches.
    If a BUIP contains a patch, the Developer may review the patch for acceptability (including but not limited to bugs, tests, coding standards) AFTER BUIP acceptance. The developer may work with the Proposer or other party for as long as necessary to ensure the patch is acceptable. After 2 months, if the Proposer believes that this process is taking too long, the President, Secretary, or Proposer may propose that the patch be included "as is", via the same BUIP proposal channel and schedule a vote (normal BUIP majority rules). This vote may not occur within one 1 week of the formal "commit as is" proposal.
    If the BUIP does NOT contain a patch but suggests technical changes, it is the responsibility of the Proposer or any other party to produce this patch. After the patch is produced, the Developer reviews it as suggested in the preceding paragraph, except in the "as is" case, the normal BUIP schedule and process must be followed. In the unfortunate situation where a patch is deliberately accepted which does not agree with the Proposer's BUIP, the Proposer's recourse is to resubmit the BUIP with a patch.
    This document can be modified via a greater than 66% majority vote on a BUIP with at least 75% of the members voting.
    Elections occur via the following procedure. The Secretary (or President then Developer if the Secretary/President is vacated) announces vacancy or impending vacancy of a position to the BU public forum and an election date not earlier than 4 weeks subsequent to the announcement. Interested members submit a BUIP announcing their candidacy, real-life identity, and including any other desired information. Submissions can happen at any time. Public discussion of the candidates is allowed and follows the same mechanism as other BUIPs.
    During the election, a modified BUIP voting process occurs where members vote for the candidate of their choice. If there are > 2 candidates, a second round of voting occurs solely between the 2 candidates with the most votes. Largest number of votes wins. Note that for expediency purposes, the Secretary may choose to collapse the voting operation into a single phase (where voters make multiple choices in a manner similar to the BUIP/counter-BUIP system) if the number of candidates is small enough to reasonably do so.
    The President, Secretary, Developer or Pool Operator may voluntarily resign before term completion, via a signed public message posted to the BU public forum. In this situation, elections occur prematurely via the process outlined in VII starting from the date of resignation. In the case of abrupt departure, an interim person may be appointed by the President, including someone currently holding another role. In that case s/he will not vacate the originally elected role.
    An officer can be removed via a "no confidence" BUIP. This BUIP follows the normal schedule, however it must pass with a 75% super-majority of voters, with at least 33% of members voting. A BUIP advocating for the removal of a particular officer may not be occur within 4 months of a prior unsuccessful proposal advocating for the removal of that officer. Removal proposals will be managed by an officer who is not affected by the BUIP. Multiple officer removal BUIPs are not allowed. Submit them separately.
    If actions of the President, Secretary, Developer, Pool Operator, or Member is in violation of these rules, that is grounds for removal. Any member may submit a "no confidence" BUIP as per section IX. Members are exhorted to vote based on their belief as to whether the individual broke these rules rather than their personal opinion of the individual's fitness for the office. A removed officer may re-run for any position.

Article 3: Operations and Resources

This article provides guidelines for operations assuming that Bitcoin Unlimited becomes a non-profit corporation. Yet it also provides instructions for operations before that event occurs.

    Any unallocated funds raised shall be held in a 2-of-3 multi-signature account with the President, Secretary, and Developer holding the keys. Fiat currency holdings shall only occur to ensure that commitments can be paid regardless of Bitcoin's volatility and shall be held either by the President or in a Bitcoin Unlimited non-profit corporation account.
    Allocated funds may be held temporarily by the person who will employ them.
    Funds donated to Bitcoin Unlimited may be applied to any purpose (including the Bitcoin Unlimited Pool) that furthers the project's goals and is authorized by majority vote via line items in a President's "Operational BUIP". Donations may not be used to pay salaries, bonuses, etc. for the President, Secretary, Developer or Pool Operator. These volunteer roles are unpaid, with the expectation that these individuals will benefit from Bitcoin's success.
    However, the people fulfilling these roles may be paid upon completion of particular tasks that exceed their stated role. For example, the Developer may be paid to implement a particular feature -- however the time required to review and merge the feature is unpaid.

The source repository administrative account shall be held by the President. But the President may only add and remove committers on the recommendation of the Developer. Additionally, the President may not use his administrative account to directly commit software to the source repository. Instead, these contributions must be submitted as a fork or patch and be reviewed and merged by the Developer or another committer.

All domain name registrations shall be controlled by the Developer.

Public Forum infrastructure shall be controlled by the Secretary.

Source repository committers may commit to the master branch repository without explicit BUIP approval during the course of their day-to-day work. Commits that implement a particular BUIP should reference that document in the checkin comments. However committers have the responsibility to implement any large or potentially controversial change on a fork or branch and bring it to Member attention via the BUIP process. Committers have the responsibility to respect the efforts of independent submissions by ensuring that authorship attribution is correct in the final commit to the BU repository. Committers must work respectfully with independent submitters to ensure coding, testing, documentation, and formatting standards are met as defined by the Developer.

A Member that feels a commit needs BUIP approval can submit a BUIP referencing the commit arguing against the change. This change may remain in the repository until the issue is determined but the Developer may not issue (non-experimental) binary releases containing any commit that is under BUIP debate.

The Developer may release experimental features under the Bitcoin Unlimited brand, and develop them in Bitcoin Unlimited repository branches. However these releases must be named and advertised as distinctly separate from the primary Bitcoin Unlimited release. Additional flavors of release may also be recommended to be created by members through the BUIP process.

Administrators of resources (source repository account, domain name, public forum, and any others) are responsible for paying for the resource for the duration of the administrator's term. However, these administrators should be compensated or pre-compensated out of BU funds if available, via an Operational BUIP.

The President may periodically issue a special BUIP called an "Operational BUIP" that details proposed payments and other organizational activities. This BUIP follows the same voting methodology as any other (detailed in 2.IV).

The President, Secretary, Developer, or Pool Operator can issue (or issue on behalf of another member) a special BUIP called an "Informative BUIP" which allows members to vote on a non-binding issue or question. These BUIPs allow the community to formally give feedback on future directions for the project. For example, an informative BUIP could be "Should we look into and then propose partnerships with hardware wallets?" Issuance is restricted to reduce BUIP spam.

Article 4: The Bitcoin Unlimited Mining Pool

(...more stuff specific to this organization; in Concord we'd say this is ordinary Policy...)



if pleading is allowed, one should be able to plead:


could consider four levels of agreement amongst Chairs:


another phenomenon arguing in favor of supermajority decision-making is that if everything is by simple majority, and the group splits into 2 factions each about 50%, then at any one time, one faction will be 'in power'; and each faction also makes decisions by simple majority within itself and all members of the faction adhere to party discipline to vote with their faction, and if each faction also splits into subfactions each about 50%, then a sub-faction of slightly over 25% controls the whole group (presumably the more splits, the weaker the party discipline, so we don't have to continue this argument forever; but in real life this does seem to occur to some degree in the U.S. government; there are two main parties each of about 50%, and within each party an ideological core controls and there is fairly good party discipline, meaning that at any one time an ideological core of less than 50% is ruling against the wishes of >50% of the total members). It would be impractical to raise the voting threshold so much so as to make this stop happening (sqrt(.5) =~ 70%), but at least it's reduced with supermajorities (.6^2 = .36, which at least is over the 'blocking threshold' of 1/3, unlike .5^2=.25).


some ideas for a shorter one:




here's a guy who supports simple majorities instead of supermajorities:

Learning to Love the Nuclear Option by Steven Waldman

he doesn't give any reasons; instead he gives examples of laws that would have passed if there were simple majorities


should ask the authors of this article for their advice:

James Wallner Ed Corrigan


mb call it a 'governance forum'


mb simply say that amendments require a 2/3 vote in the Governance Forum but a 75% vote in the Board

the motivation is that, if an ordinary supermajority is 5 Boardmembers, then that is already 71%, so to make this higher than that we need something like 75%. But 75% would be much easier to achieve in the Board than in the Forum, so make it lower in the Forum.


mb ask this guy for any ideas about how to make a more absolute freedom of speech in terms of content yet still have some sort of campaign finance regulation:


this person, Ulrich Baer, seems to be against absolute free speech? or at least against universities allowing anyone to speak? i can't quite tell what e wants:

but they seem to say that is a good policy so i should read that (although Baer seems to think that it should be superceded by a new standard based on disallowing speech that questions the rights of others to speak? i'm not clear)


maybe add back some self-selection of Boardelectors by previous Boardelectors? says that US political party candidates used to be selected by the incumbent congresspeople of that party. suggest that the switch to popular primaries caused US politics to become more polarized.

if we have 10 Boardelectors each term, maybe 3 of those could be pre-selected by the previous incumbent Boardelectors.

otoh actually selecting these guys is very different from just making them candidates.. also the entire Boardelector-elected Board is just 2 classes of 3, so it could be filled only by these perpetually selected ppl who coerce others in their party to re-nominate them. hmm... what would 'nomination' even mean in this bottom-up agglomerative clustering situation? It could mean skipping the first few rounds of cuts, but surely anyone influential enough to get nominated by the incumbent Boardelectors would achieve that anyway. Is there a way that the nominees could be 'put to a vote' by the electorate?

a little bit on the details of US corporate shareholders votes on Boardmembers:

otoh the 'open primary' system is thought to be depolarizing, so maybe that's good enough (i guess our system probably already has this quality):


about present-day Boards of Directors:


do higher supermajority thresholds reduce cyclic preferences?


what's the rule about brokers being the default proxy in shareholder votes? can we use this to make forum quorum feasible for online groups in some abstract generic way by having default proxies? looked it up briefly, it seems to be a nyse rule, not a government one?!? seems like brokers can only proxy vote on routine matters, but if at least one routine matter is on the ballot then those proxy votes count towards quorum


when the Constitution is actually an Articles of Incorporation, we still want a supermajority to amend, or to dilute votes, but we dont want to make it too hard to issue new shares. Perhaps a simple majority, or a smaller supermajority, just to issue nonvoting shares?


i dont want to add this to Concord, but one thing i think about sometimes is if we can introduce more 'specialization' into parliamentary procedure for groups.

The Six Thinking Hats discussion methodology:

" Managing Blue – what is the subject? what are we thinking about? what is the goal? Can look at the big picture. Information White – considering purely what information is available, what are the facts? Emotions Red – intuitive or instinctive gut reactions or statements of emotional feeling (but not any justification) Discernment Black – logic applied to identifying reasons to be cautious and conservative. Practical, realistic. Optimistic response Yellow – logic applied to identifying benefits, seeking harmony. Sees the brighter, sunny side of situations. Creativity Green – statements of provocation and investigation, seeing where a thought goes. Thinks creatively, outside the box. " -- Six Thinking Hats

Some of these could translate to:

and we may also have:


ask this guy for his feedback:

"John O Kenny is an Ethereum enthusiast who is passionate about decentralization. John does research and analysis of blockchain projects and is especially interested in blockchain in the energy sector. John is a proponent of decentralized governance and is currently developing what he describes as a "new & exciting DAO." John is a guest writer for ETHNews."


mb should read this sometime:

this is interesting:,%20Authority%20and%20Command.pdf

you would think this would have more like that, but i skimmed it and it doesn't appear to:


" In general, military personnel give orders only to those directly below them in the chain of command and receive orders only from those directly above them. A service member who has difficulty executing a duty or order and appeals for relief directly to an officer above his immediate commander in the chain of command is likely to be disciplined for not observing the chain of command. Similarly, an officer is usually expected to give orders only to his or her direct subordinate, even if it is just to pass an order down to another service member lower in the chain of command than said subordinate.

The concept of chain of command also implies that higher rank alone does not entitle a higher-ranking service member to give commands to anyone of lower rank. For example, an officer of unit "A" does not directly command lower-ranking members of unit "B", and is generally expected to approach an officer of unit "B" if he requires action by members of that unit. The chain of command means that individual members take orders from only one superior and only give orders to a defined group of people immediately below them.

If an officer of unit "A" does give orders directly to a lower-ranked member of unit "B", it would be considered highly unusual (a faux pas, or extraordinary circumstances, such as a lack of time or inability to confer with the officer in command of unit "B") as officer "A" would be seen as subverting the authority of the officer of unit "B". Depending on the situation or the standard procedure of the military organization, the lower-ranked member being ordered may choose to carry out the order anyway, or advise that it has to be cleared with his or her own chain of command first, which in this example would be with officer "B". Refusal to carry out an order is almost always considered insubordination, the only exception usually allowed is if the order itself is illegal (i.e., the person carrying out the order would be committing an illegal act). (See Superior Orders.) ...

    rank – especially military rank - "who outranks whom" in the power structure
    strict accountability – those who issue orders are responsible for the consequences, not those who carry them out
    strict feedback rules – complaints go up the hierarchy to those with power to deal with them, not down to those who do not have that power
    detailed rules for decision making – what criteria apply and when
    standardized language and terminology
    some ethics and key beliefs in common, usually enforced as early as recruiting and screening of recruits

" -- [1]

" In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning initiative and a freedom in execution which allows a high degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command. Mission-type orders free the higher leadership from tactical details.

For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. The success of the doctrine rests upon the recipient of orders understanding the intent of the issuer and acting to achieve the goal even if their actions violate other guidance or orders they have received. Taking the risks of violating other previously expressed limitations as a routine step to achieving a mission is a behaviour most easily sustained in a particular type of innovative culture. That culture is today often associated with elite units and not a whole army. " -- [2]

"Superior orders, often known as the Nuremberg defense, lawful orders or by the German phrase Befehl ist Befehl ("only following orders", literally "an order is an order"), is a plea in a court of law that a person—whether a member of the military, law enforcement, a firefighting force, or the civilian population—not be held guilty for actions which were ordered by a superior officer or an official.[1][2]" -- [3]

"Tactical seniority, also known as "battlefield seniority", is the manner in which a senior officer in command of a given tactical situation is determined. For instance, within the United States Navy, groups of ships performing exercises together will have one ship designated as the tactical senior unit. The commander of said ship is the senior tactical officer and may in fact be junior in rank to the other officers of the tactical group. For multi-national exercises, such as the Sharem event in South Korea, ships of foreign nations are sometimes given tactical seniority and thus may issue routine movement orders to United States vessels. Actual combat would fall under the Task Force system, in which a United States admiral, with clear seniority, would take command over all vessels.

Groups of Army units, especially in active combat, may be placed under tactical command of any officer, regardless of rank seniority, for completion of a single mission. During World War II, the term "mixed unit" was commonly used to denote military formations created from several other smaller units, most often "on the spot", due to operational confusion and the need for a single battlefield commander to take authority over all units physically present. Army Air Force bomber groups operated on a similar principal, in that tactical command could pass to officers who were not necessarily the senior most present, given the specific needs of the mission or casualties during the mission itself." -- [4]



blockchain stock ledgers explicitly permitted in Delaware:


these guys have mostly case studies but they look cool:

they have a companion site about constitution writing:

but it is more about giving advice for the procedure for writing the constitution (eg "Informal practices point to the desirability of supermajority voting rules on all sensitive items, if not as a general matter. Supermajority rules provide a greater incentive for people with diverse interests and viewpoints to use persuasion or to compromise. Similarly, voting item-by-item allows individual delegates with special knowledge of a specialized matter to make their information available to the assembly. It may slow the process but it also fosters more informed discussion.") , instead of advice about what procedures the constitution should choose.

here's the sort of data they study:

their links may be useful:


recently, there was a lot of attention on Poland, when they passed a new law (by 235-192 with 23 abstentions) that gives the president power over the high court. Apparently there were three similar laws passed. The outcome was that Poland's current president, President Andrzej Duda, vetoed two of these laws and let the third one stand.

What exactly did these laws do? What exactly is (was) Poland's constitutional procedure that allows such laws to be passed with only a 55% majority?


mb call it 'assembly', not 'forum', after all, b/c 'forum' gets confusing when you have an 'online forum' for discussions related to the 'forum'


complexity budget design choices faq

Q: why have proportional voting? represent minority factions

Q: why have score voting? give moderates a chance, and no spoiler effect

Q: why have directly elected chairs? oversight

Q: why have 3 chairs? represent minority factions

Q: why have stratified board? seems to be best practice for long-term decision-making

Q: why have 7-person board? seems to be a number that many different organizations can live with

Q: why have 9 high judges? average over time (and longer than board) so *3; also represent minority factions so *3; also odd.

Q: why have JSC? seems to be best practice for creating relatively impartial judiciary

Q: why have bidding procedure for trials? reduce legal fee advantage of wealthy

Q: why have rules for emergencies and line of succession? many long-lived organziations, even small ones, will face these situations someday

Q: why have rules for board debate? if we don't, people will argue about it someday

Q: why have rules for assembly debate? there's gotta be some way to make proposals, but also to prevent spamming with too many proposals

Q: why give chairs the roles of speaker, secretary, treasurer? someone's gotta do these things anyhow. By giving them to the chairs, we give them more oversight over the board

Q: why have procedures for removing people? eventually someone will be sick or abusive or crazy, so we need some procedure to remove them


complexity budget design choices faq part II (things that might be too complex)

Q: why give high judges all those powers? history has showns that some high courts accrete these powers, better to be explicit


"Many investor rights advocates, including the Council of Institutional Investors, have publicly challenged this practice of discretionary broker voting on routine matters--which was originafly established to help issuers achieve quonlm at meetings involving nonroutine rnatters-as undermining the corporate democratic process." [5]


mb we should summarize some of the 'main changes' and their benefits vs traditional corporate governance structure:


" diplomacy over violence knowledge as the greatest treasure mercy for those who harm you love for all creatures "


flexie 10 days ago [-]

In the EU you cannot bind consumers by such arbitration clauses:

Consumers can usually sue corporations at a court in their own jurisdiction. Many European countries also allow class action law suits. Yet, we have few law suits against corporations. There are other reasons for this:

Few who know consumer matters in both the US and the EU would trade the European system for the American.


todo read about south africa's ombudsman/public protector:


another way to reduce legal costs at trial may be to precede the trial with a 'pre-trial', with free or no defence council, where (a) if the result is 'innocent', then there is no further trail, but if the result is 'guilty' then we proceed to the full trial, (b) what is said at the pre-trial cannot be used as evidence later in the full trial. This allows the defendent to attempt to be cleared for free, before having to pay for a lawyer.

This could very usefully be used in conjunction with the legal costs bidding procedure, because it would shield rich defendents from having to pay for their own prosecution for at least the most egregious parasitic/bad faith 'spam' lawsuits.

we already have grand juries, which are sort of a pre-trial. But they seem slanted towards the prosecutor. Perhaps follow a grand jury with an anti-grand jury, which are slanted towards the defender. Or just have a real pre-trial.


another mechanism to improve the legal costs bidding procedure to shield rich defendents from paying for their own prosecution in bad faith 'spam' lawsuits: let the defendent choose between (a) doing the bidding procedure, or (b) not having any sort of 'loser pays' (including indirectly via countersuits based on the fact that the other guy sued in bad faith). So, the defendent can choose (b) in which case each side pays their own legal fees in whatever amount they wish.

Note that even (b) satisfies the criteria that a poor person can sue a rich person without the risk of being bankrupted by a huge 'loser pays' fee if they lose.

ok, i put this into the Concord bylaws.


replaced the following verbiage from Concord bylaws:

However, there is an exception to the above in the case of claims between the organization and its voters (in their capacity as voters). In this case, the party containing the voter(s) may choose between (a) no bonds to be posted and no restrictions on fees, or (b) for both sides to be bound by the above procedure. The party may only choose (b) if they are able to, and choose to, waive any provisions of law that would restrict the procedure from being binding on them.


removed the following verbiage from Concord bylaws:

Furthermore, no voter(s) or other stakeholder(s) shall have the standing to bring a case against the Organization unless: (a) the case regards an action or inaction of the Organization which specifically targeted or primarily or greatly disproportionately impacted an individual or class of voters/stakeholders with less than 6% of the votes, or (b) the party bringing the action has the support of at least 3% of the votes, where the percentages are computed as of the time the claim should have been discovered.


mb 12 boardelectors, bc 12 is a nicer number

maybe raise electors to 17 or 23


note in governments maybe a good idea to have a civil service and a top layer of 60% confirmed political executive appointees. in companies, top layer can be executives and officers, and could civil service be replaced by a standard company wide hiring process like google promotion committees?


mb have a legislative jury to decide when the board and the assembly disagree (and when the disagreement would not lead to immediate repeal)


mb in the intro explicitly state that one function of the chairpeople is to promote transparency


if there is a tie for last place in the elector elections of board members then eliminate candidates not in the tie and vote again. If 3 Rounds go by without a change then the secretary breaks the tie


this shows that even a cartel of 17 voters is big enough to sometimes be derailed, informing our minimum constituency size:

" The fiscal cliff further diminished Boehner’s standing on the right. When the new Congress convened in January 2013, some two dozen House conservatives plotted to overthrow him. Any speaker needs a majority of votes cast on the House floor on the first day of a new Congress; Huelskamp and others concluded that if 17 Republicans voted against Boehner, that would force a second ballot—and he would step aside out of shame. Huelskamp says the coup participants “signed their names in blood” the night before the vote—not literally—and he was stunned the next day to see just 12 of them follow through. Boehner survived, but was embarrassed by the revolt. It was the first attempt on his speakership, though not the last. " -- [6]

Our current minimum of 60 is way over 17, so this is evidence towards 60 being big enough, or maybe even too large.


maybe some additional wording to redundantly emphasize that the organization defers to the jurisdiction of external courts

maybe some additional wording to make it easy for a number of organizations, all of whom have adopted variants of this, to cooperate with each other. Stuff like:


more proof that a method for private unverifiable revokable publically counted proxy voting is impossible:

the voting machine gives you a receipt when you set your proxy. This receipt would allow you to revoke it. Now, the flaw is, the recipt could also allow you to prove who you voted for to someone else, which enables corruption.

Is it possible to use some fancy homomorphic etc encryption to make it impossible to tell from the reciept who you voted for?

i think not, because the ballots are also being publicly counted. So, when you later revoke, you are going to be putting a copy of the number on your receipt onto your revocation ballot. And this number will then be publicly seen, for counting, and there is no secret information that the counting authority has. So, say someone is trying to intimidate you into voting for them. They threaten you with force and demand to see your reciept after the vote. You provide the receipt. Then, after the next election at which a revocation would have been possible, they compute how the election would have turned out if the number on your receipt (which you were coerced to show them) had been entered as a revocation. From the difference between the computed hypothetical vote tally and the actual vote tally, they know who had an extra vote revoked in the hypothetical tally, and this must be the person for whom you orginally voted.


shows that mandatory 'accept written comments' rules are subject to sockpuppetting:


" I won't try to summarize all of the principles of due process, but here are some of the most fundamental, well-established principles:

    The accused receives adequate notice of the allegations.
    The accused has an adequate opportunity to respond.
    Judgments are made by an unbiased tribunal.

These principles are followed by criminal courts (where, as an extra protection, defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty); by civil courts (where the winner is whichever side has the strongest overall evidence); by arbitrators; etc. "


took this out:

i was going to change it so that, only if the Judge feels that the plaintiff is likely to succeed, then matched legal fees are allowed. But in the following bullet point, we let the defendent choose whether matched legal fees will occur or not, so this would probably not be necessary.



recc. by at


voter participation numbers in blockchains:

" One of the main criticisms of coin voting mechanisms so far is that, no matter where they are tried, they tend to have very low voter participation. The DAO Carbonvote only had a voter participation rate of 4.5%:


The EIP 186 Carbonvote had ~2.7 million ETH voting. The DAO proposal votes did not fare better, with participation never reaching 10%. And outside of Ethereum things are not sunny either; even in Bitshares, a system where the core social contract is designed around voting, the top delegate in an approval vote only got 17% of the vote, and in Lisk it got up to 30%, though as we will discuss later these systems have other problems of their own. "



if quorum isn't met at three consecutive properly called meetings, then the next meeting has no quorum requirement, and may amend the quorum requirement.


chair may adjourn without a vote in case of an emergency or a disruption that would prevent orderly continuation of the meeting


informal discussion is permitted when no motion is pending


chair must recognize a minority report from a committee, if any such report had at least 1/3 of the votes, immediately after the committee report of majority (before the vote is taken on any votable questions given in the majority report)


the proposer of a motion may amend or withdraw it, with the consent of the chair, until the assembly is voting on it or until the assembly passes a vote on it (including a vote to amend or commit, etc; note that such making a motion to amend or commit does not end the period when the proposer can amend or withdraw it, only the passage of these other motions do)


remove the words 'bylaws', 'articles', 'constitution', 'charter' from the bylaws document, since these have specific legal meanings in some contexts. Just call it 'this document', and maybe suggest that this document might be used as bylaws, articles, constitution, or charter.


'civil grand jury' like in San Diego; a committee of volunteers, elected by lot for one year at a time out of ppl nominated by a Judge, who examine whatever they want, or respond to complaints, about the organization's functioning

in San Diego they just produce reports, but i would give them standing to prosecute, or to direct the DA, or something like that -- similar powers to the Chairs i guess

i would have them just be another Tribunal, (a Board-colored committee plus Judges)


someone in a forum claimed that "systems with greater proportionality in legislative elections produce higher satisfaction with government". Citation?


in the article [8] there is the picture [9] that shows "the Communist Party Congress in Beijing last fall". The Congress appears to be made up of 7 rows of 17 people in each row (in the front row, 3 people appear to be off-camera). So this helps give a real-world sense of how big 119 people is.

It looks medium-large. On the one hand i've been in school assemblies that are much larger, on the other it would take a long time and conscious effort to get acquainted with that many people, much less discuss anything serious with all of them, so i guess frequent deep discussions would be right out. The picture is larger than the pictures you see of joint research teams or early companies (eg this picture of early Google, with 34 people: [10] ). The number of scientists slated to work at the Los Alamos subproject of the Manhattan project, certainly larger than most research projects, was only a little larger than this: "Oppenheimer initially estimated that the work could be performed by 50 scientists and 50 technicians. Groves tripled this number to 300. The actual population, including family members, was about 3,500 by the end of 1943, 5,700 by the end of 1944, 8,200 by the end of 1945, and 10,000 by the close of 1946." [11]. Even one row of (17 people) would not fit standing in my bedroom (unless squished), and would be a medium-large party even if spread throughout my apartment. One row is at least 2 two-pizza-teams, and you get the sense that if one row (17 people) were hanging out somewhere to informally discuss something important and detailed in small groups, it would take quite awhile for everyone to circulate around and talk in-depth with each of the groups. Otoh 17 is close to the number of people we put in when we were trying to formally organize CommunityWiki?, so it's not that large. How much smaller would this group of 119 people have to get before it felt significantly smaller? You can imagine eliminating one row and one column at a time. Since only 14 people can be seen in the front row (presumably 3 are off-camera), start by eliminating 3 rows and 3 columns, to get 14*4 (14 columns in 4 rows = 56 people). This still looks like a ton of people. Eliminating one more, we get 13*3 - 39 -- this looks like it feels slightly smaller. Eliminating one more, we get 12*2 = 24 -- this definitely feels smaller.

You can also try to divide the 116 visible people into groups, and see what's the smallest number that would be expected to have a representative from the smaller groups. I don't know anything about these people and they all have similar facial expressions and they all seem to be clapping (except i can't see the hands of the uppermost leftmost guy, but it looks like he is just low to the ground so his hands are hidden), so there's not much to go on besides the way they are dressed. Most people are men wearing a dark blue or black jacket and a tie (the guy at the upper left is wearing similarly dark clothing but i don't see a tie, and there are maybe about two other guys who i can't tell if they are wearing a tie, but i bet they are). There are about 16 people with miliary uniforms. And there are about 8 or 9 women. And there are about 7 people not wearing either dark blue or black, or military uniforms. So let's look at that last group, the group of people who are interesting in a sartorial sense (it is either all or almost all made up of women, but not all women are wearing something colorful). 116 visible people / 7 sartorially interesting =~ 16.5.

So we'd need a group size of about 17 to expect to have one sartorially interesting person. But if we had a group of just 17 we'd often get zero such people; an increase of 50% would be 17*1.5 = 25.5, and the nearest prime to that is 23. An increase of 100% (the population of sartorially interesting people should have two representatives, in case one of them isn't good at being a representative, right?) gives 17*2 = 34, of which the nearest primes are 31 and 37. If we counted 6 instead of 7 people in the group of 116, we'd have 116/6= 19.3 instead, and the nearest prime to 19.3*1.5 is 29.

So this suggests that the number of Board Electors should be between 17 and 37; the geometric mean of that is 25 and the arithmetic mean is 27; nearby primes are 23 and 29.

If the number of Board Electors were 23, then assuming that 6 distinct Board Electors had Board seats, we'd have 17 BoardElectors? not on the Board. Since the elected seats on the Board are in two classes of 3 seats each, that means that each of these three seats has an average constituency size of 17/3 =~ 5.7 BoardElectors?. With 29, that computation is (29 - 6)/3 = 7.7. Both of these are close to the ideal Board/committee size of 7 and within the 'two pizza teams' range, large enough so as to suggest that the range of expertise and representation in the Board Electors will be significantly wider than the Board, large enough that the Board Electors will mostly think of themselves as separate from the Board itself (because there is little chance that every Board Elector will eventually be a Board Member; even if they rotate, the rotation would take so long (over 3 Electoral Cycles; 29 - 6 / 6 =~ 3.8) that some Board Electors would no longer be serving by the time it was their turn to be on the Board), while small enough that the constituencies of Board Members remain small enough to make each Board Elector someone that their Board Member cares about keeping happy. This suggests that either 23 or 29 are good numbers for Board Electors.

The size of the upper house in the EU is 28, but most countries (especially most of the largest/most powerful/most well-known countries) have significantly larger upper houses and lower houses [12]. As for US State legislatures, the smallest appears to be the upper house of Alaska, with 20 members; however there are only a few (maybe 3? upper houses in Alaska, Delaware, Nevada) U.S. states with any house of legislature less than 29 [13].

And this is the only branch of the whole governance system with a bunch of different people in it. So maybe, for both the sake of broad expertise and for trying to get at least a few non-corrupt people in there to tell everyone else what's really going on, we should choose the higher number here, although still not too high because we want a manageable number of people. So this argues for 29. On the other hand, thinking again of actual meetings, it seems a lot harder to fit 29 people in a room, and to have a good discussion with them, than 23. Also, whatever we say, groups will have a tendency to increase, and not decrease, this number, so maybe we should start small. Also, it'll be significantly harder for the public to think of 29 people as important (in fact maybe 17 would be the upper limit there).

So, i'm leaning towards 23.

later: i asked a friend and they immediately suggested you want the larger number to get a few non-corrupt people. they're probably right.

So, i'm leaning towards 29.


Y'know, with the BoardElectors?, if we just say "there's one point in time and at that point in time, we simply take the top 3 BoardElectors? in terms of support from the other BoardElectors?, and make them BoardMembers?", then we'll have a problem. Perhaps in some faction, although the faction as a whole has the votes (that is, amount of BoardElectors?) to send 1 BoardMember?, there may be multiple contenders for this spot among the BoardElectors?. This is the sort of negotiation where neither side may back down until the last second; which may cause a miscalculation in which the deadline is exceeded, the vote to be split, and the distribution of BoardMembers? omits the faction that split the vote.

TODO: To prevent this, i suppose we need to mandate the additional complexity of eliminating the BoardElectors? one at a time (or as few at a time as possible, at least), by raising the support requirement one number at a time and progressively eliminating BoardElectors? who fall below the requirement.


yknow, if it's 29, that's prime and so won't lend itself to those symmetric architectured meeting halls that ppl like for legislatures (not sure if that really matters, esp. since we are targetting companies not govmts and since meetings may be online!). But still, it would be nice to add one more person to make 30. Who shall we add? There are 3 Chairs, so no -- the CEO may be a Boardmember or Boardelector, so no. How about we add either the inactive Boardnominee who was randomly chosen to sit on the Board, or another inactive Boardnominee?

this would give these 'people's representatives' two more powers -- first, some influence in the election of the other Boardmembers, and second, some influence in the recall of the other Boardmembers. Actually, though, that's a bad idea; we made the number of Boardelectors prime for a reason; to reduce stasis. 30 is a roundish number and so would be bad for that. We want the total number of Boardelectors to be prime, so adding one more won't do. And letting that guy sit there but not vote might be confusing (and some groups would end up letting em vote).


hmm, i wonder if we should restrict the random Boardmember to be not just an inactive Boardnominee, but an inactive Boardnominee with no Boardcoloring?


" According to Supreme Court protocol, only the Justices are allowed in the Conference room at this time—no police, law clerks, secretaries, etc. The Chief Justice calls the session to order... According to Supreme Court protocol, all Justices have an opportunity to state their views on the case and raise any questions or concerns they may have. Each Justice speaks without interruptions from the others. The Chief Justice makes the first statement, then each Justice speaks in descending order of seniority, ending with the most junior justice—the one who has served on the court for the fewest years.

When each Justice is finished speaking, the Chief Justice casts the first vote, and then each Justice in descending order of seniority does likewise until the most junior justice casts the last vote. After the votes have been tallied, the Chief Justice, or the most senior Justice in the majority if the Chief Justice is in the dissent, assigns a Justice in the majority to write the opinion of the Court. The most senior justice in the dissent can assign a dissenting Justice to write the dissenting opinion. ...

When there is a tie vote, the decision of the lower Court stands. This can happen if, for some reason, any of the nine Justices is not participating in a case (e.g., a seat is vacant or a Justice has had to recuse). " [14]

"Former Justice Scalia professed frustration that there is little substantive discussion,[16] while former Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that this makes the conference more efficient.[17]" [15]

in Canada however, the Canadian Supreme Court often reaches unanimous decisions, which is sometimes attributed to a greater degree of collegiality and deliberation [16] The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination By Donald R. Songer (2008) -- but NOT to 'logrolling', that is, trading of votes between different cases.

(why is this? i guess we should look at the selection process in Canada -- it appears that in Canada, the Prime Minister essentially makes the selection without the legislature or opposition parties getting any veto [17] [18] -- so this procedure is more majoritarian but less politicized -- also they have a formal expertise criterion, and a tradition of dividing the appointments by geographic region: "The Supreme Court Act limits eligibility for appointment to persons who have been judges of a superior court, or members of the bar for ten or more years. Members of the bar or superior judiciary of Quebec, by law, must hold three of the nine positions on the Supreme Court of Canada.[13] This is justified on the basis that Quebec uses civil law, rather than common law, as in the rest of the country. The 3 out of 9 proportion persists despite the fact only 24% of Canada's population resides in Quebec. As explained in the Court's reasons in Reference Re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, sitting judges of the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal cannot be appointed to any of Quebec's three seats. By convention, the remaining six positions are divided in the following manner: three from Ontario; two from the western provinces, typically one from British Columbia and one from the prairie provinces, which rotate among themselves (although Alberta is known to cause skips in the rotation); and one from the Atlantic provinces, almost always from Nova Scotia or New Brunswick." and they have a retirement age of 75.)

"The major difference between the two courts now really lies in the appointment process. Where in the United States the process of appointing Supreme Court justices has become a political battle, the Canadian process only has a very limited political element and is much more focused on appointing qualified candidates rather than justices who appear willing to extend or support the ruling party’s political agenda." -- [19]

So, my best guess is that the fundamental difference between the US and Canada is from (a) the appointment process, (b) the amount of partisanship in government in general. The appointment process is less balanced, so maybe the it leads to a bunch of justices who sort of agree with each other anyways? And if the amount of general environmental partisanship is less, than maybe the Prime Minister would see less value in appointing very partisan justices to support em. Kind of surprising to me all the same, because you'd think the additional balancing forces in the US side (the senate review, which until Gorsuch was constrained by the need to avoid a minority party filibuster, which effectively means a supermajority of 60% was needed) would lead to more centrist justices. Hopefully my JSC combined with 'triscore voting' proposals would lead to more centrist results.


each Justice has 4 law clerks:

"the court’s law clerks — four handpicked staffers per justice who are usually top law school graduates or junior staffers at prestigious law firms, chosen to assist each justice for one term." [20]

"Each Justice is permitted to have between three and four law clerks per Court term" -- [21]

so when a Justice is discussing with eir law clerks, that's a meeting of 5 people


probably need to state that The 29 board electors cannot recall the randomly-chosen guy, just the other 6 Boardmembers


" If you take the Global Corruption Barometer, whose most recent edition surveyed 72 countries, you see that those that have managed to establish effective control of corruption are not unified by the presence of any particular anticorruption tools or legal regulations. Instead, they have reduced corruption opportunities for the ruling elites and increased the capacity of their society to monitor and sanction corrupt behavior.

We can observe this in the few countries that have progressed from bad to good governance in the last thirty years: Estonia, Georgia, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, South Korea, Taiwan. They have done so through a mix of policies advanced by domestic advocates, not by importing legal silver bullets from abroad. Researchers from ANTICORRP, an EU-funded research project (which I manage), have captured this in the Index of Public Integrity, a statistically tested and objective measure of the capacity to control corruption. This index assembles six components: freedom of the press, digital empowerment of citizens, independence of the judiciary, red tape, fiscal transparency, and trade openness. The results of the index correlate with other indices that measure the perception of corruption, such as those produced by the World Bank and Transparency International. But in contrast to them the IPI is not subjective, but based on six straightforward and measurable policy components.

If the index does not measure legislation or give credit for the existence of dedicated anticorruption institutions, it is because trying to control corruption through specific legal mechanisms only works when rule of law already exists. Where it does not, any new scheme introduced by would-be reformers will simply be captured by the system. It turns out that the rule of law and control of corruption are nearly synonymous.

For that reason, defeating corruption must be a political process, rather than a technical one. Controlling corruption effectively is thus not the result of specific institutions, such as anticorruption agencies or an ombudsman’s offices. Countries that have more restrictive party financing rules or conflict of interest regulations are not less corrupt than others — in fact, many corrupt countries can today boast of tough anti-corruption legislation, but it rarely seems to be doing much good. What enables a country to get corruption under control is the combination captured in the IPI: a reduction in opportunities for rent-seeking (less red tape or barriers to trade, more fiscal transparency) combined with effective public scrutiny and collective action to sanction corrupt behavior. Without active citizens, free journalists, and independent judges, control of corruption is impossible. Any country can check how it ranks on the IPI against other countries and the rest of the world and plan its improvement. The current ranking has Norway at the top, with the best control of corruption, and Venezuela at the bottom. These measurements happen to correlate fairly precisely with the perception of citizens in these countries. " -- [22]

her book is: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. The Quest for Good Governance. How Societies Develop Control of Corruption.


in the Global Corruption Barometer 2017 document [23]:


and a page "PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO PAID A BRIBE WHEN THEY CAME INTO CONTACT WITH A PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE 12 LAST MONTHS*" where countries are divided into brackets, less than 5% (eg Germany), 5 to 10% (eg Italy), 10 to 15%, 15 to 20%, 20 to 30%, 30% to 40%, 40 to 50%, 50-75%, and 75%+. The countries in 'less than 5%' are (note: neither the US nor Switzerland appears on the list in ANY bracket in this report; in the 2013 report both of theose countries are in the 5-9.9% bracket):

in the 2013 report [26]:

" Key Findings


• Bribery is widespread Overall, more than one in four people (27 per cent) report having paid a bribe in the last 12 months when interacting with key public institutions and services.


Public institutions entrusted to protect people suffer the worst levels of bribery Among the eight services evaluated, the police and the judiciary are seen as the two most bribery- prone. An estimated 31 per cent of people who came into contact with the police report having paid a bribe. For those interacting with the judiciary, the share is 24 per cent.


The democratic pillars of societies are viewed as the most corrupt Around the world, political parties, the driving force of democracies, are perceived to be the most corrupt institution.



((note: since my purpose here is the design of institutions, i didn't include the 'people should..' bullet points))

Hold the corrupt to account • • All governments must work to end impunity by effectively preventing, detecting, investigating, prosecuting and punishing acts of corruption. • • Elected public officials should not enjoy immunity when charged with corruption offences.

Clean-up democratic processes • • Governments should pass and implement laws on making party financing transparent, including requirements for political parties, political candidates and their donors to publicly disclose donations. • • Parliaments should adopt comprehensive codes of conduct for members, including guidance on conflict of interest situations and rules for disclosure of assets, interests and income. • • Parliaments should introduce mandatory registers of lobbyists.

Give people the tools and protections to fight against corruption • • Governments should pass and implement whistleblower laws. These laws should include appropriate follow up mechanisms to allow people to report wrongdoing in the public and private sectors and protect whistleblowers from retribution. • • Governments should seek to provide people with effective mechanisms to report corruption and get redress. • • Governments should enable independent civil society organisations to function as effective watchdogs of government and to help people to hold public officials to account. "


<5% AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, (also in <5% in 2017 report) CANADA, (not in 2017 report) CROATIA, (in 10-15% in 2017 report) DENMARK, (not in 2017 report) FINLAND, (not in 2017 report) GEORGIA, (in 5-10% in 2017 report) JAPAN, KOREA (SOUTH) (also in <5% in 2017 report) MALAYSIA, (20-30% in 2017 report)) MALDIVES, (not in 2017 report) NEW ZEALAND, (not in 2017 report) NORWAY, (not in 2017 report) PORTUGAL, SPAIN, (also in <5% in 2017 report) URUGUAY (20-30% in 2017 report)

5-9.9% bulgaria (in 5-10% in 2017 report), estonia (in 5-10% in 2017 report), italy (in 5-10% in 2017 report), slovenia in <5% in 2017 report), switzerland (not in 2017 report except as top 5 least corrupt perception), united kingdom (in <5% in 2017 report), united states (not in 2017 report)


so countries which scored less than 5% in both the 2013 and 2017 Global Corruption Barometer reports:

and countries which are not on the above list but scored less than 5% in one year, or were in the top 5 perceived least corrupt list, and either not present or in 5-10% in the other year:

top 23 from the (cutoff at 23 chosen because that's the lowest position of any country that was either <5% in both the 2013 and 2017 Global Corruption Barometer reports, or was in the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer top 5 perceived least corrupt list:

" Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perception Index or CPI, which tracks government bribes, kickbacks, embezzlement, and other forms of public corruption. Topping the list as the world's least corrupt nation is Denmark, followed by New Zealand, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, and Canada" [27]

note: Singapore is not in the list at all, nor is it in the Global Corruption Barometer for either 2013 or 2017

note: Japan is in the Global Corruption Barometer in both 2013 and 2017 but not in the list at all

the lowest rank of any of those other 5 (Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Canada) in the list is Canada, at 14. In the 2013 and 2017 Global Corruption Barometers, all of those other 5 had <5% in one report year and were not present in the other report year. Sweden is the only one of those 5 in the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer top 5 perceived least corrupt list.

so, some countries that appear to be models of anti-corruption include:

in short: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Germany, Canada, Australia.


if you put those 8 countries into internet search engines, what else comes up?

"What is the Best Country in the World? An Index of Morality, Conscience and Good Life

The Social and Moral Development Index is a compilation of relevant statistics on a wide range of issues which are put into a database-driven formula which calculates points per country. The country's overall score is an average of all the datasets that a country appears in.

... --- The Best ---1 Pos. Higher is better Points1 1 Iceland 84.3 2 Sweden 81.7 3 Norway 80.9 4 Denmark 80.4 5 Finland 79.8 6 Belgium 79.4 7 New Zealand 79.0 8 Luxembourg 78.6 9 Switzerland 78.4 10 Germany 78.2 ...

The Criteria (Year) Winners

    Human Development (UN) (informational) (2015) Norway, Australia, Switzerland
    Overall Life Satisfaction (informational) (2011) Denmark, Netherlands, Norway
    Environmental Performance (2011) Iceland, Switzerland, Costa Rica
    Forest Area Change 1990-2015 (2015) Iceland, Bahrain, Uruguay
    Global Peace Index (2012) Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark
    Charitability (2013-6) Myanmar, USA, New Zealand
    Corruption Perception Index (2012-6) Denmark,New Zealand, Finland
    Religion Importance (2009) Estonia, Sweden, Denmark

The Criteria: Health (Year) Winners

    Adolescent Birth Rate (2015) N. Korea, S. Korea, Switzerland
    Alcohol Consumption (2010) 4-country draw
    Infant Vaccinations (2011-5) Hungary, China, Uzbekistan
    Fertility Rates (2012) N. Korea, Brunei, St.Vincent & Gren.
    Life Expectancy (2015) Hong Kong, Japan, Italy
    Smoking Rates (2015) Guinea, Solomon Islands, Kiribati

The Criteria: Human Rights & Equality (Year) Winners

    Antisemitism (2014) Laos, Philippines, Sweden
    Gay Rights and Equality (2013) Netherlands, Belgium, Canada
    Nominal Commitment to Human Rights (2009) Argentina, 12-country draw
    Personal, Civil and Economic Freedom (2014) Hong Kong, Switzerland, New Zealand
    Slavery (2013) Joint: UK, Ireland, Iceland
    Women Stand for Election & Vote (1893+) New Zealand, Australia, Finland
    Gender Inequality (2015) Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands
    Press Freedom Index (2013) Finland, Netherlands, Norway

The Criteria: Modernity (Year) Winners

    Freedom On The Net (2012) Estonia, USA, Germany
    Internet Users in Population (2017) Iceland, Norway, Bermuda
    IPv6 Uptake (2017) Belgium, Germany, Switzerland
    Malware and Email Spam (2010-2)
    Research & Development (2016) S.Korea, Israel, Japan" -- [28]

" The Top 10 Happiest Countries: Country Happiness Rank Overall Best Countries Rank Finland 1 14 Norway 2 12 Denmark 3 11 Iceland 4 N/A Switzerland 5 1 Netherlands 6 10 Canada 7 2 New Zealand 8 13 Sweden 9 6 Australia 10 7 " -- [29]


denmark sweden norway netherlands finland

" Here's a list of the countries that allow women in front-line combat positions. In Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. Elsewhere: Australia, Canada and New Zealand in the Anglosphere; plus Eritrea, Israel, and North Korea. " [31]

Countries With the Best Quality of Life

US News Best ...

Countries That Allow Gay Marriage Around The World

The 10 happiest countries on Earth

Map: Which countries allow women in front-line combat

World Happiness Report: Finland Lands No. 1, United

umm.. so basically countries that are lowest in corruption are also high in happiness, quality of life, and gender equality. So it's unclear where the causation is; when a country is happy and has gender equality, does corruption go away? Or is low corruption a necessary condition for happiness and equality? Or is there some other factor that causes both low corruption and happiness and equality?


The Organization must keep track of events where employees who have been found to give incorrect testimony in cases between the Organization and another entity, and provide Tribunals of these records along with that employee's testimony in future cases.


in terms of the idea of some organizations 'recognizing' others, should probably also think about terms like 'ambassador' and 'consul'. Although we aim towards organizing private organizations, not states, there may be some ideas that we can use there.

" There can be only one ambassador from one country to another, representing the first country's head of state to that of the second, and his or her duties revolve around diplomatic relations between the two countries; however, there may be several consuls, one in each of several main cities, providing assistance with bureaucratic issues to both the citizens of the consul's own country traveling or living abroad and to the citizens of the country in which the consul resides who wish to travel to or trade with the consul's country. "

" In Classical Greece, some of the functions of the modern consul were fulfilled by a proxenos. Unlike the modern position, this was a citizen of the host polity (in Greece, a city state). The proxenos was usually a wealthy merchant who had socio-economic ties with another city and who helped its citizens when they were in trouble in his own city. The position of proxenos was often hereditary in a particular family. Modern honorary consuls fulfill a function that is to a degree similar to that of the ancient Greek institution. "

"As such, diplomatic personnel with other responsibilities may receive consular letters patent (commissions). Aside from those outlined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, there are few formal requirements outlining what a consular official must do. For"

" Letters patent (always in the plural) are a type of legal instrument in the form of a published written order issued by a monarch, president, or other head of state, generally granting an office, right, monopoly, title, or status to a person or corporation "


[33] : "

Consular officers, being nominally more distant from the politically sensitive aspects of diplomacy, can more easily render a wide range of services to private citizens, enterprises, et cetera. They may be more numerous since diplomatic missions are posted only in a nation's capital, while consular officials are stationed in various other cities as well.


Ranks The current system of diplomatic ranks was established by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).[1] There are three ranks, two of which remain in use: "

"The body of diplomats accredited to a country form the Diplomatic corps. Ambassadors have precedence over chargés, and precedence within each rank is determined by the date on which diplomatic credentials were presented.[3] The longest-serving ambassador is the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, who speaks for the entire diplomatic corps on matters of diplomatic privilege and protocol. In many Catholic countries, the papal nuncio is always considered the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps."

" Historical ranks, 1815–1961

The ranks established by the Vienna Convention (1961) modify a more elaborate system of ranks that was established by the Congress of Vienna (1815):[4]

    Ambassadors, Legates, and Nuncios were personal representatives of their sovereign.
    Envoys and Ministers represented their government, and were accredited to the receiving sovereign.
    Ministers resident formed an intermediate class, between ministers and chargés. This rank was created by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818)[5]
    Chargés d'affaires were accredited by their Foreign Minister to the receiving Foreign Minister.


" n modern diplomatic practice, there are a number of diplomatic ranks below Ambassador. Since most missions are now headed by an ambassador, these ranks now rarely indicate a mission's (or its host nation's) relative importance, but rather reflect the diplomat's individual seniority within their own nation's diplomatic career path and in the diplomatic corps in the host nation:

    Ambassador (High Commissioner in Commonwealth missions to other Commonwealth countries); ambassador at large
    First Secretary
    Second Secretary
    Third Secretary
    Assistant Attaché

The term "attaché" is used for any diplomatic agent who does not fit in the standard diplomatic ranks, often because they are not (or were not traditionally) members of the sending country's diplomatic service or foreign ministry, and were therefore only "attached" to the diplomatic mission.


Multilateral diplomacy

Furthermore, outside this traditional pattern of bilateral diplomacy, as a rule on a permanent residency basis (though sometimes doubling elsewhere), certain ranks and positions were created specifically for multilateral diplomacy:

    An ambassador-at-large is equivalent of an ambassador and assigned specific tasks or region in which he is assigned various assignments aimed at multi track diplomacy.
    A permanent representative is the equivalent of an ambassador, normally of that rank, but accredited to an international body (mainly by member—and possibly observer states), not to a head of state.
    A resident representative (or sometimes simply representative) is also a member of the diplomatic corps, but is below the rank of ambassador. A representative is accredited by an international organization (generally a United Nations agency, or a Bretton Woods institution) to a country's government. The resident representative typically heads the country office of that international organization within that country.
    A special ambassador is a government's specialist diplomat in a particular field, not posted in residence, but often traveling around the globe.
    The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is an ambassador of Cabinet rank, in charge of U.S. delegations in multilateral trade negotiations (since 1962). The USTR's Special Agricultural Negotiator also typically holds an ambassadorial appointment.



article from Economist:

" African governance: Law comes first

Botswana is rated best on the continent in rule of law and governance, again Middle East and Africa Jun 3rd 2015

THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT Rule of Law index, a new global report that ranks countries’ adherence to the rule of law, puts Botswana in the top spot for Africa. The country's chief justice, Maruping Dibotelo (pictured at left, with President Ian Khama), was probably not surprised: the diamond-rich southern state has been regarded for decades as among the best-run on the continent. Botswana also placed near the top in the latest Index of African Governance, published annually by Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese-British telecoms magnate. That guide uses a broader set of criteria going beyond matters of law. While Botswana did not clinch the top spot in Mr Ibrahim's survey, last published in 2014, it was beaten only by the tiny island states of Mauritius and Cape Verde. On the mainland, Botswana was first. Indeed, on a global scale, the World Justice Project (WJP) report puts Botswana 31st out of the 102 countries measured, one spot behind Italy and two ahead of Greece.


The WJP report, issued in Washington, counts 18 African countries among those it measures, and uses eight yardsticks to assess how the rule of law is experienced. It seeks to measure constraints on government powers; corruption; the openness of government; fundamental rights; order and security; enforcement of regulations; civil justice; and criminal justice. Mr Ibrahim’s index covers a wider geographical range, including all but three of Africa’s 55 countries, and applies a broader set of criteria. It lumps political participation and human rights into a single category. It also measures safety and the rule of law, sustainable economic opportunity and human development, thus putting greater emphasis on prosperity.

In the WJP index, Ghana comes a notable second, while in the Ibrahim index it places seventh. That marks it out as west Africa’s most creditable country in both listings. Another strong performer is Senegal, which comes an admirable fourth in the law index and ninth in Mr Ibrahim’s table.

Middle East and Africa Jun 3rd 2015 "


Separate the Forum and the annual meeting. In meeting, default everyone's proxy to the board (ie default unless they specify a different proxy), and require board to vote its proxies the way the vote would have gone without them.


some remaining issues:


perhaps we could write theorems on the resistance of this government system to various sorts of attacks


we forbid the Board floor from deciding who chair committees based on majority vote to prevent the majority party organizations from controlling committees in a top-down manner.

To do this, we also have to prevent the Board floor from ignoring the committees. Here's an idea:


maybe just simplify committee chairmanship to always seniority

we also have to decide how committee assignments are determined, and decide if seniority is per-committee or for the whole organization.

the way the US senate does it sounds good. From wikipedia, "Seniority in the United States Senate":

"Senators are given preferential treatment in choosing committee assignments based on seniority. Seniority on a committee is based on length of time serving on that committee, which means a senator may rank above another in committee seniority but be more junior in the full Senate."


should we let ELECTORS, not just Boardmembers, be in committees?



y'know, my argument for having 0,1,2 (default 0) instead of the more intuitive -1,0,1 (default 0) was that it would reduce negative campaigning.

BUT... look at the M.O of some contemporary candidates. They say things that are outrageous to people who wouldn't vote for them anyways so as to get publicity. "There is no such thing as bad publicity". 0,1,2 makes this strategy more attractive: with 0,1,2 a candidate's main problem might be to get people who might like em to recognize their name; if something you do makes people who won't vote for you anyways hate you, there's nothing they can do, because the default vote is already the lowest vote they could give you. Note that candidates sometime says negative things about opponents, not to persuade their supporters to dislike them, but just to garner more publicity -- this would still be profitable under the 0,1,2 regime.

This accords with my vague impression from other sources that allowing negative votes is thought to promote moderation by allowing voters to punish immoderate candidates.

So, maybe switch to -1,0,1.

This also has the chance virtue of according with my 'triscore voting' procedure, which demands -1s.

I made the change in concordBylaws.


jjoonathan 12 hours ago [-]

How about having a mechanism to allow the opposition to vote on a secondary name which will be included alongside the primary name in official correspondence?

Yes, it will degrade into "Bill to Save America / Bill to Destroy America" most of the time, but that's the point: it makes the absurdity easy to spot and difficult to ignore.


airstrike 7 hours ago [-]

This is actually an amazing idea.




also a good discussion in general:

excalibur 4 hours ago

unvote [-]

This is a great start, but there's room for improvement. What if we could scale it up to roughly one representative per 10K constituents AND have each constituent represented by someone whose views closely resemble their own?

This is possible if you eliminate congressional districts altogether and have people "subscribe" to a representative. It removes the problem of a single congressman "trying" to represent constituents with widely disparate views equally, and abolishes gerrymandering in the process.

 maxxxxx 6 hours ago | unvote [-]

Sounds like an interesting idea. In the end the US needs a system where if a party gets a certain percentage of votes it gets some level of representation in Congress. For example in the 90s Ross Perot got 18% of votes but these voters got 0 percent representation anywhere. This is just extremely unhealthy. The extreme partisanship would get reduced quickly if there were some people in Congress who would vote with one of the big parties one and then with the other another time.




clarkevans 49 days ago

parent [-]on: Both in rich and poor countries, universal health ...

Regarding "violent coersion of the state", by this, I assume you mean.. taxes.

At this point in the world's history, we are not individuals who can wander off into the wilderness on our own, to live and die as God might have intended. We are members of a vast, global social fabric. We benefit from it. We pay into it. There's no way to avoid the coersion/evils or really deny the benefits/goods that this society provides. We can only discuss things relatively speaking, on a whole, in balance.

I think a productive use of our time is thinking about (and experimenting with) how information technology could better support our emerging social fabric so that we could make the best collective decisions: that is, enable even more personal freedom.



consider again having all 3 chairs co-chair the Board via voting

consider again having board subcommittees whose membership and/or chairs are selected via the triscore, and consider having them have 3 co-chairs


some ppl argue that supreme courts should have even, rather than odd, numbers. This would allow us to have only 6 procedural tribunal judges instead of 9, which significantly reduces the burden on small organizations. But, it also means that a majority decision is also a 2/3s decision, whereas currently we have some special powers that require 2/3s.

In addition, whereas for substantive matters i think it's fine for a supreme court to tie (which means that appeals are not overturned), since this is a procedural tribunal which is the court of first (and last) instance for procedural matters, a tie means it's hard to resolve procedural issues that really do need an answer. Otoh we currently have a thing in there that says that the chairs (as a group) vote to break ties on the procedural tribunal, which i guess is good.

also those 2/3 powers of the procedural tribunal add to complexity, and i'm thinking of taking them out anyhow.

otoh having appelate ties means that different original jurisdiction panels of judges might come to different understandings of the law, which means that forum shopping/venue shopping becomes more important, which is bad.

also having the Chairs get frequently involved to break procedural ties further gives 'positive' powers to the Chairs, which takes away their focus on the 'negative' powers. But it's not as bad as giving them powers over substantive matters, if we also amend their tie-breaking power to restrict it to only situations where the Procedural Tribunal has original jurisdiction, that is to say, procedural matters.

hmm.. all in all, i think i'd rather have every decision decided (no ties)... but i think that maybe reducing the burden on small organizations is more important than that.


on arbitration


mb have something like


" For example a tribal system of hunter-gatherers needs to gather food from the external world by hunting animals and gathering other goods. They need to have a set of goals and a system to make decisions about such things as when to migrate to better hunting grounds. The tribe also needs to have a common belief system that enforces actions and decisions as the community sees fit. Finally there needs to be some kind of educational system to pass on hunting and gathering skills and the common belief system. If these prerequisites are met, the tribe can sustain its existence. " [34]

mb let the chair have both the first and the last word in a debate on whether to overrturn the chair's ruling (appeal from decision of chair)

rro apparently does this [35]


Read the rest of 2013 Global corruption barometer report, start at page 12


read chapter 10 of which talks about how to prevent authoritarianism


mb just define supermajority as >= 60%, instead of either the complicated thing in the current bylaws, or 2/3s. Mb leave 2/3s in there just for bylaw amendment.