notes-groupDecisionMaking-decentralismCentralismCentripetalism

Notes on http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/files/2012/01/Normative-Models-of-Democratic-Governance-Decentralism-Centralism-and-Centripetalism.pdf by Gerring, Thacker, Moreno.

" Why are some democratic nations better governed than others? What kind of institutions promote better social outcomes? This paper outlines two normative models of democratic governance, decentralism and centralism. It then proposes an alternative model, centripetalism, which proposes that good democratic governance arises from institutions that successfully meld two goals: authority and inclusion. Democratic institutions work best when they bring together a wide array of diverse interests into a single locus of effective authority. In practical terms, we suggest that unitarism, parliamentarism and proportional representation together promote these goals. An empirical test of the impact of a variable combining historical measures of these three institutions on six indicators of governance across the world suggests that centripetal institutions promote good governance. "

" Since that time, work on the subject of democratic governance has oscillated between two ideal- types, a decentralist paradigm and a centralist paradigm. According to the first, good government arises from institutions that are diffuse and decentralized, where multiple veto points check the accrual of power in any single source. According to the second, good government arises (within a democratic framework) wherever power is effectively centralized in the hands of a single party, thus establishing a system of effective accountability at all levels of government. "

"... centripetal , proposes that good governance within a democratic framework arises from institutions that successfully meld two goals, authority and inclusion . Specifically, political 1 Pensee #870 (Pascal 1958: 261). 4 institutions should work best when they maximize centralized authority and the inclusion of diverse interests, ideas, and identities. "

" The decentralist paradigm is by no means new. In western thought, the idea may be traced back to early attempts to constrain the abuse of political authority. Commonly cited exemplars include Greece and Rome in the classical age and the Italian, Swiss, and Dutch polities in the early modern era. "

separation of powers:

" 5 ...the American Revolution, a revolution motivated by Old Whig principles. 6 As the British polity became increasingly centralized a new polity appeared that embodied the decentralist ideal in a much more explicit fashion. The US Constitution wrote decentralist principles into the country’s fundamental law, and the F ederalist P apers provided an interpretive catechism to accompany that law. If ever a country was founded self- consciously according to the decentralist ideal, that country was the United States. Thus, over the past two centuries when we speak of decentralist political institutions we are usually referring to the institutions and the example of the United States. 7 "

"Among Old Whigs perhaps the most revered writer of all was William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England educated generations of British jurists. Blackstone’s interpretation of the English constitution would endure for several centuries (until Bagehot’s E nglish Constitution , discussed below). The key feature of this interpretation was the ‘mixed’ constitution, an idea derived from Aristotle. Blackstone explains: The legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to three distinct powers entirely independent of each other, first, the King; secondly, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, which is an aristocratical assembly of persons selected for their piety, their birth, their wisdom, their valour, or their property; and thirdly, the House of Commons, freely chosen by the people from among themselves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by different springs, and attentive to different interests, composes the British P arliament, and has the supreme disposal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power sufficient to repel any innovation which it shall think inexpedient or dangerous." 8 The theory of the mixed constitution, with all its parts in balance, was said to extend back to Anglo- Saxon England. 9

This notion led directly to the theory of the separation of powers, as articulated initially by Montesquieu and later by Madison. 1 0 “The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others...,” writes Madison in Federalist #51. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition... In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on society will admit.” 1 1

Putting together the work of Montesquieu, Madison, and countless other constitutionalists from the eighteenth century to the present, M.J. Vile arrives at what he calls a ‘pure doctrine’ of separate powers. It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the government be divided into three branches or departments, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. To each of these three branches there is a corresponding identifiable function of government, legislative, executive, or judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined to the exercise of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to be at the same time a member of more than one branch. In this way each of the branches will be a check to the others and no single group of people will be able to control the machinery of the State. 1 2

 Separate powers thus refers to the diffusion of power at national levels (or indeed at any single level of government). Federalism, a second critical theoretical component of decentralism, refers to the diffusion of power between levels of government. Federalism, like separate powers, is an ancient idea. 

Broadly interpreted, the federal idea may be traced back to city-state confederations in classical Greece, the medieval Hanseatic league, and the equally venerable Swiss confederation. "

 Õ If ever a country was founded self- consciously according to the decentralist ideal, that country was the United States. Thus, over the past two centuries when we speak of decentralist political institutions we are usually referring to the institutions and the example of the United States. 7 "  

"7 Switzerland, along with pre-modern polities in England, the Netherlands, and Northern Italy, are also occasional reference points. "

 "As a general definition, William Riker’s well-traveled statement will serve. “A constitution is federal,” writes Riker, “if 1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, and 2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and 3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.” 1 3"

" In the lineage of decentralism, and in present- day practice, one finds two quite different perspectives on the virtues of decentralization. The dominant strand, including Blackstone, Montesquieu and Madison, sees in decentralized institutions a mechanism to prevent direct popular rule, or at least to moderate its effects. A majoritarian system, it is feared, is prey to manipulation by unscrupulous leaders and envious masses bent on the redistribution of wealth. 1 4 A second strand, associated with Paine, Rousseau, and others of a Radical (or in present parlance, Left- wing) persuasion, perceive the decentralization of power as a mechanism bringing government closer to the people. Their assumption is that centralized power is always controlled by elites, whose interests run contrary to the masses. "

bayle: i would add a third reason: to allow experimentation in governance (evolution, trial and error)

 " Radicals share with their Establishment confreres a belief that government is mostly to be feared, rather than trusted. Both Madison and Paine see good government as equivalent to limited government.  "
 " Among twentieth-century writers decentralism takes a number of different forms, each with its own terminology, theoretical framework, and policy concerns. This far- ranging camp includes early group theorists; 1 7 British pluralists; 1 8 American pluralists; 1 9 writers in the public choice tradition, especially those oriented around the intertwined ideas of separate powers, fiscal federalism, veto points, and insulation; 2 0 Guillermo O’Donnell’s conception of horizontal accountability; 2 1 Arend Lijphart’s consensus model; 2 2 and certain renditions of principal-agency theory. 2 3 It is for the most part consonant with modern conservativism (i.e., nineteenth-century liberalism), as articulated by A.V. Dicey, Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, Herbert Spencer, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Ludwig von Mises. Despite their evident differences, all twentieth century decentralists agree with several core precepts — diffusion of power, broad political participation, and limits on governmental action.  " 

" Bad laws have little chance of enactment in a system biased heavily against change, where multiple groups possess an effective veto power over public policy. "

" What are the specific institutional embodiments of decentralism? Separate powers implies two elective lawmaking authorities as well as a strong and independent judiciary. F ederalism presumes the shared sovereignty of territorial units within the nation- state. Both also suggest a bicameral legislature to further divide power at the apex and to insure regional representation. In addition, the decentralist model seems to imply a written constitution, perhaps with enumerated individual rights and explicit restrictions on the authority of the central state, and strong local government. Most decentralists embrace the single-member district as a principle of electoral law, maximizing local-level accountability. There is disagreement over whether this should be supplemented by mechanisms to enhance intra-party democracy, e.g., open primaries or preferential- vote options. If we take the principle of decentralism literally we are led toward several additional institutional features: multiple elective offices, frequent elections (short terms), staggered terms of office, nonconcurrent elections, fixed-term elections (no possibility of premature dissolution), term limits, popular referenda, recall elections, decentralized party structures, independent agencies, and small political units. 25

25: Many of these institutional implications have been explored by Arend Lijphart (1984b, 1999). "

centralism

" The centralist paradigm may also be traced back to English antecedents in the seventeenth century — in this case to Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin, and the nascent concept of sovereignty. Arguably, the primordial theory of democratic governance is Hobbesian. The most important task of government is to prevent humans from killing each other. Keeping the peace is necessary if civil society is to persist, and is achievable only in a political system that monopolizes power in the hands of a single individual. Challenges to unitary sovereignty lead to discord and, at the limit, to civil war, as Hobbes himself witnessed. The sovereign’s will is thus a secret ally of good government, for a successful assertion of sovereignty produces a reign of tranquility. The stronger the sovereign, the stronger and more durable the peace."

" Hobbes did not expect the sovereign to perform good works — beyond suppressing rebellion, that is. In later centuries, the centralist ideal became more expansive. By the end of the nineteenth century it was possible to envision a sovereign who was at once supreme (for a limited time) and accountable. Walter Bagehot, who perhaps more than any other writer deserves to be credited as the theorist of democratic centralism, identified this new model of government in his classic work, The English Constitution , "

" For reform Whigs, Tories, and nineteenth-century Liberals including Burke, Peel, Disraeli, Gladstone, and Bagehot, strong government — personified in the bureaucracy and the cabinet — was a mechanism to resist popular pressures, restrain corruption, and limit the extravagances of monarchy. A quite different motivation could be found among social liberals such as T.H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse, Graham Wallas, and the Webbs. 2 8 For the Fabians (aka New Liberals), strong government was a vehicle for social progress "

 " Thus, like decentralism, the centralist vision draws on two, radically different, perspectives. An aristocratic, conservative (‘Whig’) version of centralism sits beside an egalitarian, social- democratic (‘Fabian’) version. Both survive today. 29
 29: Samuel Huntington is an articulate exemplar of centralist conservatism (e.g., Huntington 1968, 1981; see also Crozier et al. 1975). Most contemporary social democrats are centralists in the Fabian tradition."

" American commentators, like Bagehot, noticed a divergence taking place on the two shores of the Atlantic, and were often critical of the American trajectory. 3 1 In later years, the Westminster model became the touchstone for a school of thought known as responsible party government, whose adherents deplored the lack of party strength and consequent lack of electoral accountability that seemed to characterize the American polity. 3 2 Today the centralist model, although rarely articulated in a self-conscious fashion, is attractive to scholars in a wide range of research traditions including economics and rational choice, 3 3 new institutionalism, 3 4 the welfare state and the developmental state, 3 5 and various critiques of interest group liberalism, porkbarrelling, side- payments, and political rents, evils commonly attributed to a fragmented (‘hyper- pluralist’) political structure. 36 36: Fiorina (1977), Lowi (1969), McConnell? (1966). We do not include Lijphart’s ‘majoritarian’ ideal-type since he does not look favorably on this form of government (Lijphart 1984b, 1999). "

 " F or these writers, the secret of good government is to be found in the centralization of political power (within a framework of democratic elections). This is usually understood in terms of unitary government (rather than federalism), parliamentarism (rather than presidentialism), a first-past-the-post electoral system, strong parties, two-party dominance, a hierarchical bureaucracy, an unwritten constitution, and a restrained judiciary. These, of course, are the hallmarks of the Westminster model. 37
 37: For the most part, we use the terms centralist and Westminster interchangeably. However, one other model of democratic centralism has attracted the attention of scholars in recent years. Fifth Republic France, in a marked departure from previous F rench republics, has managed to centralize political authority in the hands of a directly elected president, whose powers include the selection of the prime minister and the dissolution of parliament. The F rench president thus has considerably greater powers than the American president, under normal circumstances. The caveat is that in order to achieve this centralization it is necessary that parties have a strong electoral presence, a strong presence in the legislature, and party competition must also be reduced to two major parties or coalitions. Otherwise, the president and his appointed prime minister will be unable to muster consistent majorities in the legislature and thus will be forced into a situation not unlike that of presidents in other polities (e.g., in the US). ‘Cohabitation’ appears to be on the rise in recent decades; indeed, it may be a semi- permanent feature of the Fifth Republic. If so, the latter no longer serves as a paradigm of centralism. And even if not, we may doubt whether other polities, in societies less advanced and with shorter lineages of party competition, could achieve the requisite levels of party organization to assure that majorities in parliament regularly complement presidential victories. In short, as a general system of constitutional design (leaving aside the French experience) it seems that the French model of semi-presidentialism combined with single-member districts is unlikely to be as centralist as the Westminster model "

centripetalism

" As British politics evolved in the course of nineteenth century, a small group of high-minded (and high- born) reformers began to wrestle with the implications of a political system that centralized power in the hands of two political parties and, more alarmingly, in the hands of the person who happened to lead the majority party.

Dissent gradually crystallized around a set of reforms centered on the electoral system. Proportional representation (‘PR’) was the general remedy sought by a group of vociferous reformers across Europe including Leonard Courtney, Thomas Hare, Sir John Lubbock, and John Stuart Mill in England, Victor d’Hondt in Belgium, Eduard Hagenbach-Bischoff in Switzerland, and A. Sainte- Lague in France. 3 8 Their criticisms were varied, and not all would stand the scrutiny of later generations. But three points deserve mention here. F irst, P R reformers objected to the localist tendencies of the British electoral system, centered as it was on small (1-2 member) constituencies. A proper political system, they thought, should act in the general interest, not in the interests of particular constituencies. P R reformers were also bothered by the vulnerability of such a political system to the vagaries of popular opinion. Since elections in a Westminster system rested on the votes of a few electors in swing districts party leaders had to test the current of public opinion carefully before taking the initiative. This led, it was charged, to a populist style of leadership, one oriented more toward pleasing the electorate in the short- run than advancing its long- run interests. 3 9 Third, and most important, PR reformers objected to a system of election that effectively represented only two groups in parliament, and only one group in government. “In a really equal democracy,” wrote Mill, “every . . . section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. . . Man for man [the minority] would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest.” Indeed, Mill continued, “[d]emocracy, thus constituted, does not even attain its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of government in all cases to the numerical majority. It does something very different: it gives them to a majority of the majority, who may be, and often are, but a minority of the whole.” 4 0 In the wake of initiatives launched by Mill and other early protagonists, PR became a reform cause with global dimensions. "

"Many arguments were added to the arsenal, and a few subtracted. Perhaps the most important change in perspective concerned the reformers’ views of the role of political parties. While early PR enthusiasts were leery of the “machine” elements associated with organized parties and the consequent loss of member independence, later PR boosters turned the argument on its head. PR would magnify the strength of political parties, and this would be a good thing for democratic governance, for it would achieve the insulation from popular pressures that Mill and his cohort desired. Indeed, the operation of political parties under a PR system is quite different from its operation in a first-past-the-post electoral system. In the latter, party leaders cater to the median voter, small shifts of public opinion typically lead to great shifts in party control, and party leaders are therefore vulnerable. Not only do they risk losing office, and with it virtually all policymaking influence, but they also risk losing their place at the head of the party, for party losses are quite naturally blamed on the leadership. In PR systems, by contrast, party leaders can more easily ride out bad electoral weather. Secure in their leadership posts (since intra-party selection is generally controlled from above), secure from rapid alterations in the public mood (since they need only please a small contingent of hard- core supporters whose electoral support tends to be constant from election to election), and secure from the necessity of implementing an electoral mandate (since governments are formed after extensive periods of negotiation, and subsequent policymaking obscures party responsibility), party leaders approximate Mill’s ideal of an ‘instructed minority’ with long time- horizons. 4 1"

" The theory builds on the fundamental premise that good government results when political energies are focused towards the center. Two elements must be reconciled in order for this process of gathering- together to occur. Institutions must be inclusive — they must reach out to all interests, ideas, and identities (at least insofar as they are relevant to the issue at hand). And they must be authoritative — they must provide an effective mechanism for reaching agreement and implementing that agreement. "

" This is a problematic claim on the face of it. These two principles seem so radically opposed to one another that it is difficult to envision how a single institution, or set of institutions, could satisfy one criterion without sacrificing the other. ... Granted, if governance is conceptualized in the usual way, as an arena in which interests are fixed and politics a zero- sum competition, then the notion of reconciling inclusion and authority is polyannish. ... Our theory, however, supposes that interests are not primordial. ... In other words, the causal relationship between interests and institutions runs in both directions. Similarly, centripetalism supposes a positive-sum view of political power. Given the right mix of institutions, governance can be a win-win game. The movement ‘towards the center’ that we have described is plausible if we assume the plasticity of interests and the positive-sum nature of politics. Centripetal institutions foster consensus primarily by shaping the construction of interests. They are strong by virtue of the power they create, not by virtue of the power that they possess. 4 4 In its assumptions about interests and power, therefore, the centripetal model is quite different from both the centralist and decentralist models that have dominated work on this question since Hobbes and Rousseau. The authority of the centripetal state derives from its ability to bring together diverse groups and diverse perspectives under conditions of voluntary choice to a common meeting-ground, thus institutionalizing political conflict. The ‘strength’ of the centripetal state is gained through the strength of its popular appeal, its persuasive powers. Rather than a compromise position between inclusion and authority, we suggest that centripetal institutions actually reconcile these two principles, drawing the diverse strands of society together towards a single locus of sovereignty.

4 4 This creative, positive-sum view of power takes inspiration from the work of Hannah Arendt (1958). Our concern, in contrast to Arendt’s, is with politics as it occurs in the nation-state, rather than the polis, and in representative institutions, rather than face- to- face communities. For further discussion of the concept of power see Bell et al. (1969), Wrong (1979). "

" Centripetal institutions culminate in an authoritative decisionmaking process, one not easily waylaid by minority objections. 4 6 Institutions pull towards the center, offering incentives to participate and disincentives to defect. Voice, not vetoes is the motto of centripetalism. "

" How is this centripetal energy generated? We argue that under conditions of democratic rule three primary institutions are fundamental to the reconciliation of inclusion and authority: unitarism (no federalism), parliamentarism (no presidentialism), and list-PR (electoral systems that minimize intra- party choice while maximizing inter-party choice). Other, secondary institutions, follow more or less automatically from these factors and from the logic of the theory: weak constitutions (either un-written or ambiguously written so as to impose few limits on sovereignty), strong cabinets (though slightly less durable than in centralist polities), medium-strength committees within the legislature, strong party cohesion, the right of governments to dissolve the assembly, no term limits, few elective offices, congruent electoral cycles, closed processes of intra-party candidate selection, party-dominated elections, multi-party systems (more than two parties gaining significant representation in parliament), strong party organization (centralized, bounded), relatively centralized interest groups that are aligned (implicitly or explicitly) with the major political parties, no referenda (except at the instigation of the government), a restrained judiciary (nonetheless largely independent of partisan influence), and a strong, neutral, and relatively centralized bureaucracy. "

" Table 1: Paradigms of Governance, Elaborated and Contrasted DECENTRALISM CENTRALISM CENTRIPETALISM Federal Unitary Unitary Bicameral, symmetrical, and incongruent Unicameral, asymmetrical, or congruent Unicameral, asymmetrical, or congruent Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Electoral system: Single-member district or preferential vote Winner-take-all Party-list PR Constitution: Written, with explicit limits on sovereignty Weak, durable Unwritten or ambiguous; no explicit limits Unwritten or ambiguous; no explicit limits on sov. on sov. Strong, durable Strong, slightly less durable Committees: Strong Weak Medium-strength Party cohesion: Weak Strong Strong Dissolution: No (fixed terms) Yes Yes Term limits: Perhaps No No Elective offices: Many Few Few Election cycles: Incongruent Congruent Congruent Candidate selection: Open, diffuse Closed Closed Voting cues: Personal vote Party vote Party vote Campaigns: Media, interest groups, candidate organiz’s Parties and party leaders Parties and party leaders Party system: Two-party dominant Two-party dominant Multi-party Party organization: Weak, decentralized, porous Strong, centralized, bounded Strong, centralized, bounded Fragmented, nonpartisan Centralized, party-aligned Centralized, party-aligned Referenda: Possibly No (or only at instigation of leg.) No (or only at instigation of leg.) Judiciary: Activist, independent Restrained, independent Restrained, independent Multiple independent agencies Strong, neutral, relatively centralized Strong, neutral, relatively centralized Territorial sovereignty: Legislative branch: Executive: Cabinet: Party organization: Interest groups: Bureaucracy: "

" The theory of centripetalism stipulates that constitutional institutions should be unitary, parliamentary, and PR. Unitarism refers to a polity that has a central locus of sovereignty; it is both non-federal and non-bicameral — or, if there are two elective chambers, these houses are either asymmetrical or congruent (thus diluting the importance of a second chamber). Parliamentarism refers to a polity where the government is chosen by, and responsible to, the legislature; it is non- presidential. PR refers here to an electoral system where districts are multimember and voters choose among closed party lists. "

bayle: to contrast with system AC:

apathetic towards federal/unitary (e.g. AC is very abstract; the non-federal powers can't be specified without reference to an application); personally i suggest Federalism whenever possible Bicameral Parliamentary Electoral system: hierarchical delegation for the Board, score voting PR for the Chairs Constitution: Written, with explicit limits on sovereignty

cabinet: strong Committees: no Board committees prespecified because the Board is so small Party cohesion: uncertain, but probably intermediate. The party programme can be changed bottom-up via constituencies, but top-level decision-makers are insulated from direct popular votes. Dissolution: Yes Term limits: yes but only when applied to governments Elective offices: Few Election cycles: only one, for Chairs Candidate selection: open for chairs, N/A for hierarchical delegation Voting cues: i don't understand this criterion Campaigns: uncertain Party system: Multi-party Party organization: Weak, decentralized, porous Interest groups: Fragmented Referenda: continuous; the Forum is like a big invitation to referenda Judiciary: unclear, possibly activist "

If there is a continuum decentralized -> centripetal -> centralized, then AC falls in between decentralized and centripetal. Philosophically:

However, AC also believes that consensus should not be required in order to take actions that merely utilize the powers of government that have already been granted, and that in the absence of strong disagreement, the government currently in power should be able to efficiently set policy.