Notes

The rest of this document contains notes to myself about other ideas. Much of it is my own writing, but some are notes copied and pasted in from elsewhere to remind me to examine some issue or another. the "running version" of the constitution in my head incorporates most of the ideas below, and hence is rather different from what is described above. as i have time, i intend to slowly rewrite the above to incorporate the changes.

TODO: fix delegate excess problem (i.e. should adjust delegate minimum so that if there were one more person, there would be enough to elect 8 delegates)

recommendations

don't make the legislature approve a lot of the organization's actions; the legislature is designed to be able only to express the organization's views on topics on which there is broad agreement, it is not able to decide controversial issues quickly. Note that the 60% threshold translates into a need for 5 out of 7 representative on the 7-person legislatures, which is just over 70%; this is by design; the legislature, especially the representative legislature, can only act in the presence of substantial agreement. Since there are many decisions must be made one way or another even when agreement cannot be reached, the executives should be given substantial discretion to take action in the absence of legislative agreement.

mb just call the tribunes "president" since english-speakers are familiar with that term. but the role is so different... governor?

other names:

critic guardian of the people the people's guardian the people's investigator anti-prime minister governor auditor speaker investigator detective chief

eh, i still like tribune best

overseer guardian chairperson board, not commissioners?

---

the Gadaa system is interesting:

http://www.ethiopolitics.com/articles/The_Gadaa_system.htm

it's a democracy. the top 9 officials are:

1. Abbaa Bokku - President 2. Abbaa Bokku - First Vice-President 3. Abbaa Bokku - Second Vice-President 4. Abbaa Chaffe - Chairman of the Assembly (Chaffe) 5. Abbaa Dubbi - Speaker who presents the decision of the presidium to the Assembly 6. Abbaa Seera - Memoriser of the laws and the results of the Assembly's deliberations. 7. Abbaa Alanga - Judge who executes the decision 8. Abbaa Duula - In charge of the army 9. Abbaa Sa'a - In charge of the economy

this is slightly analogous to constructs in AC and in traditional structures: 3 chairs (but with positive power, too), a secretary of the Forum (parliamentarian, but not chairing), a Judge, a EEO, a CEO. Abbaa Chaffe and Abbaa Dubbi are the only ones not represented at all, afaik (a chairman of the Forum and a go-between who presents the decisions of these 9 to the Forum).

interesting and sad reading on how formal democracy, seemingly supported by the central government, can be perverted by local corruption, esp. in an atmophere of violence:

ETHIOPIA SINCE THE DERG: DEMOCRATIC PRETENSION AND PERFORMANCE. DEMOCRATISATION IN ETHIOPIA ON LOCAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL Lovise Aalen Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Norway

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ­ NOT FOR THE OROMO? STRUCTURAL REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATISATION Siegfried Pausewang Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway

from Exploring New Political Alternatives for the Oromo in Ethiopia Report from Oromo workshop and its after-effects Edited by Siegfried Pausewang

http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3360-exploring-new-political-alternatives-for-the-oromo.pdf

on the need for fair process:

http://www.sciencemag.org/content/326/5959/1466.full

" Science 11 December 2009: Vol. 326 no. 5959 p. 1466 DOI: 10.1126/science.326.5959.1466

• News of the Week

Anthropology Anthropology Chagnon Critics Overstepped Bounds, Historian Says

   1. Charles C. Mann

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA—The? scene was familiar. Almost exactly 9 years ago this week, a packed session at the American Anthropological Association's (AAA's) annual meeting rancorously debated the inflammatory misconduct charges in journalist Patrick Tierney's book, Darkness in El Dorado: How Scientists and Journalists Devastated the Amazon. That 2000 session went over its allotted time and dissolved into acrimony. On 2 December, the AAA annual meeting held another panel discussion on Darkness. It, too, was packed (though the room was smaller), filled with ethics charges and bitter, sometimes personal debate, and unable to finish on time, as arguments spilled into the hallways. Leaving the room, Robert Carneiro of the American Museum of Natural History in New York City told Science, “I don't know if this is ever going to end.” Figure View larger version:

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When worlds collide.

Napoleon Chagnon (left) was attacked for his dealings with the Yanamamö people. "CREDIT: COURTESY OF NAPOLEON CHAGNON"

This year's meeting had a different slant on the ongoing fight over Tierney's book, which focused on anthropologists' treatment of the Yanamamö Indians of southern Venezuela and northern Brazil. Nine years ago, much of the meeting echoed Tierney's book in attacking Yanamamö researcher Napoleon A. Chagnon, now a professor emeritus at the University of California, Santa Barbara. This time around, most of the criticism was leveled at Chagnon's accusers and the AAA itself. In the 2 December session, historian Alice Domurat Dreger of Northwestern University's Feinberg School of Medicine in Chicago, Illinois, reported on her research into AAA's role in the affair, as part of a book on scientific controversies. So problematic were AAA's actions, she charged, “I can't imagine how any scholar feels safe” as a member.

The Yanamamö have become something akin to anthropological celebrities: A relatively large and non-Westernized indigenous group that still largely makes a living by hunting, foraging, and slash-and-burn agriculture, they became well-known through Chagnon's work. His book, Yanomamö: The Fierce People (1968), and documentaries launched a cavalcade of research on the Yanamamö, who have since been studied by as many as 50 anthropologists. From the beginning Chagnon's work attracted criticism, especially his view that warfare is a key building block of Yanamamö society. This attracted the ire of both opponents of evolutionary psychology and indigenous-rights activists, who charged that Chagnon's ideas were being used to justify taking Yanamamö land. Eventually, these criticisms helped to get Chagnon banned from research in both Venezuela and Brazil.

But Tierney's charges went well beyond the scientific. Although Darkness excoriated many anthropologists, the book focused on Chagnon, and especially a 1968 incident in which Chagnon and the celebrated late geneticist James R. Neel vaccinated Yanamamö and observed their immune responses. Tierney argued that the pair had never obtained informed consent and exacerbated or even caused a fatal measles epidemic.

AAA, apprised of the book's charges in September 2000, asked a commission led by former AAA President James Peacock for a confidential report—“inevitably meaning that Chagnon couldn't confront his accusers,” Dreger said in an interview, and heading “down the path of violation of due process.” Peacock, as he said at the AAA meeting last week, decided the charges had enough evidence to merit “an investigation.” However, the AAA ethics code, adopted in 1998, forbids “adjudicat[ing] claims for unethical behavior,” so AAA assembled a task force to conduct an “inquiry.” Figure View larger version:

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Turning the tables.

Alice Dreger criticized Chagnon's critics. "CREDIT: S&K CREATIVE IMAGES"

The task force exonerated Chagnon and Neel of the epidemics charges (Science, 19 January 2001, p. 416) yet concluded that Tierney's allegations “must be taken seriously” and said Chagnon's work “had been damaging to the Yanamamö.” In 2005, the AAA membership voted by a large majority to rescind the task force report, but it remained on the AAA Web site until September.

Despite the task force's conclusion, Dreger obtained an e-mail from the task force chair, former AAA President Jane Hill of the University of Arizona in Tucson, describing the book as “just a piece of sleaze.” And task force member Janet Chernela of the University of Maryland, College Park, Dreger said, told her that “nobody took Tierney's book's claims seriously.” The inquiry was conducted, Dreger charged, largely because AAA wanted to safeguard U.S. researchers' future access to the indigenous peoples in Latin America; they didn't want other anthropologists to become tarred with the same brush.

In an e-mail to Science, Chagnon said he had been “dumbfounded” to learn from Dreger that task force members had thought little of Tierney's work but “went ahead with their shameful witch hunt of Neel and me.”

Invited to respond, Terence Turner of Cornell University, a longtime Chagnon critic, argued that last week's meeting was unfairly set up—he had 15 minutes to respond to what amounted to an hour of critique. Moreover, he observed, Tierney's book did much more than attack Chagnon, and neither the AAA task force nor Dreger had addressed its discussion of other, putatively unethical work. Tierney did not respond to Dreger's inquiries and was not at the meeting. Reached by Science, he echoed Turner's point and defended his work against specific allegations.

As Dreger observed, many of the most bitter feuds in social science erupt over questions of “human identity.” Because that question is central to anthropology—and because indigenous peoples are often involved in political struggle—battles are common. Yet AAA has made no institutional changes to better handle the next eruption, says Dreger, such as altering its code of ethics. “They've learned nothing,” she said. "

ideas specific to application

govmt app

no government agent or their proxies may ask, encourage, or require any person to erase or turn over their only copy of information, including photos, video, and other information

no restriction may be placed on journalists which is not placed on people in general

any snooping that is deemed allowed by the government or its proxies on the grounds that the information was made publically accessible is deemed allowed by private citizens, for any purpose, both when targeted at other private parties and when targeted at the government, including the military

tripartite govm't? military/police/other?

no permit needed for demonstrations

no collective punishment for demonstrations

if a person is being held in or is a resident of an area in which the government exerts effective control, then the person is treated as a citizen, with civil rights including the right to vote

constitutional restraint against any law enforcement or punitive activity being funded more per punishment

" In the early decades of the United States grand juries played a major role in public matters. During that period counties followed the traditional practice of requiring all decisions be made by at least twelve of the grand jurors, (e.g., for a twenty-three-person grand jury, twelve people would constitute a bare majority). Any citizen could bring a matter before a grand jury directly, from a public work that needed repair, to the delinquent conduct of a public official, to a complaint of a crime, and grand juries could conduct their own investigations. In that era most criminal prosecutions were conducted by private parties, either a law enforcement officer, a lawyer hired by a crime victim or his family, or even by laymen, who could bring a bill of indictment to the grand jury; if the grand jury found there was sufficient evidence for a trial, that the act was a crime under law, and that the court had jurisdiction, then by returning the indictment to the complainant, it appointed him to exercise the authority of an attorney general, that is, one having a general power of attorney to represent the state in the case. The grand jury served to screen out incompetent or malicious prosecutions.[4] The advent of official public prosecutors in the later decades of the 19th century largely displaced private prosecutions.[5] [edit] " -- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_jury

national security is not an exception to human or civil rights unless explicitly stated as such in a statute (i.e. a court cannot make a national security exception)

corporate personhood should incldue: entering into contracts, incurrint debts, paying taxes. should not include right to influence government and participate in civil society. what about procedural fairness guarantees?

if juries, then force declaration to juries: "how much was spent on legal representation?"

India's Right to Information law: http://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29india.html?ref=global-home

freedom of speech exception: impersonation (without the permission of the one impersonated). to prevent someone posting on craigslist claiming to be them asking ppl to take stuff from their house, etc

pyramid schemes strictly prohibited, including such things as pension funds structured as pyramid schemes

no promises of money made until there is money put aside to pay for them

sousveillance

stats tests for reps

police officers, agents and automated agents of police officers must present their identity, affiliation, and position with police upon request, and must allow a person to verify these upon further request. This requirement may be delayed in situations in which immediate presentation and verification would place the officer or other people in physical danger. A citizen shall not be punished for acting under the assumption that a police officier is in fact a criminal posing as a police officier under the officier presents and allows the citizen to verify their identity. Permitted verification shall be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the police officer's credentials are true, and shall not be less extensive than the methods that police commonly use to verify an individual's identity.

it is not a crime merely to disagree with, yell at, insult, publically verbally abuse, or be rude to a police officer (provided there is are no threats made), or to refuse to show deference beyond the minimal necessary to allow the officer to carry our hir duties.

when the law says that something is not a crime, other charges may not be used to effectively punish those who do the targeted action.

it is permissible for the law to allow a guilty person to go free when the government violates procedural rights in a matter connected with the case, even if the violation is a generic mistake that was not targeted at the specific case (for example, if a file was lost, and the lack of the file led to the violation, this may be a cause for throwing out the case even though the file was lost accidentially, and before the start of the case). the rationale is that this is one of the few ways to give the government an incentive to not make such mistakes.

External affairs

Only issues of external relations -> Only issues of foreign policy or external relations

perry et al's idea to force the exec to consult with congress, and force congress to vote on approving or disapproving of ea. war

(and, all hostilities of more than 1 week are a war)

no non-public information may be collected on individuals who are not guilty of some crime without their consent. information that is collected based on probable cause must be deleted upon the end of active investigation of the case, which cannot last longer than 10 years.

by default, ("pure" and pre-registered) political protests are immune to laws. a law can be made to apply to a political protest via a supermajority (and this can be repealed with a simple majority)

Public Auditors

Parts of the organization, and entities falling within the organization's jurisdiction, may be assigned public auditors. Individuals may not be publically audited except by their own free choice. Public auditors' powers with respect to their target entities are similar to tribunes, except as the law says otherwise, and except that their scope may extend to any criminal deception or any crime against the public, not just those crimes involving corruption of the state or violation of state procedure. this scope may be restricted by law.

any entity may nominate themselves to be the public auditor of another specific entity -- entities may not be nominated other than self-nomination. an entity may audit multiple other entities at once. an entity may only audit another entity if there is no conflict of interest, as defined by law and interpreted by the courts. being paid to publically audit is not a conflict of interest, unless the payment comes from someone with a conflict of interest (for example, the entity itself) or unless the payment is contingent upon the results of the audit. nominees may be required by law to testify that they meet some set of non-conflict-of-interest conditions. if there is no conflict of interest, then the public auditor for each entity is chosen by election, if there are one or more candidates. contained in the ballot for an entity's auditor shall be the choice, 'this entity should not be audited at this time' -- if this choice wins, then there shall be no public auditor for that entity for the time being. the election shall be in the forum and shall utilize transitive proxy but shall be just a standing vote, without debate or amendment, and shall be "on the side", in addition to the topics under discussion.

no incentives or punishments may be offered to individuals by the state contingent upon their willingness to be publically audited. each entity may be audited by at most one public auditor at any time. candidates for publically auditing individuals will not be placed on the ballot unless the individual is currently willing to be publically audited. an individual may retract their willingness to be audited at any time, even while an audit is in progress. willingness to be audited is opt-in for individuals.

any statue or regulation restricting the powers or scope of public auditors may be struck down at any time by a majority of the tribunes. the tribunes must strike down such laws in general or not at all -- they cannot strike down a law with respect to a particular entity or class of entity, unless the law itself is particular to that entity or class. failure to strike down such a law in the past does not prevent tribunes from striking down such a law later.

no state entity or official may be a public auditor. state entities may be audited. the granularity of state entities, for the purpose of public audits, shall be defined by law, although a majority of tribunes may declare state entities to be of a finer granularity.

The existence of a public auditor does not excuse entities from the responsibility to run their own audits nor does it excuse the tribunes from any of their responsibilities.

Employment status of Public Auditors

Public Auditors are formally considered to be officials of the oversight branch of the organization. However, Public Auditors may not be paid by the organization. The senior tribune may award honors which do not have substantial value (aside from the respect and publicity conveyed by the honor) to some public auditors.

no secrets for corporations

NDAs (and other contracts mandating secrecy) are not made illegal, but will not be enforced (i.e. such contracts are purely informal) --- that is, you cannot legally bind yourself to restrict your right to free speech

speech refers to any form of information transmission (obviously, hacking someone's computer or body is more than JUST information transmission, though)

corporate size limitation?

antitrust

limits on seizure

freedom to leave/deaffiliate without later persecution with freedom of speech

todo:

antitrust (votes)

more on privacy and surveilance?

balanced budget

forbid solidarity in politics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_collective_responsibility , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_collective_responsibility ? NOTE: ONLY POLITICAL solidarity IS FORBIDDEN, I.E. ONLY PARTY DISCIPLINE AS REGARDS EXPRESSION OF OPINION AND VOTING -- STRIKES, ETC I.E. ACTION IS PERMITTED

Lèse majesté is not a crime -- violating the dignity of special people or institions is allowed (at least to the extent that it is allowed for non-special entities)

there shall be no hereditary status or classification attached to individuals

no collective punishment

no cruel or unusual punishments

senate by secret ballot

watchdog and judicial branches must be nonpartisan

state power over individuals may only ever be exercised through law (thx to noah feldman)

tax and budget neutral proposals that don't o/w inc. gvmnt power or decr indiv power are 50% (thx to dana)

budget is automatically same unless changed

political districts, when defined as regions of space and when subsets of some larger political district, must be devised by an algorithm of the following form: * the space to be divided is morphed into a reference space in a continuous fashion so that the density of constitutents in the reference space is uniform * the reference space is partitioned (tessellated) into regular polytopes of identical size, each with equal-length sides. if the space cannot be tessellated, the extremities are merged into the nearest polytope (unless this would make some polytope contain more than 7% more than some other one, in which the stardard size must be decreased) * these polytopes are mapped back into real space, where they are the districts (thx to dana)

no political party shall be named or privilaged in the law (no thx to ca redistricting initiative)

legislative bodies may not change or suspend their rules by a vote of less than 2/3. permanent changes must be receive 2/3 on two occasions with at least 1 year in between. (no thx to us senate)

"guilty but should not be punished"?

ministers and any other officials in a branch outside the legislature cannot preside in the legislature (no thx to roman emperors)

apolitical military -- the military are the exception to absolute freedom of speech as they can be sanctioned for offering their political opinion

campaign finance control shall be indifferent to what they say and who they are and changes take 1 cycle to take effect

no forced/coerced/encouraged direct read/write to brains by govm't -- no forced/coerced direct read/write to brains by anyone e.g.: drugs, lie detectors

freedom of thought -- it is a crime for anyone to make any reward or position or status contingent upon someone's opinions (only overt actions)

the state is prohibited from directly promoting opinions i.e.persuasion, including any position on which courses of action are ethical (indirect promotion of the idea that the law should be followed by means of enforcing the law is of course allowed) -- this in no way impedes public free expression by govmt officials when on their time, not in their official capacity, and not aided in reaching their audience by the state (at least, not more than ordinary citizens) e.g: even no-smoking ads? yes!

(principle: when there is significant controversy, govm't effort should not aid either side, b/c both sides' taxes are paying for it -- also, govm't should not impede the flow of ideas)

each individual posseses their own body

no "party discipline"?

(how to prevent geographic reassignment?)

everything which is not prohibited by law is allowed. nothing which is not compelled by law is required.

no political party may outlaw or sanction factions???

legal rights, plurality of associations, public sphere

victimless crimes: but resonable taxes, as well as the equivalent of a "driver's license" eduation requirement, as well as age limits are in effect

sharing of non-rivalrous goods is a civil right

police and military officers must wear clearly visible badges with short, memorable identifers. they may not obscure these. exceptions may be made in special cases by an explicit, one-off order of political officials. "standing" exceptions may not be made.

explicit note: "subversive" speech, even to the extent of inciting violence, is permitted. the goal here is, after all, a State which can be revolted against if necessary.

	 as to organizing, it is not a crime to incite a riot, etc -- things against corporations, or the State. organizing for terrorism, the DELIBERATE targeting of civilians, is a crime. however, revolutionaries who allow "collateral damage", i.e. a daycare center attached to a government building, are protected (NOT in the sense that the action is not criminal -- it is -- just that organizing for the action is not -- i.e. no "prior restraint")

demonstration permits: should think of some criteria which are sufficient for a demo permit to be issued, lest demonstrations be blocked simply by never issuing permits.

agents provocateur forbidden

it is a crime to falsely enter information into a government database of suspects or criminals or people to watch or be wary of which makes the person seem to be more dangerous or alarming than they are

right to be left alone so long as one is not intruding on or harming someone else includes freedom from intrusion thx http://www.seesharppress.com/freedom.html

(should abortion be resolved in the constitution by defining a person? mb)

any high official in the legislature (i.e. the pr house, the indirect hier house, and the sortition house) may say anything they want during their speeches or in private discussion with other high officials, and this may not be used against them or against others against their will. specifically, they may admit to committing a crime or talk about others who have committed crimes without anyone getting in trouble for that/without it being used as evidence.

State cannot propagandize; EXCEPT in the manner of certification. the difference is that it cannot spend money to publicize the opinion, that is, to buy broadcast/ad time, to fly people around to give speeches, etc, and public officials cannot give press conferences on it in their role as public officials (although they can privately). it can, however, create a list of facts/opinions/ideas/people/organizations/presentations that are given various certifications (such as "the government approves!" or "the government agrees!" -- although presumably wordings less vulnerable to irony would be chosen). the people/organizations can then indicate this (or in the case of ideas, people or organizations presenting the ideas can indicate which ideas or presentations have a certification of approval) note that corporations should be bound to the same limits as states should advertising be banned? if not, then the govmt should be allowed to do it...

minimum age for all high office holders: 29 (30 in the minimum age for senators; wikipedia says henry clay was 29 when elected, so i guess that's not so bad.. anyhow, 29 is prime :) )

hmm.. maybe the reps in the indirect hier house and in the sortition house should have to swear to use their own judgement? but this cannot be determined by anyone but them, hence not enforced.

does the PM have any powers that can be exercised other than via cabinet members? well, certainly the emergency power; what else? i suppose the FM is commander-in-chief.

"No organisation which supplies a citizen with services should be exempt from the citizen’s ability to change that supplier either by voting or by spending his money differently." thx http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/2005/09/who-governs-britain.html

"At local level, it is essential that we return local accountability to police forces by introducing elected chief constables to take charge of each force and dictate local policy in accordance with the wishes of the people they serve."

note: others with proposals similar to Loring's: http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/debate.htm

todo: create continuity of govm't procedure thx to http://www.amoreperfectconstitution.com/23_proposals.htm

mandatory retirement age for all judges. thx to http://www.amoreperfectconstitution.com/23_proposals.htm

police managers must be elected locally

prereqs for office: must have been non-minor citizen for 12 years

minor from age 0-18.

right to create, posess, share, trade, and use any communications and/or computational device

educators have some sort of a right to teach their beliefs

partial nullification: federal entities can nullify laws if the nullification does not have that do not have a large effect outside of themselves. they cannot nullify human rights found in this constitution, taxation obligations, or laws restricting the power of the federal entity. each nullification must be put into the sub's constitution (by same process the sub uses for other constitutional amendments) even if the nullification has a large effect outside of it, if the effect is neither violent nor physically dangerous, the federal entity cannot be prohibited but can only be fined for the effect, and the fine must be no more than the value of the externality caused. (examples of 'large effects' that are not physically dangerous: refusing to police corporations, leading zillions of scam artists, spammers, and deceptive large corporations to live there. example of a dangerous effect: allowing the building of a nuclear bomb or a squadron of tanks. note that this is a distinction between federal entities and corporations; corporations may be denied the choice to simply pay for externalities)

the federal supergovernment may not make rewards or punishments contingent upon a sub entity or entities doing or not doing anything within their jurisdiction, even nullification, even if the reward or punishment is de facto rather than de jure.

subentities have their own police, and law enforcement units of the super cannot operate except with the express permission of the sub, and under whatever conditions the sub pleases -- with the exception of units constituted only to police the same things which cannot be nullified, which cannot be controlled or refused by the sub

explicit legislative vote with supermajority required to authorize the building of weapons of mass destruction or mind control or self reproduction (including both biological agents and also computer viruses/worms). such a resolution must explicitly specify an upper bound on the number and destructive capacity of the weapons authorized at this time. simple majority required to force reduction of weapon stockpiles.

http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/4957 has interesting idea for subsidarity decisions:

".... 7.1.3 Some decisions will affect everyone in a region, but not beyond. So, here too, so long as the decisions are not properly reserved to individuals or lower level councils, the decisions should be made by regional councils and not above.

7.1.4 And a decision that affects everyone should be decided by everyone. 7.2 More difficult are those cases that have most of their impact within some area, but some lesser impact beyond. Then who decides which level is most appropriate?

7.3 Say a second-level council wants to enact policy X and the third-level council takes the view that X should not be permitted. Who decides? One can insist that in a dispute of this sort, the higher-level council decides, or the opposite – that the lower level council decides. But it is likely that neither rule will lead to optimal results, for there is no general answer to the question of which level should decide: it will depend on the specifics of the case.

7.4 Accordingly, in cases of disagreement, the question of which level should decide should be made by the Council Courts. The Council Courts’ role in making sure that majorities don't violate the fundamental rights of minorities is a subset of this larger role, which is to determine the appropriate level at which any issue should be determined. If there is a debate between a second-level council and the third level council as to who should decide an issue, the determination should be made by the third-level Council Court.

7.5 Two possible rulings that the Council Court might make are (1) the decision should be made by second level councils and (2) the decision should be made by the third level council. But there is no reason to limit the Council Court to these two possibilities. Here are four other possibilities: (3) the decision should be made by second level councils, but only after a deliberative meeting with a deputation from the third level council; (4) the decision should be made by the third level council, but only after a deliberative meeting with a deputation from the second level council; (5) the decision should be made by second level councils, but only with a two-thirds vote; (6) the decision should be made by the third level council, but only with a two-thirds vote. (And, of course, the Council Court can also issue ruling (7), which is that neither the second level nor the third level council has a right to enact legislation on the issue because it is a matter properly left up to individuals or to primary-level councils.) "

balanced budgeting: when a proposal is put forth, it is first submitted to the Office of Procedure, who estimates its cost. the initial proposal contains the maximum amount authorized to be spent on the proposal, and specifies which taxes are to be raised in order to fund it, and in what proportion, but does not specify how much the taxes should go up. when the proposal is submitted to the Office of Procedure, they estimate its cost (such that they think there is a 95% chance that the real cost will not be more than 5% above the amount they set) and set the tax amounts accordingly. each year, after collecting taxes, if there is extra, it is kept in a special fund by the tax-collection agency, and if there is an undershoot, or if operations cost more than expected, the treasury may go into debt. after collecting taxes, the treasury calculates an additive factor to next year's taxes which, if there was extra this year, is negative if necessary to 'give back' the money, or, if there is debt, is positive if necessary to pay back the debt. this number is automatically added to next year's tax rates at the time taxes are levied. it is a felony for any individual in the Office of Procedure to willfully misestimate the cost of something or to willfully misjudge procedure.

by a supersupermajority vote, the legislature may direct the state to take on up to a specified amount of debt and not to pay it back at the end of any year. this can be later recinded, or the debt ceiling may be lowered, by a simple majority, in which case the remainder of the debt, if there is any, is treated as usual (i.e. assessed as debt immediately, forcing the adjustment of the additive factor to the next tax levy, and then paid back after the next year's taxes are collected; i.e. there is a 1-year lag here)

the government may maintain a liquidity or "rainy day" fund, to which extra taxes are placed and from which money is taken before going into debt, however, such a fund must be explicitly legislated, and the legislation creating it is counted as an increase in spending. the point of this is that, by only a majority vote, the fund can be cancelled and the procedure described above comes back into effect, by default. this makes it hard for government to divert the extra money into a slush fund against the wishes of a majority.

 to prevent improper influence, some organizations might wish to forbid people from joining the same constituencies as their subordinates. 

following the freedom of individual speech/no freedom of government broadcast, incumbents in the government can individually nominate or endorse particular candidates, however, this cannot be reported or transmitted in any official government organ or press conference, except if all other endorsements or nominations of anyone for anyone else are reported or transmitted in the same way, without preference to or highlighting of the incumbent's choices or opinions, at government expense. government organs may not collectively/officially endorse or nominate anyone. so, for example, boards of directors cannot officially recommend their successors, although the incumbents may, acting as individuals, recommend successors -- but this cannot be written in the literature distributed to shareholders unless every shareholder may recommend someone and have this reported in the literature -- and if the latter, the nominations of the incumbents may not be placed first or anything. so, for example, in a government, the PM cannot endorse some candidate at an organized press conference (one for which taxpayer money was spent planning or calling) -- but the PM can respond to journalist questions, and the PM can personally call up journalists and schedule a press conference to issue a personal endorsement.

judicial independence should be mentioned somewhere in the substantive rights section

"4th" amendment against unreasonable or warrentless search, like USA, but also considers information to have "reasonable expectation of privacy" if disclosed to a 3rd party with expectation of confidentiality or that the info would only be used for a certain purpose

for general case / corp application, every mention of "regulation" was removed, because, while statues are still useful (as the vehicle for the voters to tell management what to do), "regulation" is meaningless, because management doesn't have anyone to regulate except for its own employees in the general case.

regulations:

in glossary, add:

A regulation is a rule adopted by an authorized executive agency within the organization.

in tieHands, replace:

The legislature still has the authority to dictate general procedure; it can only prevent itself from intervening in individual cases.

with:

The legislature still has the authority to overrule regulation with statue, and thereby to dictate general procedure; it can only prevent itself from intervening in individual cases.

at the end/bottom of the order of precedence, add:

 > [Self:notes-groupDecisionMaking-plan11-bylaws-executive regulation]

exceptional conditions:

under tribunes/ === Powers held by jointly by multiple tribunes ===:

The tribunes have a special role in States of Exception.

under executive/, just before "individual decisions taken by executive agencies", add:

Except for during a Major Exceptional Condition, no executive agency create, modify, or remove statues. Executive agencies may create, modify, and remove regulations if and only if authorized to do so by statue in a specific domain.

Not just regulations, which describe general procedure, but also

under ceo, === Powers of the CEO and EEO ===, add:

The CEO also has a special role regarding States of Exception.

add exceptional/:

Exceptional conditions

Exceptional situations may occur in which fast, decisive action is necessary. Therefore, there is a mechanism for temporarily weakening the usual deliberative requirements.

Exceptional conditions fall into two classes: Minor Exceptional Conditions, and the Major Exceptional Condition.

The Normal condition

The organization is said to be in "normal condition" when no state of exception pertains.

Normal condition can be restored (that is, all exceptional conditions can be cancelled) by any of the following methods:

• A unilateral declaration by the CEO
• The expiration of the time limit attached to an exceptional condition
• An act by a simple majority of any single house of the legislature
• An act by a simple majority of the Tribunes
• An act by a simple majority of the group of people who (a) were delegate commissioners at the time of the declaration of the exceptional condition, and (b) are still reachable
• An act by a simple majority of the group of people who (a) were elect commissioners at the time of the declaration of the exceptional condition, and (b) are still reachable

Minor Exceptional Conditions

Minor Exceptional Conditions may be unilaterally declared by the CEO at any time.

The effects of a Minor Exceptional Condition are defined by statue. Multiple types of Minor Exceptional Conditions may be defined. Minor Exceptional Conditions cannot alter or bypass the legislative process.

A Minor Exceptional Condition automatically expires in two weeks unless renewed by an act of the legislature. If the full legislature is unable to be reached, a partial legislature may function as the legislature for the duration of the Minor Exceptional Condition. A Minor Exceptional Conditions may not last longer than two months.

The Major Exceptional Condition

The Major Exceptional condition may be jointly declared by the CEO and a simple majority of Tribunes. If a majority of the Tribunes are unavailable, the CEO may unilaterally declare a Major Exceptional condition, but only until a majority of the Tribunes become available.

During a Major Exceptional Condition, the CEO has temporary power to amend and create statues. The Major Exceptional Condition does not alter or bypass the process for amending or making an exception to the bylaws.

Time limits

No more than six months out of every period of one year may be spent outside of the normal condition.

"Length of time Outside Normalacy" shall initially be defined to be the length of time spent in exceptional conditions after the previous period of Normal Condition.

Define a "Fallow Period" after each return to Normal Condition. The Fallow Period lasts as long as the Length of time Outside Normalacy at the time of the return to Normal Condition. If some Exceptional Condition is declared again before the Fallow Period, then the intervening time between the last return to Normal Condition and the new Exceptional Condition is added to the Length of time Outside Normalacy.

Limitations on amendments to the bylaws

No bylaws concerning exceptional conditions may be removed, added, or modified except when the Length of time Outside Normalacy exceeds six months.

If the Bylaws are amended during any Exceptional Condition, these amendments shall expire with the restoration of Normal Condition, and shall not be re-enacted until the Length of time Outside Normalacy exceeds six months. If the amendments had an effect on the distribution of power (for instance, if they affected who is a Commissioner, who is CEO, who is a Tribune, etc), this effect is reversed upon such expiration.

maybe when there are three layers or more, the top two layers of the indirect hier house (the delegates pyramid) should be full time (if it wishes to be; or should we just leave this up to statues?). with P=11 and n=3.5e8, the top two layers of delegates (including the delegates' commission as the top layer) are 649 in number, so this is like having a full-time congress in the U.S. (although as noted i maybe govmt would use P=17, making it 17*68=1156, which is a bit more than congress -- but with P=13 its 13*62=806, which sounds pretty good to me -- and 13 is nicer than 17 for council deliberation, as noted).

hmm, maybe the full-time should be forced only when there are 3 layers or more (over 8,886,110) -- dunno if this makes sense for companies though. mb leave this as a config option? or just as a statue, but a recommendation from me.

if both commissions exist, then they must both meet for about the same amount of time per year

no prior restraint on speech

no agent provacteurs (sp), and peaceful protests may not be dispersed by means other than those on this list: pushing

   (i.e. no tear gas, no rubber bullets, no swinging of batons, no loud sounds)

proportional force may be used. "proportional" is defined to not exceed the class of weapon used by the opponent, e.g. rocks may be thrown at someone throwing rocks, but metal bullets may not be used against that person. proportional force must only be used against individuals, not crowds (i.e. if you do not know which individual threw a rock, you cannot throw a rock into a crowd), although some "collateral damage" may occur. a response is not proportional if a reasonable person may expect it to injure or kill more people, more seriously than were injured or killed by the opponent -- i.e. if a crowd throws rocks which seriously injure two people, and the government fire weapons which may be expected to kill ten people, the response was not proportionate.

is there a way to ban paramilitary groups which may be used by the government for terrorist suppression? and to ban paramilitary military youth groups?

no vague laws such as "disturbing the public order"

when issuing any denial of a permit to organize a public gathering or protest, the authority must issue a permit to organize the gathering or protest within a safe, near-by, convenient, visible public forum, which can accomodate as many people as the requesters request within one week of the date originally requested. if the request is more than a week before the requested date, the request may require a certain date. if no suitably large, safe, near-by, convenient, visible public place is available on the requested date, the authorities must permit the gathering to take place in the originally requested location. organizers may be punished for requesting a space to accomodate an orders-of-magnitude larger crowd than attends, provided that a reasonable person would not have expected a crowd as large as the request.

authorities may not take the purpose or political viewpoint of a gathering into account when granting a permit, and such information may not be requested

organizers of a gathering may not be held responsible for the independent actions of attendees.

defensive equipment, such as gas masks, may not be made illegal or taken from people permanently or even temporarily before a planned gathering. people may not be temporarily detailed with the purpose of impeding a planned gathering.

spec const duty to rebel, tiered rebellion, citizen shall not be punished for rebellion itself

corp application

for corporations and open source projects, i suggest using my "dominant eigenvalue+seniority" idea, discussed elsewhere, to distribute votes unequally among members. this would allow the founding members/major contributors of projects to have more say over the project's direction, compared to a one-person/one-vote system. in these cases, you would expect to often find commissions smaller than 11 where some major contributor effectively has a semi-permanent seat on all commissions.

for some wikis, however, and other situations where the equality of all members is paramount, one-person/one-vote should be used.

organizations such as non-employee owned corporations, where the voters don't really want to do anything, should not have the commission of delegates, or the councils, or a separate external board, and should not separate the constitutional court, the officers of procedure, or the tribunes.

nonprofit app

not allowed to be the recipient of any nondisclosure agreements (i.e. no one can be obliged to non-disclose to a nonprofit)

idea for giving control to contributors to a nonprofit w/o sacrificing democracy; give them a sublinear amount of control vs. their lifetime donations. for instance, if you give them sqrt(total value of donations), then we have:

sqrt($1) = 1 votes sqrt($100) = 10 votes sqrt($1000) = 32 votes sqrt($1bil) = 31,623 votes

of course, if you don't want a zillion small contributions, you could set the minimum contrib at 40, and then divide by 40.

applying the rule for startups that i heard, '1/3 for ideas, 1/3 for sweat, 1/3 for connections', (although 1 person can contribute parts of each category, meaning that individuals don't all get equal equity here), i guess nonprofit financing is most like 1/3 for connections for startups, so how about saying that 1/3 of the votes are allocated in this manner?

the point between the sublinearity is not primarily because of notions of equality between human beings (although that is a secondary motivation), but rather to encourage people who can't afford to donate much to do so (and to remain involved after donating).

assuming a power law (zipf?) distribution of donations (todo: is this realistic?), what would be the distribution of votes between large and small donors?

in addition to nonprofits, this could perhaps be used in mostly-employee-owned for-profits who wish to raise external capital

a problem is that of course such a system could be easily gamed by a rich entity acting through sockpuppets. this means that such a system ideally should not be used in a context where corporate entities or pseudonyms can aquire votes, only where verifiable individuals can. alternately, the 2/3 of the entity not tainted by fundraising votes can establish a committee with the sole discretion to 'unify' blocks of fundraisers in their sole discretion without cause. this may not be reassuring for the fundraisers, though, since this provides the other 2/3s a chance to completely control the fundraiser votes through gerrymandering if they are dastardly. as a compromise, perhaps a committee set up by the entire institution (or perhaps just through the normal legislative process) should unify votes -- this is simpler too. ok, i like that better. how about the constitution says, if it believes in good faith that unification may help recify gaming, but without due process, evidence, or proof, then the legislature can unify fundraising votes. if it has a preponderance of evidence (in its sole determination) that some organizations have been gaming, then it can nullify those organizations' votes. if an organization A owns or effectively controls, directly or indirectly, more than 33% of another organization B's shares (or votes), then A and B must declare this relationship, and then their fundraising votes may be unified. if A controls a majority of B, then their votes MUST be unified (and are automatically upon their declaration). (as noted above, failure to declare leads to automatic nullification of votes when that failure is discovered).

i think mb sqrt of fundraising is too harsh -- giving the $1000-giver only 32 votes seems like too little. how about raising to the 3/4 power? now we have:

1e2^.75 31.623 1e3^.75 177.83 1e9^.75 5.6234e+06

putting a reasonable "minimum donation" of $25 to get a single vote on this, we get

(1e2/25)^.75 = 2.8284 (1e3/25)^.75 = 15.905 (1e5/25)^.75 = 502.97 (1e9/25)^.75 = 5.0297e+05

this seems more reasonable to me

(rounding is not actually necessary -- fractional votes may be allowed)

for example, let's say that a group has $3000 in donations (or venture funds), coming from 1 $1000 donor, 10 $100 donors, and 100 $10 donors; so, as groups, the $1000 donors, the $100 donors, and the $10 donors are each contributing 1/3 of the donations. we have

s=(1e3/25)^.75 + 10*(1e2/25)^.75 + 100*(1e1/25)^.75 = 94.487 ((1e3/25)^.75)/s = 0.16833 (10*(1e2/25)^.75)/s = 0.29935 (100*(1e1/25)^.75)/s = 0.53232

so the voting power of the groups is about 17%, 30%, and 53%.

more general octave code:

 levels=3
 =  3
 groups = logspace(1,levels,levels)
 =

     10    100   1000

 group_votes=groups(end)./groups.*(groups./single_vote_cost).^.75

   50.297   28.284   15.905

 group_votes./sum(group_votes)

   0.53232   0.29935   0.16833

let's say we have the similar situation with $6,000,000 in donations:

octave:95> single_vote_cost = 25 single_vote_cost = 25 octave:96> levels=6 levels = 6 octave:97> groups = logspace(1,levels,levels) groups =

        10       100      1000     10000    100000   1000000

octave:98> group_votes=groups(end)./groups.*(groups./single_vote_cost).^.75 group_votes =

   5.0297e+04   2.8284e+04   1.5905e+04   8.9443e+03   5.0297e+03   2.8284e+03

octave:99> group_votes./sum(group_votes) ans =

   0.451951   0.254151   0.142919   0.080369   0.045195   0.025415

the guy who donated 1/6 of the total only has 2.5% of the vote -- then again, he is only 1/100,000th of the membership:

group_sizes=groups(end)./groups group_sizes =

   100000    10000     1000      100       10        1

octave:102> group_sizes./sum(group_sizes) ans =

   9.0000e-01   9.0000e-02   9.0000e-03   9.0000e-04   9.0000e-05   9.0000e-06

how does this work out if the dynamic range is not so large? for instance, in a company with on the order of 100,000 employees, we wouldn't expect most of them to be willing to pay only $10 for stock -- maybe it's more like there's a million employees, and only 100,000 of them have $100 worth of stock apiece:

octave:106> group_votes=groups(end)./groups.*(groups./single_vote_cost).^.75 group_votes =

   2.8284e+04   1.5905e+04   8.9443e+03   5.0297e+03   2.8284e+03

octave:107> group_votes./sum(group_votes) ans =

   0.463736   0.260778   0.146646   0.082465   0.046374

so, each group just gets bumped up a notch

in this scenario, the largest donor's vote is reduced by a factor of about 4.3 compared to if there was one vote per donation dollar, and the smallest donors' vote is increased by a factor of about 2.3. the ten second-largest donors are reduced by about 2.4x, so the people who donate $100,000 lose out by about as much about the $100 donors win.

it would of course be more meaningful to first find out empirically what scaling law donations or fundraisers have, and then to calculate this sort of thing.

now, i'm not sure this would be good for for-profit corporations -- because the small shareholders end up being the ones who dont care much about the corporation in the long-term, which would lead to shorttermism (pension funds and such would be large shareholders). perhaps this rule could apply to those who bought during private rounds of funding but not after such shares were transferred, and not during a public stock listing/IPO.

the difference between this and the nonprofit case is that people donate to nonprofits because they want to have an impact, so if voting counts as a type of impact, then mb you attract more small donations by giving small donors disproportionately large votes. in the for-profit case, the main motivation of buying shares isn't to have an impact on the company, it's to make money off dividends (including indirectly via capital gains). so maybe this makes more sense in the for-profit case if restricted to people who are expected to have 'controlling the company' or 'helping the corporate community' as a primary motivation for buying shares rather than people who are expected to want to make money -- so mb just employees.

so mb an initial setup for a company would be:

1/3 of the vote for external stockholders (proportional to stock held) 2/9 (=1/3 of the remaining 2/3s) of the vote for employees who purchase stock through the employee plan, under a ^.75 rule 4/9 of the vote periodically redistributed on trust-merit via the a seniority-biased dominant eigenvalue scheme.

or, to reward employee stock ownership, one could let the employee stock also count in the 1/3, and then to double-count them by giving them votes in the 2/9 also.

so, if 1/3 of the votes came from stock, and employees owned 1/3 of the stock, and they owned it according to the 5-tiered distribution above from $100 to $1,000,000, then the votes would be distributed as follows:

(group_votes./sum(group_votes))*(2/9) + [1/45 1/45 1/45 1/45 1/45] ans =

   0.125275   0.080173   0.054810   0.040548   0.032527

external shareholders: 22.2% (2/9 = 1/3*2/3)

44.4% distributed based on merit/trust/seniority amongst employees

so, an external person buying a share of stock gets 1/3 of a vote. an employee buying stock with a size multiplier of 1 gets 5/9ths of a vote. an employee who doesn't own any stock who is buying $100 of stock gets .84 of a vote per share, and an employee buying $1,000,000 gets .385 per share. here we see that this plan takes the form of an extra incentive for employees to own shares, combined with giving employee shareholders disproportionate voting power, but small employee shareholders are incentived more.

instead of decoupling votes from shares, one could more simply just have the company itself own 2/3s of its shares, and then temporarily lend them to people in accordance with the rules above; that is, 2/9s of the shares are lent to employees in proportion to the shares they own, and 4/9s are periodically redistributed in accordance with the dominant eigenvalue+seniority trust scheme.

the difference between that and vote decoupling is twofold:

1) avoidance of awkward questions about why ownership != voting (although its still weird for the corporation to own most of itself, i guess)

2) dividends are now distributed in the same proportions as votes. in fact, since the dominant eigenvalue+seniority trust scheme was envisioned partially as a bonus distribution system, perhaps now dividends could replace bonuses.

note that employees get a higher ROE (return on equity) than non-employees, and employees who own a small amount of shares get a higher ROE than those who own a large amount.

in comparison to a fully eigentrust-based voting system, this system only has 4/9s of the voting power in eigentrust. so this provides a more conservative idea that full eigentrust (because it is an interpolation between the current capital-based voting system, and the theoretical eigentrust-based voting system).

in initial fundraising rounds, VCs could be cut in to the employee plan. so, ignoring the scaling, a VC could get majority control of voting by providing 90% of the capital. however, with the scaling, it would be harder. the VCs would not be permanently grandfathered into the employee plan, however, only those shares sold to them during the fundraising would have the extra voting privilages attached, and they would go away if the VC sells the shares or goes bankrupt or has a change in ownership.

---

analysis notes (todo)

http://www.threefeloniesaday.com/

to my surprise, after thinking of this, a lower vote threshold for special issues is already included in the US legislative process, called "reconciliation": http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/politics/02hulse.html?_r=1&hp

some principles/heuristics, and where they led:

• directedly elected officials have more legitimacy (indebted to ?_
  • direct election of tribunes
• positions with smaller multiplicity are perceived as more glorious, powerful
  • only 3 tribunes (it was hard to decide 3 over 1)
• positions whose only role is the election of other officials become impotent (ex: elections of the US presidency)
  • indirect electors (vol hier const) can recall
• small groups won't put up with many officials
  • "scale down"
• elected officials are forced to be more concerned with positive powers than negative, more concerned with substance than procedure
  • creation of tribune, which has only negative powers and only concerned with procedure

note: so tribune is highest; few tribunes

indebted to (amongst others): -- Hare for voluntary constiuencies -- rangevoting.org for range voting ideas -- "liquid democracy" advocate for learning about delegable proxy -- soviet analysis for "circle of power" idea -- bagehot for the idea that drama draws teh public attention's, which is good -- athens for sortition, which informed -- that law review article

notes: -- recent iranian election (2009) shows that there can be trouble when the highest directly elected official is not the most powerful official -- recent iranian election shows the importance of verifiable election procedures, trust in review committees (in the recent iranian election, the head of the committee that would investigate the election was perceived as fiercely partisan, hence people didnt trust that verification mechanism) -- recent iranian election shows the importance of freedom of speech, peaceful assembly for legitimacy

tribunes dont have the right to request things like computer passwds, although they do have the right to insist on chaperoned admin access sessions?

Motivation for the size of the senate, the number of layers, and the minimal vote thresholds for each layer

(note: the # of people per constituency in layer i is approx S^{1 + k (L - i)}, where i=0 for the lowest layer of the undersenate, and L gives the size of the senate itself)

First, I decided what I thought the size of the senate should be. I wanted a formula that took as input the size of the electorate, and yielded the size of the Senate. I wanted this formula to be scalable, that is, to give reasonable answers for moderately small groups and also for groups the size of the entire population of Earth, and larger. In numerical terms, I require a rule that scales for groups of about 1000 up to groups of about 9 billion. If possible, it would be nice if the rule would scale down to about 15 and up to about 1e12.

Some approximate example group sizes to help get a handle on these numbers:

Size of representative bodies in this system with those numbers, and 8,15 and 1e18 thrown in just to see what happens with really small and with ridiculously large groups4

:

By the reasoning given elsewhere, I felt that the current size of the U.S. Senate, 100, is significantly too large. The Senate, I feel, should be as small as possible, a tiny body that is small enough to sit down together and have serious discussions; the only reason it needs to grow with population at all is to allow all of the major political viewpoints to have a voice (and to allow each major viewpoint to be represented by more than one member so that the personal preferences of one person doesn't overly dominate the expression of the will of their faction).

Let me emphasize that: I see the proper role of the Senate as a guide for public discourse and a focus for attention. So, the number of Senators should grow in proportion to the number of points of view that the public should be made to focus upon. This is in opposition to an idea in which the number of Senators should grow roughly in proportion to the size of the population itself, in order to ensure each faction of some fixed size at least one representative in the Senate.

Now, the simple fact is that, no matter how much you would like the public to devote sufficient time to be able to understand all of the subtleties of politics, that people will refuse (and rightly so) to spend too much time on this, and so the media will simplify the world into a small number of factions. In the United States today, by looking at how the media talks about political factions, I guess they divide domestic politics into about 6 factions: (religious Republicans, other Republicans, anti-corporate Democrats, other Democrats, greens, "other"). So let's say that the magic number is between 5 and 7. Since we will allow each of these factions (except "other") to field 2 reps, we have a body of at least 9 to 13. Now, if even the small factions such as the greens have 2 reps, surely some of the larger ones will have more. So we want a Senate of about 13 to 24 members.

Nth-root formulas are one alterantive, but n must be 6 or more in order to bring the Senate below 50 for 350,000,000 people. I worry that this scheme would not scale too well if the population continues to increase exponentially. For example, for 18 trillion people, the 6-th root rule yields about 162 senators, which seems like a lot to me. Does this fit with out intuitions? This would mean that with a population 3000 times larger than the current population of the entire Earth, the media would pretend that there is about 40-56 factions. This seems like too many to me.

On the other end of the scale, this formula gives Senate sizes that I feel are too slightly too low for small groups. For example, the 6-th root rule would give 3 senators for a group of 500, which seems like too few; would a 500 employee company have a board of directors of only 3 people?

In addition, the 6 seems like a kludge.

All in all a 6-th root rule would not be too bad, but log seems better. Log gives answers that seem better for very small and very large groups.

To start with, I tried natural log. log(350000000) \approx 19.7, which seems like a reasonable size for the Senate of the United States. log(25e9) \approx 24, so even with a population of more than twice current projections for the maximum world population within the forseeable future, this rule yields a suitably small Senate size. log(18e12) is only 30.5. Does this fit with out intuitions? This would mean that even with a population 3000 times larger than the current population of the entire Earth, the media would pretend that there is only about 7-11 factions. This seems too small to me, but I think it's closer than the guess of 40.

On the other end of the scale, for a 30 person group, which is about the size of the computational neurobiology graduate subprogram that until recently i was part of, we get a senate of 3.4, which seems about right. For a 65 person group, about the size of my class in elementary school we get a senate of 4.2, which also seems reasonable. For a

One model that would justify this is if we assume that the cognitive cost of holding in mind n factions is exponential in the number of factions, and the benefits of adding a new faction is directly proportional to the number of people who will be represented by that faction.

In this case, if we have P people and F factions, then that must be because the benefits of creating the last faction outweighed the costs. The benefits are proportional to P/F. The costs are proportional to exp(F) - exp(F-1). We have

exp(F) - exp(F-1) = P/F

F*(exp(F) - exp(F-1)) = P

F*(F e^{F-1} - e^{F-1}) = P

F*e^{F-1}*(F - 1) = P

ln F*e^{F-1}*(F - 1) = ln P

ln (F*(F-1)) + ln(e^{F-1}) = ln P

ln (F*(F-1)) + F-1 = ln P

F = O(ln P)

Natural log seems to wor

For example, according to http://physics.ucsd.edu/was-sdphul/dept/pr/gintro.html, UCSD currently has on the order of 2500 graduate students. The Senate would correspond to the size of the Graduate Student Council, our student government.

If each individual in the electorate

5 \end{comment}

\begin{comment} (log_S P -1 - L)/(\sum_{j=1}^L j) = k

log_S P = 1 + L + k*(\sum_{j=1}^L j)

log_S P = log_S S^{1 + L + k*(\sum_{j=1}^L j)}

P = S^{1 + L + k*(\sum_{j=1}^L j)}

P = S^{1 + L + k + 2*k + .... + ik + .... + L*K}

P = S^{1 + (1 + k) + (1 + 2*k) + .... + (1 + ik) + .... + (1 + L*K)}

P = \prod_{i=0}^L S^1 S^{1 + k} S^{1 + 2*k} * ... * S^{1 + ik} * .... * S^{1 + L*K}

P = \prod_{i=0}^L S^{1+k i}

x = \prod_{i=0}^{ceil(log(ceil(log(x))))} (ceil(log(x))^{1+k i}

--- according to http://books.google.com/books?id=nqfLXDGXMSYC&pg=PA263&lpg=PA263&dq=congress++"pages+per"&source=bl&ots=z2lUKVyWcl&sig=aJF53sHdgPLqDQJYV6ZXlIe-OJk&hl=en&ei=B14SSo7FMqP0tAP-6bTxDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2#PPA263,M1, The transformation of British politics, 1860-1995 By Brian Howard Harrison, p. 263, British parliament got through 16 pages per day for days in which bills passed in 1945.

see also http://www.dirksencenter.org/RHM_Manifesto/appndx_Comparative%20Data%20Summary.pdf

---

design principles:

• interpolate
• multiple forms

and goals:

• reduce the quantity of law
• attract public attention
• allow individuals to work on the issues they care most about

backwards-moving agenda process (i.e. status quo considered last) -- cite "the logic of lawmaking"

majoritarian bias in council of 11 with U-1:

.5^(10 - 2*11/3)*11 - .5^(10 - 1*11/3)*11 ans = 1.5960 octave:3> .5^(10 - 3*11/5)*11 - .5^(10 - 2*11/5)*11 ans = 0.81526

note: neither the senate, the BFA, nor the ministers have sole jurisdiction over anything -- policy in all spheres can be set by statue. (this is in contrast with certain theories of the USA constitution, which hold that the president as "commander-in-chief" has sole authority to decide on military matters. of course, in most occasions it would not be wise for the legislature to issue orders directly to the battlefield, but i trust that the either the house of the people or the senators would show some restraint when it is needed)

of course, the legislature would need a supermajority in most situations (specifically, a supermajority is required unless the orders are to demobilize, to cease hostilities, to retreat, or not to attack in some class of situation. in other words, anti-aggressive orders require a simple majority and other actions require a supermajority).

--

4 types of legislatures: personal/no communications media (sortition), representative/no communications media (hierarchial indirect representation), personal/communications media (mass parliament, also referenda), representative/communications media (direct elections of representatives)

pros, cons:

(general notes: "media influence" implies money influence, at least in societies where the rich can buy broadcast bandwidth indirection probably implies corruption )

sortition: +: unbiased gauge of the people's will -: no media -: unskilled at legislation -: no accountability +: simple +: no indirection historical examples and other fans: Athens

	   slogan: "we're really people"
	   	   this is the only form in which ordinary people ("real people") directly discuss and make decisions on policy

hierarchial indirect representation: +: no media -: possible top-down problem (i.e. the Politbureau/Stalin problem) -: very much indirection -: not simple +: skilled legislators -: parties/powerful candidates may appeal directly to voters via media anyway, castrating indirectness

	    historical examples and other fans: original method of selecting usa president, libertarian municipalism, party structure in usa, party structure in soviet russia

	    slogan: "you can actually discuss things"
	    	    in this form, discussion can take place directly between individuals, and each individual can discuss things personally with a representative. this is unlike the direct elections of representatives form, in which discussion is mediated by mass media (campaigning), and unlike the mass parliament, in which discussion is mediated by the mass communications protocol. unlike sortition, everyone can have an influence.

mass parliament: -: media influence +: no indirection -: unskilled legislators (but ameliorated by presence of some skilled ones within civil society) (other pros/cons?? todo: look at referenda. but these may change with actual mass parl)

	  slogan: "the voice of the people"
	  	  in this form, the people as a whole speak directly. this is unlike sortition, where only a few of the people speak, and unlike either form of indirect representation.

direct elections of representatives: -: media ~: medium amount of indirection +: skilled legislators ~: medium simple

       slogan: "accurately represents the people"
       	       in this form, unlike indirect hierarchial representation, the ideological composition of the representative body is guaranteed to closely match that of the people. sortition can't be said to really "represent" the people; the members of that body are supposed to do what they think is best, not speak for others. the mass parliament might be the voice of the people, but it is unclear what distortions will be introduced into that voice by way of the mass communications protocol.

hierarchial indirect representation (the "senate" above): maybe single term limit to control the "top-down" problem? secret ballots? mb "parties/powerful candidates may appeal directly to voters via media anyway" could be prevented w/ single term limit? or just outright forbid a voluntary constituency to advertise itself in terms of who it will elect at a higher level, or to tie its rep's hands; reverse wave of timing of elections (i.e. first lowest level elects; then next lowest level; etc; so that highest level election is at the end of the cycle, right before the lowest level reelects; or same, but transpose each pair, i.e. if level 1 is top and 6 is lowest, 6,4,5,2,3,1)

there are 19*70 = 1330 people in the senate and the top tier of the undersenate. so these ppl are about half as powerful than congresspeople in the U.S.. Such people have a limit of 5 terms. So this is sorta like a limit of 2.5 terms in the U.S., or 10 years; or 6 years except for the P.M.

notes:

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 35, No. 2, May 2007 Abkhazia: Patronage and Power in the Stalin Era Timothy Blauvelt

Patrons and Clients The patron­ client model concentrates on how members of a hierarchy are bound into factional entities through personal ties. These factional entities, or patronage net- works, are used by leaders to consolidate their power and by clients to gain power. Client relationships can range from outright nepotism to loose alliances based on shared interests. The defining characteristic, however, is the exchange of services between patron and client, personal loyalty and support for the patron in return for tenure in office and promotion (and all of the benefits that accompany official pos- itions) for the client.1 In a phenomenon that Andrew Walder refers to as the "unintended social conse- quences of the party's ideological orientation," in Communist Party states the Party can gain loyalty and ideological adherence by giving preferential treatment to officials and other individuals at various levels of the hierarchy. The standard mode of exercis- ing authority in such systems requires, in turn, the cultivation of stable networks: . . .[P]arty branches develop stable networks of loyal clients, who exchange their loyalty and support for preference in career opportunities and other rewards. The result is a highly institutionalized network of patron­client relations that is maintained by the party and is integral to its rule: a clientelist system in which public loyalty to the party and its ideology is mingled with personal loyalties between party branch officials and their clients.2 As both Walder and Sheila Fitzpatrick emphasize, patron­ client relations in Communist states are unlike those in other kinds of system because of the nearly total control by the government over resources and their distribution--a government and state based around the reality of deficit. Unlike other political systems, in the Stalinist state the government (1) was the official distributor of goods and had a near-monopoly on their production, (2) was nearly the only employer of citizens, and (3) continuously tried to regulate the lives of its citizens, through the demand for endless documents and written positions without which functioning in normal life became impossible.3 Everything necessary and desirable in daily life was avail- able only through interaction with government: trade, travel, finding an apartment, going to university, getting married, etc. The extent to which the patron­ client relationship formed the basis of political authority from the top down is a recurring theme in the literature on political decision making and elite recruitment during the Stalin era. The essence of Stalin's approach to political control was the manipulation of the formal and informal structures of the government and Party apparatus to create and maintain a bureaucratic base for the leader's authority, a system referred to by Robert V. Daniels as the "circular flow of power."4 This system was formalized by the decision of the 8th Party Conference of 1919 to give the central Party hierarchy primacy over local Party organizations and Stalin's systematization of the center's ability to direct the appointment of local Party secretaries. In this way, the center (and Stalin as the General Secretary) could control the process that confirmed the leader's own authority.5 Stalin's power rested on his authority to "recommend" candidates for local Party offices, to influence upcoming cadres through the nomenklatura system, to get rid of unsatisfactory clients through the use of "party discipline," to rotate client assignments between the center and the regions, and to send central elites to the provinces to deal with problems. The local clients, in turn, used their local authority and networks to ensure the required outcomes in elections to Party congresses that in turn supported the General Secretary.6

13. The term "circular flow of power" was coined by Robert V. Daniels in "Soviet politics since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, ed., The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin (New York: Van Nostrand -- Reinhold, 1971): 20. Daniels had developed the basic interpretation at some length more than a decade earlier in his The conscience of the Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), and similar views had been elaborated by numerous scholars such as Merle Fainsod and Leonard Schapiro. -- http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe1780.html

attributes of the 4 houses

	   	   	      	  	      direct demo   pr  indirect hier rep	sortitioneveryone can influence		      	      	     + + + - personal discussion (anti "knee-jerk") - + + + expertise					     - + + - no large groups/communications media		     - - + + no campaigns		   		   	     + - - + real people (opposite of "expertise") + - - + transparency	    	      	 		     + ~ - + lack of long-term internal politics		     + ~ - + tried-and-true					     - + - + secret ballots					     ~ - - + not pre-polarized				     + ~ - +

pre-polarized: a group of representatives, each one selected by groups of like-minded voters, is called "pre-polarized" in that the representatives chosen will to each have a high degree of ideologically committment to their positions, more so than the average member of the public

~: * pr is pretty transparent, but you have a have got a bunch of expert political operators in the same room, so maybe it won't turn out as transparent as hoped * pr doesn't in itself have LT internal politics, but it will be greatly influenced by the political parties, which do * direct demo has secret ballots for individuals, but you can see which way your proxy voted your vote, so the holders of proxy votes can't secretly vote those proxies * the pr part of pr will elect committed ideologues, but the condorcet part will elect centrists

y'know, mb it's dumb to have the size of the legislatures vary with population size. the socializing and collaboration of the people on top doesn't similarly scale (well, with technology it might though..). so perhaps the size should be fixed. i guess we want a size as small as possible (b/c ideally you want everyone to be able to have in-depth one on one discussions with everyone else, and to grow to understand everyone else's positions), yet big enough that the group won't become, socially, a single small group (b/c then groupthink will happen more --- the PM + cabinet can be a small group, though). i'm guessing that 12 is small enough to become a single small group. so how about 17 (the next prime after 12 -- it's good to have odd numbers, but i have no particular reason for picking primes, but they're neat so why not)? so, each of the three legislatures involving people are 17. remembering that the foreign legislatures were half the size (b/c there we DID want a small group), and rounding down to the nearest prime (or, heck, to the nearest odd number -- same answer in this case), we get 8.5->7.

so, 1/17 is about 6 percent, and 1/7 is about 15 percent, so in theory factions as small as 6% will be represented domestically, and factions as small as 15% foreign-ly. in fact we can expect about 1/3 (i just made that number up) of each legislature to not do a good job of representing a faction (even before accounting for the Condorcet series winners within the Loring PR legislature), so we have about 11 "representative" domestic guys and 5 "representative" foreign guys. this gives us factional sizes of 9% and 20% respectively. for comparison, a search for "libertarian party percent" on google yields #1 hit http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa580.pdf , which claims about 9-13% libertarians (by sentiment, not party affiliation) (i can't quickly find a similar statistic for the U.S. green party). ross perot got about 19% in 1992 and 8% in 1996 (but remember, he lost a lot by dropping out mid-stream in 1992). so, we can expect that small parties may have to fight to be represented in these bodies, although it will be possible. which sounds about right -- i'm a little uncomfortable with how large the minimal factional sizes are, but that's good, since i think it's really really important to minimize group sizes.

so, there's 3*17 = 51 domestic legislators, and 7*3 = 21 foreign = 72 total legislators on Capitol Hill. small enough that:

• the 51 domestic legislators will be able to get acquainted with each other
• the 21 foreign legislators form a medium-size group
• the total 72 is small enough that professional politicians will be able to get acquainted with everybody, although it is too many for ordinary people to keep track of

nonrenewable 15-year terms for all judges. thx to http://www.amoreperfectconstitution.com/23_proposals.htm

ok i think i've been successfully propagandized that range voting is better than condorcet, for single-winner elections. since the problem withapproval/range voting seems to be that you can't choose your strategy until you know what others will be doing, how about 7 rounds of range voting (results are added) when small bodies vote? also, it seems like the broad range will make that problem worse, so how about allowing only 0,1,2, blank=1 with 1/2 quorum.

in small groups, range voting can go by "3 in a row" needed to win -- but what about instability? mb decay...

i sort of buy that asset voting is corrupting. the counterargument is that if you can buy a candidate in asset voting, you can buy the same candidate in another system (in the other system, they will still be elected, but they will secretly be under your control). but the counter-counter-argument is (1) in another system, you can't trust that they'll continue to follow your directions for their entire term of office, (2) there are other benefits to actually being elected besides the benefits of affecting policy; for instance, being in the news. in other systems, this can't be bought by corrupting a small group of people; in asset voting, it can.

also, asset voting is annoyingly indirect. also, the hier senate already provides some form of asset voting.

hier senate elections should be held n time more frequently than others, because due to the reverse staggered propagation, it will take n cycles for the popular will to bubble up -- with a 1/n cycle period (for instance, 1 per 1.33 yrs rather than 1 every 4 years), it will lag by exactly one std cycle.

recall that the formulas for calculating senate structure are:

k = (log(n)/log(S) - 1 - L)/sum(1:L)

s3 = S.^(1+k*(L - 3)) s2 = S.^(1+k*(L - 2)) s1 = S.^(1+k*(L - 1)) s0 = S.^(1+k*(L - 0))

code for calculating group sizes is in file govmt_size.m, and code for generating a report of interesting sizes is in file govmt_scale.m.

reports: P = 7

out of date for when intermediate layer added

Report on points of discontinuity

PR_thresh = 7 senate_thresh = 49 sortition_thresh = 8103 senate_layer_3_thresh = 8886110 senate_layer_4_thresh = 7.2005e+10

n= 7 no PR house no senate no sortition house

n= 8 PR size= 3 PR external relations size= 1 no senate no sortition house

n= 49 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

warning: division by zero warning: division by zero n= 50 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 8103 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1157 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 2701 no sortition house

n= 8104 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 group size in allsenate layer 0= 57 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 134 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 8886110 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 group size in allsenate layer 0= 6128 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 14300 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 8886111 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 27 group size in allsenate layer 1= 108 group size in allsenate layer 0= 425 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 143 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 993 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= -1009544695 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 123 group size in allsenate layer 1= 2174 group size in allsenate layer 0= 38333 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 93 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 2884 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 89445 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= -1009544694 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 4 group size in allsenate layer 4= 7 group size in allsenate layer 3= 32 group size in allsenate layer 2= 148 group size in allsenate layer 1= 683 group size in allsenate layer 0= 3146 external relations group size in allsenate layer 4= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 21 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 148 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1043 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 7342 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

Report on points of PR group size increase

n= 8 PR size= 3 PR external relations size= 1 no senate no sortition house

n= 10 PR size= 3 PR external relations size= 1 no senate no sortition house

n= 26 PR size= 5 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

Report of sample sizes

small_graduate_program = 30 my_elementary_school_class = 65 active_debian_voters = 400 my_high_school_class = 600 one_thousand = 1000 debian_developers = 1900 UCSD_graduate_students = 2500 san_diego_population = 1200000 illinois_population = 12000000 texas_population = 22000000 us_midwest_population = 66000000 us_population = 350000000 earth_current_population = 6.0000e+09 estimated_peak_pop = 1.0000e+10 estimated_peak_pop_times_100 = 1.0000e+12 n= 30 PR size= 5 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 65 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 9 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 21 no sortition house

n= 400 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 57 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 133 no sortition house

n= 600 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 85 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 199 no sortition house

n= 1000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 142 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 333 no sortition house

n= 1900 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 271 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 633 no sortition house

n= 2500 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 357 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 833 no sortition house

n= 1200000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1613 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 3764 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 12000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 28 group size in allsenate layer 1= 119 group size in allsenate layer 0= 494 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 21 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 158 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1154 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 22000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 32 group size in allsenate layer 1= 146 group size in allsenate layer 0= 670 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 24 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 194 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1563 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 66000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 38 group size in allsenate layer 1= 211 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1160 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 28 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 280 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 2708 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 350000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 50 group size in allsenate layer 1= 368 group size in allsenate layer 0= 2672 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 38 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 488 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 6236 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 1705032704 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 81 group size in allsenate layer 1= 949 group size in allsenate layer 0= 11065 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 61 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1259 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 25819 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 1410065408 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 88 group size in allsenate layer 1= 1126 group size in allsenate layer 0= 14285 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 66 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1493 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 33333 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= -727379968 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 4 group size in allsenate layer 4= 7 group size in allsenate layer 3= 41 group size in allsenate layer 2= 251 group size in allsenate layer 1= 1504 group size in allsenate layer 0= 9013 external relations group size in allsenate layer 4= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 27 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 251 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 2298 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 21031 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

Combined report: P= 7

n= 18 PR size= 5 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 37 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 49 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

warning: division by zero warning: division by zero n= 50 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 65 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 9 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 21 no sortition house

n= 101 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 14 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 33 no sortition house

n= 145 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 48 no sortition house

n= 197 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 28 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 65 no sortition house

n= 257 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 36 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 85 no sortition house

n= 400 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 57 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 133 no sortition house

n= 600 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 85 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 199 no sortition house

n= 1000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 142 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 333 no sortition house

n= 1900 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 271 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 633 no sortition house

n= 2500 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 357 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 833 no sortition house

n= 8103 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1157 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 2701 no sortition house

n= 8104 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 group size in allsenate layer 0= 57 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 134 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 1200000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1613 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 3764 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 8886110 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 group size in allsenate layer 0= 6128 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 14300 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 8886111 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 27 group size in allsenate layer 1= 108 group size in allsenate layer 0= 425 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 143 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 993 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 12000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 28 group size in allsenate layer 1= 119 group size in allsenate layer 0= 494 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 21 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 158 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1154 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 22000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 32 group size in allsenate layer 1= 146 group size in allsenate layer 0= 670 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 24 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 194 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1563 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 66000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 38 group size in allsenate layer 1= 211 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1160 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 28 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 280 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 2708 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 350000000 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 50 group size in allsenate layer 1= 368 group size in allsenate layer 0= 2672 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 38 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 488 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 6236 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 1705032704 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 81 group size in allsenate layer 1= 949 group size in allsenate layer 0= 11065 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 61 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1259 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 25819 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= 1410065408 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 88 group size in allsenate layer 1= 1126 group size in allsenate layer 0= 14285 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 66 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1493 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 33333 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= -1009544695 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 group size in allsenate layer 2= 123 group size in allsenate layer 1= 2174 group size in allsenate layer 0= 38333 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 93 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 2884 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 89445 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= -1009544694 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 4 group size in allsenate layer 4= 7 group size in allsenate layer 3= 32 group size in allsenate layer 2= 148 group size in allsenate layer 1= 683 group size in allsenate layer 0= 3146 external relations group size in allsenate layer 4= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 21 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 148 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1043 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 7342 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

n= -727379968 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 senate layers= 4 group size in allsenate layer 4= 7 group size in allsenate layer 3= 41 group size in allsenate layer 2= 251 group size in allsenate layer 1= 1504 group size in allsenate layer 0= 9013 external relations group size in allsenate layer 4= 3 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 27 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 251 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 2298 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 21031 sortition size= 7 sortition external relations size= 3

for P=17, we have: small_graduate_program = 30 my_elementary_school_class = 65 active_debian_voters = 400 my_high_school_class = 600 one_thousand = 1000 debian_developers = 1900 UCSD_graduate_students = 2500 san_diego_population = 1200000 illinois_population = 12000000 texas_population = 22000000 us_midwest_population = 66000000 us_population = 350000000 earth_current_population = 6.0000e+09 estimated_peak_pop = 1.0000e+10 estimated_peak_pop_times_100 = 1.0000e+12

Combined report: P= 17

n= 18 PR size= 5 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 37 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 65 PR size= 9 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 101 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 145 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 7 no senate no sortition house

n= 197 PR size= 15 PR external relations size= 7 no senate no sortition house

n= 257 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 no senate no sortition house

n= 289 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 no senate no sortition house

n= 290 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 17 group size in allsenate layer 0= 17 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 41 no sortition house

n= 400 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 17 group size in allsenate layer 0= 23 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 57 no sortition house

n= 600 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 17 group size in allsenate layer 0= 35 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 85 no sortition house

n= 1000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 17 group size in allsenate layer 0= 58 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 142 no sortition house

n= 1900 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 17 group size in allsenate layer 0= 111 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 271 no sortition house

n= 2500 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 17 group size in allsenate layer 0= 147 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 357 no sortition house

n= 8103 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 17 group size in allsenate layer 0= 476 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1157 no sortition house

n= 8104 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 17 group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 group size in allsenate layer 0= 23 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 57 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 1200000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 17 group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 group size in allsenate layer 0= 664 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1613 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 8886110 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 17 group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 group size in allsenate layer 0= 2523 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 6128 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 8886111 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 17 group size in allsenate layer 2= 37 group size in allsenate layer 1= 80 group size in allsenate layer 0= 175 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 27 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 108 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 425 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 12000000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 17 group size in allsenate layer 2= 38 group size in allsenate layer 1= 89 group size in allsenate layer 0= 203 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 28 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 119 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 494 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 22000000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 17 group size in allsenate layer 2= 43 group size in allsenate layer 1= 108 group size in allsenate layer 0= 275 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 32 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 146 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 670 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 66000000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 17 group size in allsenate layer 2= 51 group size in allsenate layer 1= 157 group size in allsenate layer 0= 477 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 38 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 211 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1160 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 350000000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 17 group size in allsenate layer 2= 68 group size in allsenate layer 1= 274 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1100 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 50 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 368 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 2672 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 6000000000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 17 group size in allsenate layer 2= 109 group size in allsenate layer 1= 706 group size in allsenate layer 0= 4556 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 81 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 949 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 11065 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

n= 10000000000 PR size= 17 PR external relations size= 7 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 17 group size in allsenate layer 2= 119 group size in allsenate layer 1= 837 group size in allsenate layer 0= 5882 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 7 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 88 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1126 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 14285 sortition size= 17 sortition external relations size= 7

small_graduate_program = 30 my_elementary_school_class = 65 active_debian_voters = 400 my_high_school_class = 600 one_thousand = 1000 debian_developers = 1900 UCSD_graduate_students = 2500 san_diego_population = 1200000 illinois_population = 12000000 texas_population = 22000000 us_midwest_population = 66000000 us_population = 350000000 earth_current_population = 6.0000e+09 estimated_peak_pop = 1.0000e+10 estimated_peak_pop_times_100 = 1.0000e+12

Combined report: P= 11

n= 18 PR size= 5 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 37 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 65 PR size= 9 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 101 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 121 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 122 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 11 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 24 no sortition house

n= 145 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 13 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 28 no sortition house

n= 197 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 17 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 39 no sortition house

n= 257 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 23 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 51 no sortition house

n= 400 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 36 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 80 no sortition house

n= 600 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 54 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 120 no sortition house

n= 1000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 90 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 200 no sortition house

n= 1900 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 172 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 380 no sortition house

n= 2500 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 227 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 500 no sortition house

n= 8103 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 11 group size in allsenate layer 0= 736 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1620 no sortition house

n= 8104 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 11 group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 group size in allsenate layer 0= 36 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 80 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 1200000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 11 group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1026 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 2258 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 8886110 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 11 group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 group size in allsenate layer 0= 3900 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 8580 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 8886111 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 11 group size in allsenate layer 2= 32 group size in allsenate layer 1= 93 group size in allsenate layer 0= 270 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 24 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 121 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 596 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 12000000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 11 group size in allsenate layer 2= 33 group size in allsenate layer 1= 102 group size in allsenate layer 0= 314 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 25 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 133 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 692 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 22000000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 11 group size in allsenate layer 2= 37 group size in allsenate layer 1= 125 group size in allsenate layer 0= 426 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 28 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 163 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 938 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 66000000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 11 group size in allsenate layer 2= 44 group size in allsenate layer 1= 181 group size in allsenate layer 0= 738 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 34 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 236 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1624 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 350000000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 11 group size in allsenate layer 2= 59 group size in allsenate layer 1= 316 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1700 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 45 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 412 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 3741 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 6000000000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 11 group size in allsenate layer 2= 94 group size in allsenate layer 1= 817 group size in allsenate layer 0= 7041 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 72 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1062 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 15491 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 10000000000 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 11 group size in allsenate layer 2= 103 group size in allsenate layer 1= 968 group size in allsenate layer 0= 9090 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 79 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1259 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 20000 sortition size= 11 sortition external relations size= 5

small_graduate_program = 30 my_elementary_school_class = 65 active_debian_voters = 400 my_high_school_class = 600 one_thousand = 1000 debian_developers = 1900 UCSD_graduate_students = 2500 san_diego_population = 1200000 illinois_population = 12000000 texas_population = 22000000 us_midwest_population = 66000000 us_population = 350000000 earth_current_population = 6.0000e+09 estimated_peak_pop = 1.0000e+10 estimated_peak_pop_times_100 = 1.0000e+12

Combined report: P= 13

n= 18 PR size= 5 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 37 PR size= 7 PR external relations size= 3 no senate no sortition house

n= 65 PR size= 9 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 101 PR size= 11 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 145 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 169 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 no senate no sortition house

n= 170 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 13 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 34 no sortition house

n= 197 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 15 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 39 no sortition house

n= 257 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 19 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 51 no sortition house

n= 400 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 30 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 80 no sortition house

n= 600 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 46 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 120 no sortition house

n= 1000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 76 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 200 no sortition house

n= 1900 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 146 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 380 no sortition house

n= 2500 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 192 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 500 no sortition house

n= 8103 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 1 group size in allsenate layer 1= 13 group size in allsenate layer 0= 623 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1620 no sortition house

n= 8104 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 13 group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 group size in allsenate layer 0= 31 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 20 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 80 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 1200000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 13 group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 group size in allsenate layer 0= 868 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 106 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 2258 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 8886110 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 2 group size in allsenate layer 2= 13 group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 group size in allsenate layer 0= 3300 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 207 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 8580 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 8886111 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 13 group size in allsenate layer 2= 33 group size in allsenate layer 1= 88 group size in allsenate layer 0= 229 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 24 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 121 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 596 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 12000000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 13 group size in allsenate layer 2= 35 group size in allsenate layer 1= 97 group size in allsenate layer 0= 266 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 25 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 133 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 692 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 22000000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 13 group size in allsenate layer 2= 39 group size in allsenate layer 1= 119 group size in allsenate layer 0= 360 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 28 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 163 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 938 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 66000000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 13 group size in allsenate layer 2= 47 group size in allsenate layer 1= 171 group size in allsenate layer 0= 624 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 34 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 236 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 1624 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 350000000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 13 group size in allsenate layer 2= 62 group size in allsenate layer 1= 299 group size in allsenate layer 0= 1439 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 45 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 412 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 3741 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 6000000000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 13 group size in allsenate layer 2= 100 group size in allsenate layer 1= 772 group size in allsenate layer 0= 5958 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 72 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1062 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 15491 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

n= 10000000000 PR size= 13 PR external relations size= 5 senate layers= 3 group size in allsenate layer 3= 13 group size in allsenate layer 2= 109 group size in allsenate layer 1= 916 group size in allsenate layer 0= 7692 external relations group size in allsenate layer 3= 5 external relations group size in allsenate layer 2= 79 external relations group size in allsenate layer 1= 1259 external relations group size in allsenate layer 0= 20000 sortition size= 13 sortition external relations size= 5

post-hoc justification for prime number of group members: you will never have m factions of n members each on any given issue; one faction will always have a plurity

     the limit on Cabinet size is in order to ensure that the legislature and the public can keep track of all ministers. for instance, in the U.S., the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security are highest-profile; it would be desirable if the Cabinet-level positions were only a few more than this so that there was more accountability. The max number of ministers occurs when the group size maxes out at 17/7, and is 8 (domestic) + 3 (foreign) = 11. By contrast, the U.S. has 21 such positions.
     the limitation that the PM/FM exercise power through the Cabinet prevents the circumvention of the purpose of the Cabinet via the creation of a zillion executive agencies like in the U.S. The PM/FM can still decide policy because they can fire the ministers, however a minister who disagrees can always resign, which may be a big deal because many ministers are high profile.
     the submajority vote serves two purposes. first, it forces the PM/FM to build a coalition with at least 40% support, at least initially (after they have some confirmed ministers, later on they can fire some and reassign portfolios to the others without legislative approval). second, it raises the profile of the ministers, making them more independent of the PM/FM. third, it encourages the PM/FM to build a majority coalition if possible, because otherwise the fact that a majority of the legislative body voted against their choice will be glaringly apparent.

the effect is that a majority which is not quite strong enough to win in the High Council has an incentive to try to win in the Undercouncil by getting its members to negotiate with partisans from other factions. this may lead to compromises and greater understanding. the downside is that it allows another route for majoritarian force (i.e. by taking advantage of the statistics that sometimes the counselmembers from other factions will happen to agree with the majority anyways; therefore the votes in the Undersenate dd will be gerrymandered, since it requires a consensus to vote no as well as yes in the Undersenate dd). Council deliberations are private, except for the High Council, but resolutions of councils are signed by everyone who voted for them (i.e. consensus-2 names).

by a supersupermajority vote, the legislature may make a single, specific exception to the constitution. this exception cannot have the effect of making it easier to amend or to take exception to the constitution. an exception is not counted towards text limit for example, making an exception to the requirements for amending the constitution for the purpose of amending it 'just once' isn't allowed! for example, if the legislature wants to temporarily go over the text limit, it can do so by first passing an Exception

initiative constitutional referendum: requires 33% of the number of votes cast in the previous election as signatures. this is ridiculously difficult by design; usually the dd house is supposed to serve in place of the "initiative referendum" process -- members should use the process provided by that house to directly introduce proposals. the initiative constitutional referendum is only provided as a last-ditch measure in cases all 3 houses, including the dd house, because corrupted in some way -- for example if organized crime buys 1/3 of the votes in the dd, intimidates 1/3 of the people into joining their constituencies in the councils, and bribes 1/3 of the senate; then this procedure provides a way to change the constitution with the support of 3/4 of the voters by secret ballot. the point is that voting by secret ballot, without a participatory debate, is the most resistant to corruption, but the least deliberative, of all of these approaches.

	   diagram: a simple diagram of the structure of the state can be drawn as follows. draw a diamond. draw a horizontal line in the middle of it, connecting the two middle vertices. draw a vertical line from the center of that line up to the top vertex. draw a vertical line coming up off the top, like an antenna. now embolden or highlight or color the top three vertices of the diamond. now you should have a diamond, with an upside down T inside of the top half of the diamond, and an antenna on top of it. the three exterior vertices of the T are emboldened.
	   	    the interpretation is as follows. each of the 6 total vertices represents an entity. the 3 bold vertices represent the legislative entities. the lines represent control of a non-legislative entity by one or more legislative entities. 
		    	the top vertex of the diamond represents the people, and the popular house. the two middle vertices of the diamond represent the council and the senate. the vertex in the middle of the diamond, controlled by the previous three, represents the constitutional court and the office of procedure. the bottom vertex of the diamond, controlled by the council and senate, represents the administration. the topmost vertex, controlled by the people, represents the tribunes. 
			note: it doesn't have meaning in the diagram, but if you like, you can draw a smiley face in the empty space in the bottom of the diamond.

echo '----' > /tmp/delimit.txt; cat bylaws.txt /tmp/delimit.txt enact.txt amend.txt /tmp/delimit.txt forum.txt /tmp/delimit.txt simplifiedForumRules.txt /tmp/delimit.txt forumRules.txt /tmp/delimit.txt electBoard.txt /tmp/delimit.txt councils.txt /tmp/delimit.txt delegatePyramid.txt /tmp/delimit.txt boardRules.txt /tmp/delimit.txt executive.txt executiveTeam.txt quasiIndepenentAgency.txt /tmp/delimit.txt highCourt.txt chair.txt parliamentarians.txt selectionOfJudgesAndParliamentarians.txt /tmp/delimit.txt /tmp/delimit.txt groupSizes.txt electoralCycle.txt budget.txt internalExternal.txt franchise.txt partyDiscipline.txt majorContract.txt noMoney.txt rights.txt orderOfPrecedence.txt rank.txt electingRecallableDelegate.txt removal.txt renew.txt rangeVoting.txt reweightedRangeVoting.txt termLimits.txt transparency.txt tieHands.txt voteTrading.txt voteThresholds.txt /tmp/delimit.txt glossary.txt > singlePage.txt