notes-legislative accountability

Note: it is often incorrect to hold a legislator accountable for voting for an amendment that you don't like. this is because the legislator might be voting strategically in a way that actually improves the final outcome in a way that you do like.

For example, consider the case of a saving amendment provided by (Enelow, 1981) (which I found by way of Strom, 1990, page 47). In 1966, there was a civil rights bill in the U.S. House of Representatives (H.R. 14765). The bill initially contained text that barred, "discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing in housing". However, Representative Charles Mathias offered an amendment that, "...permitted a real estate broker to follow the written instructions of a homeowner, even if discriminatory, in the sale or rental of a home, privded the broker did not solicit the instructions."

Now, assuming you are a fan of civil rights, you might think you should be angry at Mathias and at those who voted for his amendment. But in fact, it is thought that the original, un-amended civil rights bill would have failed, and that Mathias's amendment in fact allowed the whole bill to pass. So, those who voted for Mathias's amendment were actually helping the cause of civil rights, because a weak civil rights bill is preferable to no bill. Enelow's analysis of the positions of the legislators who voted for Mathias's amendment showed that a number of them in fact were pro-civil rights who voted for the amendment not because they liked it better than the original bill, but because they realized that voting in this way would actually serve the cause of civil rights by getting preventing the failure of the whole bill.

Another way of looking at this is compromise. The pro-civil rights Representatives were faced with the option to compromise with their opposition, and end up with some of what they wanted, or to not compromise, and get nothing at all. A vote for the amendment was a vote for compromise.

So, the conclusion is: if you see that a representative has voted for an amendment B' to a bill B, and you liked the original bill B better without the amendment, you do not yet have enough information to conclude that the rep has voted against your interests; perhaps the rep has the same goals as you, and was forced to compromise.

Enelow, 1981. Saving amendments, killer amendments, and an expected utility theory of sophisticated voting.

Strom, 1990. The Logic of Lawmaking.