notes-econ-predictionMarkets

SchellingCoin

"

• The SchellingCoin? mechanism has an associated sub-currency.
• Anyone has the ability to “join” the mechanism by purchasing units of the currency and placing them as a security deposit. Weight of participation is proportional to the size of the deposit, as usual.
• Anyone has the ability to ask the mechanism a question by paying a fixed fee in that mechanism’s currency.
• For a given question, all voters in the mechanism vote either A or B.
• Everyone who voted with the majority gets a share of the question fee; everyone who voted against the majority gets nothing.

Note that, as mentioned in the post on P + epsilon attacks, there is a refinement by Paul Sztorc under which minority voters lose some of their coins, and the more “contentious” a question becomes the more coins minority voters lose, right up to the point where at a 51/49 split the minority voters lose all their coins to the majority. " -- [1]

Subjective SchellingCoin

Designed to answer 51% attacks against SchellingCoin?.

"

• For a given question, all voters in the mechanism vote either A or B.
• Everyone who voted with the majority gets a share of the question fee (which we will call P); everyone who voted against the majority gets nothing. However, deposits are frozen for one hour after voting ends.
• A user has the ability to put down a very large deposit (say, 50*P) to “raise the alarm” on a particular question that was already voted on – essentially, a bet saying “this was done wrong”. If this happens, then the mechanism splits into two on-chain forks, with one answer chosen on one fork and the other answer chosen on the other fork.
• On the fork where the chosen answer is equal to the original voted answer, the alarm raiser loses the deposit. On the other form, the alarm raiser gets back a reward of 2x the deposit, paid out from incorrect voters’ deposits. Additionally, the rewards for all other answerers are made more extreme: “correct” answerers get 5*P and “incorrect” answerers lose 10*P. " -- [2]